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In December, on a hillside near 
Grozny, I met with exhausted 
Chechen refugees while artillery 
shells rained down on the suburbs 
only a few kilometers away. Such 
experiences are a reminder that 
foreign policy is not merely 
concerned with impersonal 
forces. It concerns the lives of 
individual human beings – their 
needs, interests and rights. In fact 
it often concerns the most 
fundamental of all rights, the 
right to life.1  
                                                 
1
 Statement on Foreign and Security Affairs to the Parliament by Foreign Minister Knut Vollebæk, 20.1.2000 
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” The Norwegian people's deep respect for human worth means that the safeguarding and 
promotion of human rights is a cornerstone of all our policies.”2  
Norwegian governments throughout the 1990s consistently promoted an image of Norway as a 
“peace nation”, a human rights advocate and the United Nations best friend and supporter.3 In 
accordance with this notion, Norwegian Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal’s comments on the 
recent Russian military invasion of Chechnya, in early January 1995, were robust and highly 
critical. Boris Yeltsin, Russia’s first president and leader of a nascent democracy in Russia, had 
launched a full-scale war on one of Russia’s own autonomous republics in December 1994. 
This was unwelcome news that worried Norwegian authorities. Godal informed the Norwegian 
press that he had sent a letter to his Russian counterpart strongly condemning the Russian 
military invasion and the subsequent disregard of human rights in the small Chechen republic.4
However, Godal’s and other internationally expressed concerns and condemnations of 
Russian military action seemingly did not change Russian authorities’ approach to the 
situation. Opportunities to sanction Russia occurred several times during the 1990s. However, 
none of these were exploited.5 Norway’s succeeding governments, on their part, consistently 
rejected the use of measures or sanctions other than verbal criticism. Norway was also, 
throughout the period, just as consistent in its explicit recognition of Russian territorial 
integrity, which included Chechnya, and Russia’s right to fight terrorism within own borders.
Russo-Chechen peace treaties were signed in 1996 and 1997, however, these led in the 
end to little other than a hiatus between 1996 and 1999. A second war in Chechnya was 
initiated in 1999. The second war was officially declared over by Russian President Vladimir 
Putin in early 2001. However, due to constant armed activity in Chechnya, it has been difficult 
to proclaim the end of the second war, despite official Russian declarations. Since 1994 
thousands of people have been killed, and thousands more are still missing in the small 
republic. The Russo-Chechen conflict has overall received little attention in spite of being one 
                                                 
2
 Statement to the Parliament on human rights by Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal 10.10.1996; 
http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dokumentarkiv/regjeringen-brundtland-iii/ud/Taler-og-artikler-arkivert-
individuelt/1996/statement_to_the_storting_on_human.html?id=261849 (13.5.2010) 
3
 Even Lange, Helge Pharo and Øyvind Østerud (ed.), Vendepunkter i Norsk utenrikspolitikk: Nye internasjonale 
vilkår etter den kalde krigen [Turning points in Norwegian Foreign Affairs: New international conditions after the 
Cold War], Oslo 2009: 9-10. 
4
 «Tiltagende vestlig kritikk av Russland» [Increasing Western Criticism of Russia], Morgenbladet, 13.1.1995; 
«Utenriksminister Godal protesterer i Kreml» [Foreign Minister Godal protests in the Kremlin], NTB, 9.1.1995 
5
 James Hughes, Chechnya: From Nationalism to Jihad, London 2007: 131 
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of the gravest humanitarian situations of the 1990s and 2000s, not least in regards of the 
massive human rights violations.6 
The quest of the present thesis is to explain a possible discrepancy between Norwegian 
governments’ presentation of Norway as a “peace nation” and human rights advocate, versus 
Norway’s actual conduct in foreign affairs. This postulated discrepancy will be examined in 
light of how three succeeding Norwegian governments related to the Russo-Chechen conflict. 
Put in the form of an idiom: did Norway practice what it preached concerning human rights 
advocacy in relation to the Russo-Chechen conflict and its massive human rights violations? 
With this in mind, what kind of policy did the Norwegian government conduct towards the 
Russo-Chechen conflict throughout the 1990s until 2001, and why did Norway choose this 
approach?7 
WITH ATTENTION TO DETAIL 
Before providing a theoretical framework it can be useful to establish which factors dominated 
Norwegian foreign policy in general, and towards Russia in particular, in the 1990s. By doing 
this, it is possible to pose the question of what factors dominated Norwegian policy towards the 
Russo-Chechen conflict.8  
A White Paper headed by the Labour party’s Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg in 
1989-90, is often spotlighted in explaining Norwegian Foreign Policy in the 90s. The White 
Paper, Development trends in the international society and their effects on Norwegian foreign 
policy, sometimes referred to as was a defined strategy for Norwegian foreign policy in the 
upcoming years.9 A long list of national, regional, and global foreign policy and interests and 
aims followed.10 It purported that Norway should strive to initiate processes, to be active and 
creative, and have a facilitator role in peace-processes.11 The paper underlined the advantage of 
Norway being a small country without a colonial past, and other aspects of great powers 
deemed unfortunate in the 1990s international community.12  
                                                 
6
 Anne Marie Austbø (ed.), Whose Responsibility? Protection of Chechen internally displaced persons, asylum 
seekers and refugees. Report by the Norwegian Refugee Council, Oslo 2005: 12.  
7
 When Norway is used as actor in this thesis, Norway equals the Norwegian government.  
8
 The term policy is here used in a very general manner to describe the act of relating and reacting to the Russo-
Chechen conflict.  
9
 Olav Riste, Norway’s Foreign Relations: A History 2005: 284-285 
10
 Rolf Tamnes, Oljealder: 1965-1995, bd. 6 av Norsk Utenrikspolitisk historie [Oil Age: 1965-1995, vol. 6 of 
Norway’s Foreign Political History], Oslo 1997: 341-349; Riste 2005: 284-285. 
11
 Tamnes 1997: 341. 
12
 Hilde Henriksen Waage, ‘Norwegians? Who needs Norwegians?’ Explaining the Oslo Back Channel: Norway’s 
Political Past in the Middle East, Royal Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Evaluation Report 9, Oslo 2000: 
68; Tamnes, 1997: 341. 
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Norway was also engaged as peace facilitators in several processes in the 1990s and 
considered its engagements in many ways successful. It is almost possible to claim that some of 
the enthusiastic Norwegian participators were soaring on a “peace-high”.13 Jan Egeland’s claim 
that foreign policy had become Norway’s best export article was perhaps not all true, but 
efforts were clearly made in the spirit of the saying.14 Norwegian historian Rolf Tamnes has 
called this on peace and development engagement policy.15 The engagement policy can be 
characterized as an ethical foreign policy driven by idealism and value diplomacy, such as 
human rights activism, humanitarian aid, and environmental issues. The Norwegian 
peacemaking efforts can be seen as an attempt to find a place in the post-Cold War world. It 
had become less certain what kind of interests and position a small country like Norway had, 
and what strategies was best to promote a small country’s position in an international context.16 
The Norwegian MFA lost its explicit security political mandate it had been custodian of during 
the Cold War.17 However, by establishing a position as important peace facilitators, the 
Norwegian government, especially the MFA, earned itself a new and important mandate.18  
Uncertainties nonetheless characterized the situation in the 1990s. Qualms were linked 
to the new relations with a new version of NATO and the post-Soviet Russia in a reforming 
state. Norway was still firmly positioned within the alliance after NATO’s summit meeting in 
London in 1990. However, it was an unfamiliar situation for Norway that its allies no longer 
regarded the Northern areas and Norway itself with a security focus.19 Other areas were 
perceived more challenging by NATO, and the security concerns in the northern areas had to a 
large degree become local rather than international concerns.20 An additional momentum was 
that the Norwegian people had turned down membership in the European Union (EU) in a 
national referendum in 1994. This was the second time the Norwegians chose to remain outside 
                                                 
13
 «De sa vi ikke kunne klare det», NY TID, 15.6.2001. 
14
 Waage 2000: 68; «Norsk utenrikspolitikk selger», Aftenposten, 31.3.1995. 
15
 ”Engasjementspolitikken.”; Tamnes, 1997: 19, 344.  
16
 Janne Haaland Matlary, Verdidiplomati – kilde til makt? [Value diplomacy: A source to power] Makt- og 
demokratiutredningens rapportserie, Rapport 46, august 2002 
http://www.sv.uio.no/mutr/publikasjoner/rapp2002/Rapport46.html (13.5.2010) 
17
 Jon Harald Sande Lie, «Utvikling, frivillige organisasjoner og utenrikspolitikk»[Development, voluntary 
Organizations and Foreign Policy], in Birgitte Kjos Fonn, Iver B. Neumann and Ole Jacob Sending, Norsk 
utenrikspolitisk praksis: Aktører og prosesser[Norwegian Foreign PolicyPractice: Actors and Processes], Oslo 
2006: 138. 
18
 Hilde Henriksen Waage, «Fredspolitikk i Midtøsten», in Even Lange, Helge Pharo and Øyvind Østerud (ed.), 
Vendepunkter i norsk utenrikspolitikk: Nye internasjonale vilkår etter den kalde krigen[Turningpoints in 
Norwegian Foreign Affairs: New International conditions after the Cold War], Oslo 2009: 158-159. 
19
 Tamnes 1997: 138-139; Riste 2005: 228-229. 
20
 John Kristen Skogan, «Norsk sikkerhetspolitikk: En oversikt»[Norwegian Security Policy: An Overview], in 
Jon Hovi og Raino Malnes (ed.), Normer og Makt: Innføring i internasjonal politikk[Norms and Power: 
Introduction to International Politics], Oslo 2003: 43. 
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the European community. The first time was in 1972.21 Both of Norway’s immediate 
Scandinavian neighbours, Sweden and Denmark, joined the EU at this point. Norway feared 
being sidelined, as the EU was attempting to establish foreign policy coordination through the 
European Political Cooperation (EPC). The EPC aimed at revitalizing the Western European 
Union (WEU) as its defence and security arm in Europe. As a non-member of the EU Norway 
only obtained consultation arrangements with the EPC and associate membership of the 
WEU.22 
NORTHERN NEIGHBOURS IN A NEW ERA 
Three sets of factors have been distinguished as essential in Russo-Norwegian relations in the 
1990s. First, Russia’s relation to the West in general, and to NATO and USA in particular, 
affected Norway’s relation with Russia. A consequence of Norway’s NATO membership and 
the close security cooperation Norway has had with the USA since the Second World War. 
During the Cold War, the international framework was paramount to Russo-Norwegian 
relations. In Norway the political turnabout in Russia in the late eighties and early nineties led 
to a sort of euphoric feeling towards the Russians, as the final wrap up of Soviet communism 
altered the Norwegian view of Russia. The general Norwegian conception in the early nineties 
was that Norwegians and Russians could return to their natural and pre-Cold War relations.23 
The ideological change that occurred within Russia with the dissolution of the USSR did not 
necessarily change the essential international framework. Structural factors, such as Russia 
great power status and Norway’s membership in NATO, an alliance that Russia continued to 
recognize as an obstacle to own security interests, remained unchanged.24  
Second, Russo-Norwegian bilateral relations were affected by the Russian domestic 
situation. Russia experienced tendencies of a state in dissolution during the 1990s, due to huge 
economical problems and internal fractions. The struggle for political power, prestige and 
pressured resources often affected the surrounding world.25 
Third, the relations were affected by Norwegian policy in the high north. There were 
several issues where Norway and Russia was opposed to each other in the border region of the 
northern areas in both land and at sea. Among them was the Barents Sea, of massive 
                                                 
21
 Tamnes 1997: 147. 
22
 Ibid: 144. 
23
 Geir Hønneland, «Vårt bilde av Russerne»[Our perception of the Russians], i Lars Rowe and Geir 
Hønneland(edt.), Russlandsbilder: Nye debattinnlegg om naboskap i nordområdene, Bergen. 2007: 16. 
24
 Torunn Laugen, «Mot et kaldere klima? Utviklingen av det bilaterale forholdet mellom Norge og Russland på 
1990-tallet», Internasjonal politikk, 59, 1, 2001: 92 
25
 Laugen, 2001: 92 
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importance to both Norway and Russia, has been a disputed area for many decades. Fish and 
petroleum, Norway’s two main exports, are both linked to the sea. This has had, and still has, 
important implications for Norwegian foreign policy.26 Unlike the mainland border, established 
in 1826, the bilateral maritime boundary has been somewhat problematic defined and less 
consequent.27 The disagreement boiled down to diverging opinions on how to most properly 
delimitate the maritime borders. Norway wanted to use the median line, whilst Russia wanted 
to use a meridian based sector principle.28 They both favour the principle that will leave their 
own country the most area and resources.  
In the 1970s Norway and the Soviet Union had managed to reach some arrangement. In 
1978 they agreed on a so-called Grey Zone where they were responsible for their own vehicles 
and citizens; an area that was not accounted for, but considered an international free-zone.29  
Foreign Minister Thorvald Stoltenberg initiated a new approach to the northern areas 
through the Euro Arctic Barents Sea Region along with Russia, Sweden, and Finland.30 The 
Barents Region was officially inaugurated on 11 January 1993 through the signing of the 
Kirkenes-declaration.31 The main areas of co-operation were environment, student-exchange 
and promoting commerce. There were several strategies behind the project. Foremost to bring 
Russia closer into the European sphere and make the Northern area an interesting place to the 
rest of the world, also after the vigilance of the Cold War was gone.32 The governance of the 
fishing resources was kept within a Russo-Norwegian bilateral cooperation that had existed in 
more or less the same form since 1976.33  
The post-Cold War Russo-Norwegian relations in the high north were nevertheless 
characterized by uncertainty and unpredictability.34 The Norwegian authorities worked hard to 
establish a peaceful and cooperative link with the Russians in this new epoch. The Russian 
presidential candidate Boris Yeltsin was in Norway, as in other Western nations, celebrated as 
a good man and a hope for a possible Russian democracy. When Yeltsin won the elections, the 
                                                 
26
 Tore Nyhamar, «Norsk Utenrikspolitikk i en ny tid»[Norwegian Foreign Policy in a New Era], in Jon Hovi og 
Raino Malnes (ed.), Normer og Makt: Innføring i internasjonal politikk[Norms and Power: Introduction to 
International Politics], Oslo 2003: 43. 
27
 Daniela Büchten, Tatjana Dzjakson and Jens Petter Nielsen, Norge – Russland: Naboer gjennom 1000 år, Oslo. 
2004: 24.  
28 Tamnes, 1997: 291-293; Riste, 2001: 250. 
29 Tamnes, 1997: 300; Riste, 2001: 214-215, 224-225. 
30 Geir Hønneland, Barents-brytninger: Norsk nordområdepolitikk etter den kalde krigen[Barents waves: 
Norwegian High North Policy after the Cold War], Kristiansand 2005: 14.  
31 Tamnes 1997: 334-335. 
32 Ibid: 334-335. 
33 Ibid: 295, 332. 
34
 Riste 2005: 278. 
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expectations for his future achievements were running high.35 However, Yeltsin was soon on a 
warpath towards Russia’s own Parliament and towards the small mountain republic, Chechnya. 
Norway had many reasons to react and respond to the outburst of the Russo-Chechen 
armed conflict. It concerned security in its largest neighbouring state Russia, it occurred within 
an OSCE member state, and moreover the conflict caused violations of many of the universal 
values that Norway claimed it stood for and promoted.36 Nonetheless, Political Scientist Tore 
Nyhamar explicitly claims that Norwegian considerations for human rights were, in the course 
of the Russo-Chechen conflict, subordinated the fear of “falling out” with Russia over matters 
that did not directly concern Norway.37 
SOME THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES 
Russo-Norwegian relations are often analyzed in terms of basic realist thinking. Small Norway, 
with its estimated 4.5 million people cannot outrun its geography as neighbour to Russia, a 
regional great power. The bilateral relation between the two was, and still is, asymmetric, 
especially with regards to military capabilities and human resources. According to basic theory 
of realism the state is the most central actor in international politics. The world is also 
perceived as anarchical due to the lack of a superior global authority with executive power. A 
following realistic supposition is that the distribution of material power establishes states’ room 
for manoeuvre. Whereas a great power can do what it has the power to do, a small state accepts 
what it must accept. In this perspective a small state will always have to tread carefully in 
relations with great powers. Realism theory stresses military and economical capacities. A 
state’s capacity to maximize its own security and power through economic and military means 
is in this perspective decisive. Norway’s effort to balance the asymmetrical relation with Russia 
is apparent through the import of security through NATO and close relations with the USA.38  
An additional theoretical perspective is based on liberal theory of international 
relations, which stresses interstate integration and interdependence. This perspective was, and 
is, visible in Norway’s approach to foreign affairs through its confidence in economical 
integration and cooperation as conflict resolving factors in international relations. The global 
                                                 
35
 «Vesten hilser Jeltsin velkommen» [The West greets Yeltsin Welcome], NTB, 23.8.1989; «Boris demokrat», 
[Boris Democrat], Nordlys, 8.3.1990;  
36
 Phone Interview with Knut Vollebæk, 17.2.2010 
37
 Nyhamar 2003: 178. [Under den russiske krigføringen i Tsjetsjenia i 1995 og 1999-2000 var hensynet til 
menneskerettigheter underordnet hensynet til ikke å legge seg ut med Russland i spørsmål som ikke angår Norge 
direkte.]  
38
 Svein Vigeland Rottem, Geir Hønneland og Leif Christian Jensen, Småstat og energistormakt: Norges 
sikkerhetspolitiske rolle i nord[Small State and Energy Great Power: Norway’s Security Political role in the High 
North], Bergen 2008: 24-25. 
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anarchy becomes modified in this perspective, because the actors recognize that cooperation is 
the best solution for everyone. In an analysis of Norway’s policy in the northern areas the 
Norwegian conviction that inter-cultural and economic cooperation was stabilizing is central. 
The Euro Arctic Barents Sea Region cooperation and other similar international organizations 
and treaties are examples of this. The United Nations (UN) is also such an organization that 
clears the ground for mutual understanding and agreements. That is not to say that this forum 
does not allow national interests on the agenda, but the point of departure is an understanding 
that mutual obligations and treaties affects and “frames” eventual conflicts in international 
politics. Liberal theory recognizes conflict potential in interstate dynamics, while stressing that 
smaller actors have the possibility to affect their own room of manoeuvre.39 
A constructivist based perspective claims that national, regional and international norms 
and perception affect the conduct in foreign affairs on any given level. The power to define 
what conduct is legitimate or not and what is morally right and wrong can be considered a 
structural ideological power. An actor can “sell” a good idea, or convince others of something 
and thereby attain power of definition.40 In regards of this thesis it can be helpful to discern 
“what conflict” the Norwegian Government related to and how. It is important to be aware of 
narrative constructions of conflict based on prejudice and myths, and show plain awareness of 
the fact that there are several ways to present a given conflict. This is because the version 
“bought” by the external actors relating to it is fairly decisive on how they relate to it. The 
following is a simplified example of such a perspective: When Norway supported the 
“humanitarian bombing” in Kosovo it was perceived as legitimate, because the Kosovo-
Albanian people were perceived as threatened by genocide. The Chechens were not perceived 
to be under the threat of genocide, and Chechnya’s secessionist regime was also perceived as 
nesting terrorists and mafia enterprise. Concerning the latter, it would be regarded as Russia’s 
legitimate right to protect territorial integrity and security for its citizens. Thus, it was not 
legitimate for external actors to intervene. 
Questions of national identity and legitimate behavior and conduct are central factors of 
a constructivist perspective. A Norwegian perception of the Norwegian “peace tradition” and 
“peace nation” is well established, although thoroughly contested both inside and outside 
Norway.41 This perspective implies that perceptions of one’s own role affects and “frames” 
                                                 
39
 Rottem, Hønneland og Jensen 2008: 25-27. 
40
 Ibid: 23. 
41
 Tamnes 1997: 343; «De sa vi ikke kunne klare det», NY TID, 15.6.2001; Sverre Lodgaard, «Helhetsperspektiver 
på norsk utenrikspolitikk», Internasjonal Politikk, no. 3, 2002; Sverre Lodgaard, «Helhetsperspektiver på norsk 
utenrikspolitikk», Internasjonal Politikk, no. 2, 2007: 279-285; Halvard Leira, «Norske selvbilder-norsk 
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Norwegian defense and security policy. The ideas of Norway as “the good keeper”, i.e. the 
sensible and wise administer of the northern areas suits such a self image perfectly. On the 
regional level it refers to the good historical Russo-Norwegian relations and on the 
international level sovereignty and states’ administrative responsibility. It is strategically 
important for Norway to show or convince the world that Norway is the “most dependable 
keeper” of the great resources of the North. The international normative environment is central. 
The idea of Norway as human rights advocate also suits Norway’s self image. Norway presents 
itself as an inexhaustible promoter of human rights and criticizes regimes for human rights 
violations across the globe. However, Norway has not tended to criticize Russia. Here, Norway 
cannot historically refer to itself as critical and outspoken on human rights violations.42 
Joseph Nye Jr. Professor in Political Science established the terms hard and soft power 
in “Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics”.43 Hard power is understood to 
pressurize others, through economic or military means, to act against their own will. Hard 
power strategies are neither possible nor desirable from a Norwegian perspective. The 
exception is that hard power has some relevance through alliances, such as NATO. More 
important to Norway is soft power. The term is based on a perception that political actors, 
states for instance, can affect other actors conduct, action and interests through ideological and 
cultural advances. To Nye these acts can often be considered strategic. Nevertheless, they also 
need to be considered valuable by other actors. The international, regional and national 
normative environment is given much importance. Nye referred to Norway by stating that the 
Norwegian role in peace negotiations and similar engagement can increase Norway’s room of 
manoeuvre, and facilitate access to important decision arenas.44 It thus contests the idea of 
Norwegian foreign policy of peace facilitating and humanitarian- and development aid as 
something being purely altruistic. 
With the transnational NGO-organizations, global media, and the World Wide Web, 
which accelerated to new heights through the nineties, there was created an international public 
that challenged the traditional inside-outside divide between domestic and foreign policy. The 
term public diplomacy refers to the fact that the public, to a much greater degree than earlier, 
discusses foreign and security political matters, and the media reports, especially on conflicts, 
in a much more direct way. Foreign policy is now also performed in public, not only in closed 
                                                                                                                                                           
utenrikspolitikk», Internasjonal Politikk, no. 2, 2007: 285-288; Mark Curtis, Doublethink: The two faces of 
Norway’s foreign and development policy, Forum for Utvikling og Miljø, Oslo 2010, 
http://www.forumfor.no/Artikler/5677.html  
42
 Rottem, Hønneland og Jensen 2008: 27-28. 
43
 Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The means to success in world politics, New York 2004. 
44
 Rottem, Hønneland og Jensen 2008: 27-28. 
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sessions by professional diplomats and politicians.45 It has become possible for people other 
than the political elite to be updated on conflicts through television and internet, and see 
pictures directly from war zones and follow the development from day to day. The NGO’s 
reportage and criticism of political leaders has gained wider legitimacy in the early 1990s. This, 
however, changed somewhat with the US led operations in Afghanistan and Iraq, where 
Western authorities was less willing to listen to criticism uttered by human rights advocates.46 
Nonetheless, because of human rights focus in the 1990s, it became more important for 
political leaders to show awareness of human rights in public. In conflicts with severe human 
right violations, such as the Russo-Chechen conflict, it became harder for the foreign policy 
makers and actors, to keep matters withdrawn from the public, at least without making some 
sort of effort to legitimize their actions, or lack of action, through open discussions.47 Due to 
this development soft power can be considered strategically more important. 
A timeline of seven years has been useful to discern developments in the Norwegian 
policy throughout two Russo-Chechen wars, three succeeding Norwegian governments and a 
regime change in Russia. This thesis’ main focus is events that took place from 1994 until 
2001. It would be possible to go back to 1991, when Chechnya declared its sovereignty. 
However, I find it better to start with the Russian invasion in 1994 because of the explicit 
Norwegian reactions that followed. The analysis ends in 2001 for two main reasons: First, the 
second war was officially declared over by President Vladimir Putin. Second, a discussion on 
the period after the attack on the World Trade Center, and what is by many seen as a change of 
paradigm in international politics, would go beyond the scope of this thesis’ time and pages. 
Nonetheless, the timeline has been stretched here and there to be able to explain particularities, 
or place them in a context. By doing this it is also possible to point out some of the 
development after 9/11, without making a thorough analysis. 
In order to have a handle on what kind of conflict Norwegian authorities were relating 
to, Russo-Chechen relations and the conflict is presented in Chapter 2, before the empirical 
chapters. To be able to discern factors of Russo-Norwegian relations, which may have affected 
Norway’s policy towards the Russo-Chechen conflict, it is essential to examine how Norway 
related to the Federal State of Russia in that period. Therefore, a short historical background of 
Russo-Norwegian relations will be presented in the following part of the introduction.  
                                                 
45
 Matlary 2002: http://www.sv.uio.no/mutr/publikasjoner/rapp2002/Rapport46.html 
46
 Hughes 2007: 135. 
47
 Matlary, 2002: http://www.sv.uio.no/mutr/publikasjoner/rapp2002/Rapport46.html 
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NEIGHBOURS THROUGHOUT A THOUSAND YEARS 
Contrary to the Chechen people, the Norwegians have usually enjoyed overall peaceful 
relations with the Russians.48 The following excerpt of Russo-Norwegian relations is in 
compliance with the glossy image that is brought forth when Norwegian and Russian political 
leaders meet. It is possible to trace relations of trade and royal intermarriage between Norway 
and Russia through written sources a thousand years back.49 In the 18th and19th century an 
annual trade market, since called the Pomor-trade, brought the cultures together. More than 
300 hundred ships left Russia for northern parts of Norway every summer, to trade Russian 
flour for Norwegian fish.50 Naturally, given geography and trade interaction, Norwegian 
decision makers in Oslo were more sceptical towards the Russians than their northern 
countrymen.51 
After a short period of independence from Denmark in the 18th century, Norway entered 
a union with Sweden.52 During the Swedish-Norwegian Union, the awareness of “the Russian 
threat” was said to be particularly felt in Swedish elite circles. It was claimed that the Swedish 
authorities used this “threat”, i.e. ‘if Norway stood by itself, Russia could invade Norway’, to 
keep Norway in line. The same Russophobe ideas were however also widespread in Norway.53 
In the early 1900s Russia favoured Norway’s dissolution from Sweden because it would 
weaken Sweden’s potential power.54 Thus, Russia was the first of the great European powers to 
acknowledge the national sovereignty of Norway on 29 October 1905.55 Norway was 
correspondingly among the first states in Europe to recognize the Soviet regime as the 
legitimate government of Russia following the Russian Revolution.56 
                                                 
48
 Alexander Kan og Jens Petter Nielsen, «Naboer i det høye nord: Tusenårig samkvem og samarbeid» 
[Neighbours in the High North: A Thousand years of co-existence and cooperation], in Daniela Büchten, Tatjana 
Dzjakson and Jens Petter Nielsen (ed.), Norge – Russland: Naboer gjennom 1000 år [Norway and Russia: 
Neighbours through a 1000 years], Oslo 2004: 25. 
49
 Tatjana Dzjakson, «Norge og Rus-riket i vikingtiden: Normannerspørsmålet»[Norway and the Rus-kingdom in 
the Viking age: the question of the Normans], i Daniela Büchten, Tatjana Dzjakson and Jens Petter Nielsen(ed.), 
Norge – Russland: Naboer gjennom 1000 år, Oslo 2004: 40. 
50
 Tatjana Schrader, «Pomorhandelen.»[The Pomor-trade] I Daniela Büchten, Tatjana Dzjakson and Jens Petter 
Nielsen(ed.), Norge – Russland: Naboer gjennom 1000 år, Oslo 2004: 92. 
51
 Kan og Nielsen, 2004: 26. 
52
 Vadim Roginskij, «1814 og 1905- to viktige år i Norges historie»[1814 and 1905 – two important years in the 
history of Norway], i Daniela Büchten, Tatjana Dzjakson and Jens Petter Nielsen,(ed.), Norge – Russland: Naboer 
gjennom 1000 år, Oslo 2004: 131. 
53
 Jens Petter Nielsen, «Norske bilder av Russland i lys av den svensk-norske unionen»[Norwegian perceptions of 
Russia in the light of the Swedish-Norwegian union], i Daniela Büchten, Tatjana Dzjakson and Jens Petter 
Nielsen(ed.), Norge – Russland: Naboer gjennom 1000 år, Oslo 2004: 149-50. 
54
 Roginskij 2004: 131. 
55
 Ibid: 133. 
56
 Øyvind Nordsletten og Aleksander Panov, «Trekk fra de diplomatiske forbindelser mellom Norge og 
Russland»[from the diplomatic relations between Norway and Russia], i Daniela Büchten, Tatjana Dzjakson and 
Jens Petter Nielsen(ed.), Norge – Russland: Naboer gjennom 1000 år, Oslo 2004: 400. 
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During the Second World War, the Germans kept 90,000 Soviet citizens in Norway as 
prisoners of war. There was a great deal of interconnection between these and the Norwegian 
civilian population, which tried to help them with food and refuge.57 In 1944, the Red Army 
liberated the eastern part of Finnmark and as is often highlighted since, withdrew from this area 
the following year.58  
Norway’s relations with the Soviet Union (USSR) were strained because of the Cold 
War. The struggle for world dominance between the USSR and the USA followed from 1945 
all the way into Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s period in the 1980s. Caught between the two 
superpowers, Norway at first avoided, as best as possible, quarrels between the USA and the 
USSR. What has been called a bridge-building position is also regarded to have been as a 
general disengagement from international affairs.59 After rumours that Norway might receive 
the same “threatening invitation” as Eastern European states and Finland, Norway’s position 
changed.60 In 1949 Norway openly chose sides with the USA in the conflict by entering the 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and thus opposed the USSR-based defence 
organization, the Warsaw Pact.  
Sharing 196 kilometres of common border with Russia is a constant factor in 
Norwegian foreign policy, and the peripheral geographical situation, another. Norway was 
strategically important in the Cold War, as the only NATO country with a common border to 
the USSR. The small country thus “enjoyed” a central position. According to historian Olav 
Riste, two sets of formulae determined the course of Norwegian security policy: “In relation to 
the Soviet Union, the ‘deterrence’ obtained through membership of the Atlantic Alliance would 
be paired with efforts of ‘reassurance’ that such membership was strictly for defensive 
purposes.”61 Self-imposed restrictions became a key term in Norwegian foreign policy in the 
North. Consequently, Norway was among other averse to having NATO-exercises in the high 
north and did not want to have nuclear arms stationed in Norway.62 
The self-imposed restrictions did not only concern NATO and “bases policy”, but also 
other levels. Norway, for instance, was reluctant to criticize the USSR of maltreatment of 
                                                 
57
 Marianne Neerland Soleim, «Sovjetiske krigsfanger i Norge 1941 – 1945[Soviet prisoner of war in Norway 
1941-1945]», i Daniela Büchten, Tatjana Dzjakson and Jens Petter Nielsen(ed.), Norge – Russland: Naboer 
gjennom 1000 år, Oslo 2004: 400. 
58
 Mikhail Suprun, «Frigjøringen av Øst-Finnmark i 1944»[the Liberation of Eastern Finnmark in 1944], i Daniela 
Büchten, Tatjana Dzjakson and Jens Petter Nielsen(ed.), Norge – Russland: Naboer gjennom 1000 år, Oslo 2004: 
414-15. 
59
 Riste, 2005: 185. 
60
 Ibid: 199. 
61
 Ibid: 210. 
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 Tamnes 1997: 100-117; Skogan 2003: 32-34. 
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Christians, Jews and political dissidents, while Norwegian governments would strongly 
condemn other regimes elsewhere.63 The tense situation that had been an omnipresent factor of 
Russo-Norwegian relations during the Cold War was in part relieved when Mikhail S. 
Gorbachev came to power in 1985. Gorbachev was of the opinion that the USSR needed 
reform to manage economically and politically. His government launched many broad reforms 
in Russian society, Perestroika, and promoted openness on many levels, Glasnost.64 Gorbachev 
was also more sympathetic to the West than his predecessors and strengthened diplomatic 
relations with USA, and Western European nations.65  
The reforms and the openness undermined the structures that the USSR was built on, 
and the Soviet empire started crumbling. Added to the situation came an international wave of 
nationalism over Europe making it harder to keep federations such as the USSR and 
Yugoslavia together. Smaller scale conflicts were rumbling beneath the surface. Some of the 
conflict had been frozen by the Cold War and some were seemingly a consequence of the 
dissolution itself. Chechnya could be placed in the latter category.66 In the USSR the forces 
promoting reform, secession and national independence eventually managed to overcome the 
conservative communist forces trying to reform the USSR in function. International political 
relations changed drastically with the dissolution of the USSR and the change brought with it 
uncertainty to the international order.67 Part of the changes was the wars erupting inside nation 
states. The questions of how the international community should deal with conflicts, such as 
the Russo-Chechen, soon arise. Reactions and responses towards the conflicts would vary 
greatly among Western government. As all conflicts and situations are different this can be 
regarded as obvious, however at times it seems as Western governments operated with a double 
set of morals. 
LITERATURE 
This is, as far as I have been able to find out, the first thorough study on how Norway related to 
the Chechen conflict. James Hughes, professor of Comparative Politics states in his book, 
Chechnya: from Nationalism to Jihad that, previous studies of the international aspects of the 
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Oslo 2006: 257. 
65
 The West is defined as the members of the NATO in 1994; Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, 
Luxembourg, Holland, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Germany and the USA + Sweden, Finland, Austria, Switzerland. 
66
 Hughes 2007: 198. 
67
 Tamnes, 1997: 134. 
1 – INTRODUCTION - 1 
 13 
Chechen conflict, focused on how Russian foreign policy makers had managed the conflict 
internationally: “The determinants of the Foreign Policy of other states […] on the question of 
Chechnya are a much-neglected field of study.” 68 In line with Hughes, no overwhelming 
amount has been written on this specific topic in Norway. Although, there are several 
Norwegian authors that tap into it, while exploring the Chechen conflict in general or 
Norwegian foreign policy per se. 
Aage Borchgrevink mentions Norwegian decision makers’ lack of response to the 
conflict and general tendency to ignore it in his book Den usynlige krigen: Reiser i Tsjetsjenia, 
Ingushetia og Dagestan [The Invisible War: Travels through Chechnya, Ingushetia and 
Dagestan].69 Ingvald Godal has also noted what he considers political silence brought to the 
fore in his book Tsjetsjenia: Der enkene blir selvmordsbombere [Chechnya: Where the widows 
become suicide bombers].70 Similarly Siri Lill Mannes with Livvakt i helvete – Aleksandr og 
krigen i Tsjetsjenia [Bodyguard in Hell – Aleksandr and the War in Chechnya]71 and Åsne 
Seierstad with stories from the Chechen war in De Krenkede: Fortellinger fra Tsjetsjenia 
[Angel of Grozny: Inside Chechnya]72, have explicitly criticized the way the Chechen conflict 
has been overlooked.  
Rolf Tamnes’ book Oljealder 1965-1995 in Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie, bind 6[Oil 
age 1965-1995]73, Olav Riste’s Norwegian Foreign Relations: A History74, and Vendepunkter i 
Norsk utenrikspolitikk: Nye internasjonale vilkår etter den kalde krigen [Turning points in 
Norwegian Foreign Affairs: New International Conditions after the Cold War]75 have provided 
a general historical backdrop on Norwegian foreign policy. I have also used several articles 
from the Norwegian publication International Politikk.  
The solid collaborational historical work, and exhibition catalogue, “Norge-Russland: 
Naboer gjennom 1000 år” [Norway-Russia: neighbours through a 1000 years], has supplied 
background material for Russo-Norwegian historical relations. Norwegian relations with 
Russia in the 1990s are to a certain extent covered in literature on fields of national security, 
and the cooperation in the Barents Sea. All the books mentioned above on Norwegian Foreign 
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Policy covers Russo-Norwegian relations. Professor II and Senior Researcher of Political 
Science Geir Hønneland have written several books on Norwegian-Russian relations since the 
end of the Cold War.76 Småstat og energistormakt: Norges sikkerhetspolitiske rolle i nord 
[Small State and Energy Great Power: Norway’s Security Political Role in the North], co-
written by Hønneland has provided most parts of the thesis theoretical approach and some 
background material.77 Hønneland focuses more explicitly than many on the fascinating 
perspective of perception between the two neighbour states.78 
There exists today a fairly large amount of literature on the Russo-Chechen conflict and 
the perceptions of the conflict are as many as works or more. I have had to be selective, and I 
have used three works as main background material. The first is “Chechnya: Tombstone of 
Russia” by journalist and historian Anatol Lieven.79 The book is comprehensive and deals with 
the North Caucasian history and the contemporary social condition and politics in both Russia 
and Chechnya. He also provides personal experience of the conditions during the first war, and 
firsthand knowledge about many of the main protagonists he met when he stayed there. 
However, Lieven, as many others, end up describing the conflict with a mythological tendency. 
In Chechnya: from Nationalism to Jihad, Professor of Comparative Politics James 
Hughes takes a more sober approach.80 Nonetheless, he analyzes the history and cultural factors 
of Russo-Chechen relations, which have often been taken for granted as causes, but with a 
critical distance. In addition, he adds a theoretical approach, the dynamics of conflict, which 
presents an alternative to the many “either – or” explanations, showing instead the dynamics 
and development of both protagonist and circumstances. “Chechnya: from Past to Future”, is a 
reader edited by Richard Sakwa. The volume are brought together by leading experts from all 
sides of the conflict, with Western, Russian and Chechen perspectives on the conflict, 
explaining the conflict’s context and causes.81 In addition, I have used several other books to 
explain particularities, or more thoroughly comprehend the context. 
                                                 
76
 Geir Hønneland, Barents-brytninger: Norsk områdepolitikk etter den kalde krigen, Kristiansand. 2005; Vårt 
bilde av Russerne, Kristiansand 2002. 
77
 Svein Vigeland Rottem, Geir Hønneland og Leif Christian Jensen, Småstat og energistormakt: Norges 
sikkerhetspolitiske rolle i nord, Bergen 2008. 
78
 Hønneland, 2005: 106-165. 
79
 Anatol Lieven, Chechnya: Tombstone of Russia, London 1998. 
80
 James Hughes, Chechnya: from Nationalism to Jihad, London 2007. 
81
 Richard Sakwa (ed.), Chechnya: From Past to Future, London 2005. 
1 – INTRODUCTION - 1 
 15 
SELECTING SOURCES and METHODICAL APPROACH 
This is an empirical study and the thesis’ analysis is based on qualitative research. The 
narrative builds on analysis of newspapers articles and primary sources such as, statements to 
the Norwegian Parliament, speeches, and whitepapers, and some interviews. In order to answer 
my research questions I have used diverging and broadly based basic theoretical approaches to 
analyze the source material I have had at hand. This is done along with a reading of secondary 
literature, to put the material into a wider context.  
The topic of this thesis made it natural to explore the Royal Norwegian MFA’s archive. 
However, after seven months of having my application processed, I was unfortunately denied 
any access to this material, on the basis that the MFA does not give access to matters of current 
interest and affairs still in process.82 The archive of the Norwegian Parliament (Stortinget) has 
been of great use, although I have mainly looked at published sources. I have drawn on the 
Foreign Ministers Annual Address on Foreign Policy to the Parliament and the following 
debates, but also other statements and speeches by the foreign-, defence- and prime ministers as 
well as press releases from the succeeding governments. 
The newspapers in Norway have covered the Chechen conflict, if not to a great 
extent.83 The Norwegian News Agency (NTB), which serves over 70 Norwegian newspapers, 
offering broad coverage of national and international affairs, has been a great source. The 
newspapers have been useful as a tool in finding information, on how the Norwegian MFA 
handled the situation officially, and how the ministry portrayed it to the Norwegian public.84 
Although these newspapers have different profiles, the media in Norway is often claimed to be 
part of the broad consensus orientation in Norwegian foreign policy.85  
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This claim is based on two observations. First, the Norwegian press corps’ profession-
ethics is strict about what is regarded a legitimate source, when covering Norwegian foreign 
policy, compared to other domestic areas of journalism. Reportage of this sort usually occurs 
when a “legitimate critic”, i.e. representatives of political parties, military, NGOs or specialists, 
denounces the government’s action.86 Second, the possibilities to run critical source-based 
journalistic practice are limited by the fact that final foreign political decisions and choices 
often take place within processes that are exempt from the public. These processes tries to unite 
party political opponents, public discussions on foreign policy are narrow, and the decision 
making occurs through a consultative organ, between the government and the Parliament.87  
Due to this strict profession-ethics where journalists usually reports only on what has 
been said or done by “foreign policy authorities”, the Norwegian newspapers are fairly reliable 
sources. The newspapers will therefore mainly be used as providers of information only, and 
will not be regarded as a voice of its own. A methodological problem using only Norwegian 
papers is the disproportionate focus by the journalists on Norwegian actors compared to the 
overall situation. These actors would often be mentioned more briefly, or not at all, in other 
countries papers, which would not perceive the Norwegians as important as the Norwegians 
would themselves. 
Interviews with former Ministers of Foreign Affairs Bjørn Tore Godal and Knut 
Vollebæk have been undertaken. Accordingly conversations with some of the advisors and 
state secretaries of respective Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Cecilie Landsverk, Odd Gunnar 
Skagestad and Kim Traavik have taken place. Apart from some recollection problems, they all 
shared privileged insight with me, and helped me to shed some more light on how Norway 
related to the wars in Chechnya.  
                                                                                                                                                           
Norwegian foreign political decicion maker processes], Birgitte Kjos Fonn, Iver B. Neumann og Ole Jacob 
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Before the Chechen conflict in the 1990s, there had been little Norwegian awareness of the 
Northern Caucasus, and little contact between Norwegians and Chechens, or North Caucasians in 
general. Exceptions are the author Knut Hamsun’s and the Norwegian national hero Fritjof 
Nansen’s respective travels through the North Caucasus in the early 20th century.88 Russia and 
Chechnya, on the other hand, have shared close relations for over two hundred years with 
varying degrees of tension. The two recent wars involve a conundrum of history, nationalism, 
petroleum and religion. Furthermore, the wars have put human rights aside, at times strained 
Kremlin’s relations with Western powers, and caused cold shudders to spread throughout 
neighbouring countries.89 
Two central questions can be posed peering into the blood-stained history of the North 
Caucasus and the two recent Russo-Chechen wars (1994-96 and from 1999 until time of writing). 
First, why was it exactly Chechnya that wanted national sovereignty, in light of the fact that none 
of the surrounding republics held the same sovereignty claim in such a zealous and inexhaustible 
manner? Second, why has Russia fought so ardently to keep this mountain nation within its 
borders?  
Conflicts are usually complex, and to present a balanced conflict narrative is seriously 
challenging. A conflict account less than 18 pages worth is perhaps infeasible. Nonetheless, it 
gives a rough idea of a situation through the shedding of light on important factors, events, 
protagonists and dynamics. Several ways of presenting and explaining conflicts can, and will 
hopefully, always be found and the Russo-Chechen conflict is not an exception. Narratives of the 
Russo-Chechen conflict are often painted with broad strokes of black and white with little 
attention for detail. Myths created by reviewing Russo-Chechen relations through the biblical 
story of David and Goliath, or the story of “the lone wolf’s unending struggle against the great 
bear”, are examples of this. It makes exciting stories, but does little to promote future peace and 
reconciliation.90 The myths are often based on the notion of the resistance met by the Tsar’s 
generals in the 1800s and the classical romantic literature of Mikhail Lermontov, Alexander 
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Pushkin and Leo Tolstoy presenting the “noble savage”.91 Many of these romantic elements have 
also been reproduced by Western journalist and academic writers on the war.92 
Common Russo-Chechen historic relations have often been given too much importance, 
and this is still often done when someone wishes to draw attention to Chechnya.93 Chechen 
culture, traditions and especially religion, has been increasingly in focus. There has also been a 
tendency of personalizing the conflict, for instance spotlighting bad relations between President 
Yeltsin and Chechnya’s first president Dzhokhar Dudaev. What we can refer to as the Russian 
version has been claimed to be the most powerful voice in the main narrative upon which both 
political action (and to some extent public opinion) is based. This has above all been the situation 
within the Russian Federation. However, this has also increasingly been the situation in other 
countries, since the attack on the World Trade Center 11 September 2001, or one could argue 
since Vladimir Putin came to power.94 The Russian government portrays its action as an 
important and necessary contribution to, or at least part of, the West’s “war on terror”. The 
Federal actions are presented as an effort to help the Chechens deal with atrocities committed by 
criminals within their own group.95 What has often been neglected are the dynamics of conflict as 
an explanatory factor. The two recent wars should be seen in the light of the history of Russo-
Chechen relations. Nevertheless, the recent conflict is also a distinct and separate affair that 
erupted after more than 50 years of reasonably tranquil relations.96 
CONQUEST AND RESISTANCE 
When Chechnya claimed national sovereignty from Russia in 1991, the area had more or less 
been integrated in the Russian Empire for about 150 years. In the late 18th century Catharine the 
Great established Russian forces in the North Caucasus on a permanent basis. Sheikh Mansur 
Ushurma led his Chechen, Dagestani, Kumyk and Kabardin Mountaineers followers to victory 
against the Russian army. However, he later failed to unite them and after six years of fighting he 
was caught by Russian forces in 1791. He died in captivity.97 In Russian history writing Sheikh 
Mansur’s and other North Caucasian’s resistance in those years are often referred to as revolts. 
However, as the North Caucasians at the time had not recognized Russian rule, resistance is 
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perhaps a better word. Fighting continued sporadically for half a century from Mansur’s death.98 
The 1860s was the decade when the generals of Tsar Alexander II completed the conquest of the 
North Caucasus. The Russian regime was consolidating its power. Compared to the many 
European colonizers, often motivated by trading possibilities and commerce, the colonization of 
the North Caucasus was primarily motivated by geopolitical concerns.99 The “small peoples” of 
the Caucasus had throughout the centuries constantly been invaded by others: Rome, Parthia, 
Iran, the Byzantines, the Arab caliphate, the Khazar kaganate, the Seljuks, the Mongol Timur, the 
Golden Horde, the Safavids, and the Ottomans among others.100 In the 18th and 19th century, the 
area was scene of a struggle of control between Sunni Muslim Ottoman Turkey, Shi’i Iran and 
the Orthodox Christian Russia.101 
There existed no such thing as a nation, or area, called Chechnya at the time of the 
conquest. Although, the Chechens inhabited most parts of the same area as they do today.102 
However, “the Russian conquest of the Caucasus”103 did not solely affect the Chechens, but a 
plurality of people such as the Ingush, Dagestanis, Abkhaz, Ossetians, Circassians and many 
more.104 On the other hand, it is often said that in comparisons with other indigenous people of 
the North Caucasus, the Chechens are known as the most rebellious throughout the history of the 
Russian empire, the Soviet Union and post-communist Russia. They have indeed had their share 
of trouble with various Russian/Soviet regimes and vice versa. 
A continuous 30 years of resistance was lead by the legendary Dagestani religious and 
military leader Imam Shamil during the Russo-Caucasian War in the mid 19th century. The 
densely forested highland of Dagestan and Chechnya provided ideal conditions for guerrilla 
warfare. Shamil, nicknamed the Lion, surrendered in 1859 as he saw his forces exhausted and the 
holy struggle, ghazawhat, as completely devastating to the region and its people.105 In 1864, the 
revolt called the Battle of the Daggers came about due to the arrest of the Chechen Sufi and 
pacifist religious leader Hajj Kunta.106 The Russian-Ottoman war in 1877-78 led to new uprisings 
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in Chechnya and Dagestan. Revolution throughout Russia led to further revolt in Chechnya in 
1905. Through the years 1917-21, with the Bolshevik seizure of power, there was a final 
Checheno-Dagestanian struggle for allegiance to Islam and independence from the Russian 
regime.107 
In 1921 the Chechens, Ingush, Ossetes, Karachai, and Balks were united in the Soviet 
Mountain Republic. Yet, only three years later, they were organized into separate autonomous 
regions, and raised to the status of Autonomous Republics. Disturbances again broke out between 
1929 and 1935, which led to many Chechens being executed as a reprisal in 1937. The Chechen 
nationalist Hassan Isvailov led an uprising against Russia in 1940, and his group allegedly joined 
the German front in June 1941.108  
THE DEPORTATION 
On Stalin’s order 478 479 ethnic Chechens and Ingush were deported on 22 February 1944, 
charged as Nazi-collaborators en masse.109 It did not only affect Chechens and Ingush. Kalmyks, 
Karachai, Balkars and Crimean Tatars were also deported by Stalin’s regime.110 The deported 
peoples were unloaded onto the steppes of Kazakhstan and other settlements throughout Central 
Asia, where it is estimated that one quarter of the deportees died.111 These figures include the fact 
that in half a dozen Chechen villages the Russian deportation troops were unable to move the 
inhabitants. Instead of being deported, the villagers were massacred in barns and mosques by 
Russian troops.112 
The deported nationalities were eliminated from all Soviet official documents and the 
great Soviet encyclopaedia as if they had never existed.113 During Nikita Khrushchev’s period, 
1953-64, the Chechens and Ingush were allowed to return to their homeland. Although 
Khrushchev never withdrew the Nazi-collaborator charges, the Premier initiated investigations 
into the massacres committed during the deportations, and went for a fresh start by denouncing 
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the deportations as crimes of the Stalin-era. The autonomous republics were re-established.114 The 
Chechens as a people has suffered hardships, and their shared North Caucasian history with the 
Russians has, as shown, at times been outright gruesome. However these events in themselves 
cannot provide the main explanatory cause of a war taking place 60 years later. Nonetheless, it is 
well known that misuse of history can provide belligerent leaders with narratives they can use in 
their agitating rhetoric, as was done, deliberately or not, by the Dudaev regime in the 1990s.115 
The Russo-Chechen shared history is not all battles and blood. 
INTEGRATION AND SOCIAL UNREST 
From the Khrushchev-period, and up until 1991, is seen by many as a peaceful period with 
cultural and economic prosperity.116 Still, instances of social unrest occurred from time to time. 
There were tensions between ethnic Chechens and Russians in the Chechen-Ingush Republic. 
Ethnic Chechens and Russians lived in fairly distinctly separated areas within the republic. 
Whereas Russians mostly populated the urban areas, ethnic Chechens dominated the countryside. 
Intermarriage seldom took place between ethnic Chechens and Russians, as they did in some 
other autonomous republics with mixed populations.117 Also, 90 percent of the ethnic Chechens, 
although fluent in Russian, placed the Chechen language above Russian in terms of daily use. In 
other ethnic republics within the Russian Federation, Russian was usually dominant as practiced 
language, also within the non-Russian populations.118  
By the end of the 1980s the Chechen Ingush Republic lagged behind the rest of the 
Russian republics in most aspects of socio-economic development.119 Half the population was 
under 30 years of age, and unemployment among ethnic Chechens reached 30 per cent. Not 
surprisingly, there was a growing discontent among ethnic Chechens in the republic. Chechnya 
was the only ethnic republic that did not have a person from their own ethnic group in a 
leadership position. An increasing nationalist tendency, which focused on their indigenous 
culture as separate from the Soviet/Russian, gradually got a firmer foothold. A demand for more 
autonomy became apparent. This was conceded by the Soviet regime to ease the fervour in the 
republic, but perhaps the initiative came too late. Nonetheless, in June 1989 Doku Zavgaev 
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became the first Chechen to lead the republic as head of the Chechen Communist Party 
Organization.120  
DISSOLUTION 
In Boris Yeltsin’s struggle to undermine the authority of Premier Mikhail Gorbachev and gain 
support in the upcoming election throughout Russia, he supported secessionist groups in 
republics within Russia. He let slip the now famous phrase: “Take as much sovereignty as you 
can swallow.”121 Many people took this literally, causing great enthusiasm and support, also 
within the Chechen republic. 
The disintegration of the USSR was accelerated by a failed coup in August 1989 launched 
by a group of conservative communists against Premier Gorbachev. It was uncertain to people in 
both the union republics and the autonomous republics to what leader they owed their loyalty. 
Was it to the conservative coup initiators; the reformist Gorbachev; or the new Russian 
leadership in pursuit of democracy headed by Boris Yeltsin? There were different conceptions as 
well on whether the union should disintegrate altogether or be redesigned in a new way.122  
The USSR’s collapse was a period of deep and general crisis for Russia. The state 
institutions were altered; the national economy suffered from the collapse of the Gorbachev 
economy and the loss of the Eastern European markets; and the population’s savings were wiped 
out by hyperinflation. The Russian national identity also went through a crisis due to questions of 
the “what constitutes Russia now”, “who are Russian” sort. The great Red Army was deprived of 
its highest authority, its purpose and ideology. Soldiers had to go for months without wages and 
new equipment, and it was a despairing situation for many men in Soviet uniform. This situation 
would also lead way to massive plundering and corruption during the Russo-Chechen wars.123 
YOU SAY YOU WANT A REVOLUTION 
The crisis in the USSR and Russia presented an opportunity for the political mobilization of a 
national identity in Chechnya that aspired to independence. In November 1990 a congress aiming 
to celebrate Chechen culture was held in Grozny.124 The congress consisted mostly of clan-elders 
and excluded much of the urban population. The urban population was Russian-Chechen-
dominated, less inclined to traditional observation of Islam and Chechen custom and overall 
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more Sovietised.125 This difference has also been obvious in the recent conflicts, where the most 
zealous resistance towards Russia has come from the southern Chechen highland. 
The congress initiative was supported from different groups with diverging agendas. 
Doku Zavgaev, the first ethnic Chechen to be head of the Chechen Communist Party 
Organisation, contributed to the making of the congress in an attempt to consolidate his newly 
achieved power in the republic. He wanted to smoothen over the uneasy situation between the 
diverging alliances in the Chechen society. Yeltsin supported the congress with the aim of 
putting pressure on the local Soviet authorities, i.e. Doku Zavgaev, to speed up political change 
on a larger scale.126  
Dzhokhar Dudaev, the first ethnic Chechen to achieve the title of Air force General in the 
Soviet Army was elected Chairman of the Congress. He had already taken part in the Estonian 
revolution; by refusing to obey Gorbachev’s orders to deploy Soviet Special Forces into Estonia 
by closing off the airspace.127 This choice of Chairman turned out to be unfortunate for Doku 
Zavgaev, because Dudaev had in stark terms criticized Zavgaev for not having strongly enough 
condemned the Communist coup attempt in August. The communist elite, with Zavgaev as head, 
including moderate intellectuals, were fairly rapidly swept away by brutal revolutionary political 
events unfolding under the leadership of Dudaev.128  Dudaev had able men under his command, 
who were preparing for war and who knew the Soviet/Russian army from the inside: Aslan 
Maskhadov and Shamil Basaev, described below, became the main protagonists on the Chechen 
side after Dudaev was killed by a laser guided missile while using a satellite phone.129  
Former Colonel in the Soviet Artillery Aslan Maskhadov was later to become the first and 
only elected President of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. He was by many seen as the most 
moderate of the Chechen separatist leaders. He was however not able to gather the factions of the 
post-war Chechnya between 1997 and 1999. Although he is often spoken of in positive terms, he 
gained no international support as President and had to fight against both internal and external 
forces.130 Maskhadov was killed by Russian forces 8 March 2005.131  
Shamil Basaev who would become Chechnya’s legendary commander, and the Kremlin’s 
proclaimed “enemy nr.1”until he was killed in a car explosion July 2006.132 At the start of the 
Chechen conflict he had already obtained a reputation as a terrorist when he hijacked a Russian 
                                                 
125
 Sakwa 2005: 3. 
126
 Ibid: 3. 
127
 Hughes 2007: 23. 
128
 Sakwa 2005: 3-4. 
129
 James Hughes 2007: 87. 
130
 Ibid: 95-97. 
131
 Sakwa 2005: 14. 
132
 James Hughes 2007: 107. 
2 - RUSSO-CHECHEN: SYNONYMOUS TO CONFLICT? - 2 
 24 
airplane in 1991. Basaev had been trained by Soviet forces, and he had fought against the 
Georgians on the Abkhazian/Russian side. Basaev would become Chechnya’s legendary and 
charismatic field commander, but also notorious for the terrorist operations in Budennovsk and 
Beslan.133 
Dudaev was elected President in Chechnya on 27 October 1991 where he gained 85 
percent of the votes. The dodgy state of the election proceedings brought about loud protests. 
Dudaev gave himself emergency powers, officially for a month only, but he never surrendered 
them.134 In November 1992 the Ingush proclaimed their own republic, separate from the 
Chechens and firmly placed within the Federal Republic of Russia. The democratic reforms 
many were hoping for in Chechnya faltered at an early stage.135 The Chechen civilian society 
suffered in the years before the first war erupted. The nascent regime of Chechnya was upheld by 
a shadow economy and had large internal problems to deal with. Money laundering, human 
trafficking with open slave-markets, drug trade, and illegal weapon transactions were all main 
components of this economy. During the Yeltsin period law enforcement was too underfunded 
and poorly trained to protect businesses and enforce binding contracts on most levels. It therefore 
became necessary for many people to join a protection racket usually controlled by local mafia. 
The Chechen mafia, notorious for its brutality, clan loyalty and safe havens in the Chechen 
highland, controlled the Russian criminal underworld.136 Mafia enterprise became a bearing 
structure in Chechen society, seemingly accepted by the Grozny regime under Dudaev. 
Kidnappings turned into a profitable and common activity, and train robberies an almost weekly 
affair.137 It was not a new phenomenon, but the criminal problems emanating from the Chechen 
republic in the period leading up to the first war presented a massive problem to the Russian 
government.138  
On 2 November 1991 Dudaev and his government claimed full independence from 
Russia. Yeltsin responded to the increasingly lawless circumstances by declaring a state of 
emergency in Chechnya in November 1991, and threatened to use military force. The threat was 
real enough, but the Russian troops that performed the half-hearted intervention were quickly 
surrounded by Dudaev’s national forces. The operation was called off by the Russian parliament, 
and Yeltsin’s operation turned into an unpopular blunder.139 His military forces were put on buses 
                                                 
133
 James Hughes 2007: 153. 
134
 Lieven 1998: 63. 
135
 Tishkov 1997: 209. 
136
 Said 2007: 137. 
137
 Gakaev 2005: 32-33. 
138
 Said 2007: 137-138. 
139
 Pål Kolstø, Political Construction Sites: Nation-Building in Russia and the Post-Soviet States, Oxford 2000: 215. 
2 - RUSSO-CHECHEN: SYNONYMOUS TO CONFLICT? - 2 
 25 
and driven out of Chechnya.140 The Kremlin supported, however, from that point on pro-Russian 
forces in the Caucasus. It developed into a “half-force variant” where Russian authorities 
sustained the Chechen opposition’s against President Dudaev in August-November 1994.141 
MASTERS OF WAR 
In December 1994 Russia invaded Chechnya, and two years of brutal war followed. However, it 
was not only Chechnya that was on the brink of armed conflict in the Russian federation. Some 
political commentators at the time believed that several other republics, such as Tatarstan, were 
more likely to erupt into war than Chechnya.142 Contrary to Chechnya, President Yeltsin managed 
to sort out a functional agreement with Tatarstan. But why did he not manage the same with 
Chechnya? Why did Russia invade Chechnya and why at this point? The answers provided are as 
many as the works providing them. However, “the origins of the Russian invasion of Chechnya 
in late 1994 are complicated and still somewhat mysterious, despite the availability of memoir 
accounts, interviews, and some documents.”143 
As shown above, the historic relations cannot account for the turn of event alone. Neither 
can Dudaev’s revolution as it went on for three years before the invasion. However, the 
increasingly generally criminal situation in Chechnya and a series of bus-hijackings in the 
summer of 1994 is often seen as either triggers or pretexts of the first war. These hijackings has 
been connected to what has been described as a social tradition of banditry for younger Chechen 
males has functioned as a form of national resistance towards Russia. This type of action, which 
included robbery and kidnapping, contributed to trigger the intervention in Chechnya in 1994, 
and has been used by Russian authorities as an excuse to impose military control on the 
“uncivilized” and “banditry” people.144 Such an argument, however, can be considered tainted by 
the tendency of reading myths about the Chechen people into the situation of the nineties.  
Russian decision makers of this mindset thought they would be met as liberators by the 
people in Chechnya from what was often referred to as a “bandit-regime”. This misfired most 
likely because it triggered the Chechen people’s collective memory of ardent struggle against 
Russian invaders for centuries.145 Opposed to perceiving the Russian military as liberators, the 
Chechen people, even the moderates who approved of being a republic within the Russian federal 
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system, united against the Russian invasion.146 It is in addition by many emphasized that Yeltsin’s 
popularity had for a while been low and the ratings seriously wavering by 1994. In this respect, 
some of his advisors thought he could benefit from a “small victorious war”.147  
In the period leading up to the first war, Dudaev made several attempts to meet with 
Yeltsin. Dudaev’s repeated foulmouthed comments about Yeltsin did not help him set up such a 
meeting. Yeltsin’s closest advisors repeatedly advised Yeltsin not to meet with Dudaev.148 
However, Chechnya had, in addition, a couple of other assets that were important to the Kremlin, 
perhaps most importantly the geostrategic situation. 
GEOGRAPHY AND PETROLEUM 
Natural resources and the geopolitical position of Chechnya contributed to the wars in several 
ways. A strategic argument was that Yeltsin and his government wanted to set an example 
against a domino-effect on aspiring secessionist republics, fearing that the drive for independence 
would pick up elsewhere in Russia and lead to an eventual destruction of Russian territorial 
integrity.149 Eastern Caucasus lay on the edge of Russia’s two main lines of communication to the 
Transcaucasia: the capital coastal road via Derbent to Baku and the Georgian military highway 
from Vladikavkaz to Tbilisi. It would be a considerable obstruction to the Russians to have a 
labile sovereign Chechnya in the midst of the area.  
During the Soviet era Chechnya’s oil production constituted 21.5 million tonnes per year. 
In 1991 it was down to 6 million tonnes.150 Today, official output stands at less than 2 million 
tonnes per year. Illegal extraction is estimated to be between 100,000 and 2 million tonnes per 
year. Grozny had the largest refinery in the USSR, but it was unsuitable for Chechen oil, which 
was therefore shipped to a special refinery in Tuapse on the Russian Black Sea coast. During the 
bombing of Grozny the Petro-Chemical facilities were severely damaged.151  
Illicit siphoning and refining of Chechen oil was an economy of its own. The profit was 
split between the Russian military and the Chechen warlords and was perhaps the most obvious 
petroleum related prolonger of the conflict. There are a couple of more indirect ways to add to 
the picture: First, Russia became more dependent on oil revenues during the Yeltsin period, 
which saw a decline in state economy and a weaker state structure. Second, the USA, and other 
Western government’s increasing interest for Caspian oil, and the Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan pipeline 
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that completely evades Russian territory, was perceived by parts of the Russian military and 
political establishment as direct challenges to Russia’s interests in the region.152  
A large oil consortium in Azerbaijan, with British Petroleum and Norwegian Statoil as 
leaders, wanted, along with Russia, to lead the oil in the already existing pipelines through 
Chechnya. This demanded stability. Precisely because of the instability, alternative pipeline-
routes were explored, both through Georgia and Turkey.153 The violence in Chechnya in the 
1990s affected Dagestan and should be seen in connection with trans-national petroleum 
companies’ rivalry for the oil of the Caspian basin.154 This can have made it more difficult for the 
Kremlin to accept international involvement in the resolution of the conflict.155  
So, not only was it important to keep the Federal State of Russia from disintegrating even 
more, but it was also a question of natural resources. Nonetheless, even though these matters 
have been of key concern to the Kremlin, it has not been proclaimed as the Kremlin’s basis for 
invading the small mountain republic twice. The second war was launched in 1999 by Prime 
Minister, Vladimir Putin after a period of two years of Chechen independence. As will be shown 
in chapter 4 and 5, it was a period with little social, political and economic prosperity and with 
almost total political isolation. Putin gradually turned the wars in Chechnya into campaigns 
against terrorism linked to Islamism.156 
FAITH 
Religion has been seen as an increasing part of the conflict, but it has been difficult to define its 
role, which moreover has changed with the dynamics of the conflict. There is no consensus 
among scholars or parties involved in the conflict as to what extent religion promoted conflict 
with the Russians. The Chechens are Muslims, as are most people of the Northern Caucasus. 
There are distinct cultural differences from the orthodox Christianity and the Soviet atheism in 
Russia, without claiming, in Huntington manner, that this difference has been a natural cause for 
conflict.157 The Islamization of the Caucasus has gone through different stages, in the course of 
over 1000 years and diverging versions of Islam were imposed depending on the respective 
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rulers.158 The Chechens usually follow one of the two Sufi orders Quadiriya or Naqshbandiya.159 
Sufism is a mystical oriented version of Islam, where the goal for the worshiper, in addition to 
leading a correct Islamic life, is to reach a spiritual connection with the Deity, “to become one 
with God”.160 The Sufi tradition has been present in the Northern Caucasus through the centuries, 
but it was mainly in the early 19th century that the Sufi orders established their dominance.161 
Naqshbandiya-Mujaddidiyya-Khalidiyya was introduced first and was after thirty years largely 
supplanted by the Quadiriya.162 
The person introducing the Quadiriya brotherhood was al-shaykh al-Hajj Kunta al-
Michiki al Iliskhani. He preached to end the armed struggle, and the war exhausted Chechens 
gathered around his authority. His popularity aroused Russian suspicion, and he was arrested and 
died after five years in Russian captivity.163 The Quadiriya movement, which had started out 
opposing armed resistance to Russia, “turned into its sworn enemy”.164 Later, branches of the 
Quadiriya took part in all, and lead many, uprisings against Russian rule – tsarist, Soviet and 
post-Soviet alike.165 In the Soviet Union, the Chechens were not allowed to practise their religion, 
and even after the reconstitution of the Chechen-Ingush Republic in 1957, they were still not 
allowed to build mosques.166 It is hard to estimate the extent and the significance of Islam, in 
particular Sufism, in Chechnya by the time of the Soviet collapse. Religious practice was 
severely controlled by Soviet authorities and Sufi orders were suppressed. The Sufi-orders 
themselves, however, are secret and allow the followers pragmatic deception to avoid detection, 
and are therefore hard to control.167 
It has been asserted by many conflict experts and politicians that the conservative Islamic 
branch of Wahabism took firm hold of certain groups in Chechnya in the early nineties.168 It has 
further been assumed that this lead to a radicalisation of the Chechen insurgents and intensified 
the use of terrorism as a political weapon. Wahabism is an ultra-conservative Sunni-Muslim 
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tradition established by 18th century Arab reformer Muhammed Ibn Abd Al-Wahab.169 The Saudi 
kings, consolidating their power, supported him and it is still state religion in Saudi Arabia 
today.170 Today, the term “wahabi” often refers to a group of only loosely related movements, 
“many of which do not espouse violent action.”171 
RELIGION AND TERRORISM 
Horrifying images from the Childrens School in Beslan and earlier terrorist attacks made it more 
legitimate for the Kremlin to internationalize its idiom of the conflict as one that matched 
Western concerns about Islamic terrorism.172 Shamil Basaev was supposedly one of the senior 
leaders who took an increasing interest in a Wahhabist-direction. He left Chechnya several 
months in 1994 for the military training camp, Khost (al-Qaida’s main base), in Afghanistan with 
some thirty of his soldiers.173 It is assumed that Basaev there became part of the Wahabi jihad.174 
The notion that Basaev himself was a Wahabist is nonetheless disputed. Basaev came from the 
traditionalist Chechen highlands where Sufi Islam and Chechen customs, Adat, were observed. 
Shamil Basaev was allegedly himself named after the legendary Imam Shamil the Lion, and his 
birth town Vedeno, in the Chechen highland, was permeated by political and religious 
traditions.175 The association between the Chechen radicals under Basaev and al-Qaida were 
highlighted, and Putin was forceful in presenting the Russian position in international affairs.176  
Basaev second in command in Chechnya was the Saudi Arabian with the nom de guerre 
al-Khattab. In early 1995, when al-Khattab joined the Chechen resistance movement, he was one 
of Bin Laden’s senior commanders. Through these connections the Chechen insurgents were 
provided with money and military resources.177 The insistence, however, that there were many 
Arab fighters in Chechnya has been proven false. There were some, among them al-Khattab’s 
small group of fighters called the “Islamic International Brigade”, but not more than a few 
dozens all in all.178 
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Although using Wahabism as an ideological justification for acts of terrorism, “individuals 
such as Basaev would more accurately be described as militants or separatists.”179Close 
associates of the Chechen military commander such as Maskhadov, however, argue against 
Wahabi-influence on the Chechen fighters.180 They argued that Basayev was too traditionalist to 
be personally engaged with Wahabism. Political scientist Julie Wilhelmsen does not agree with 
Russian authorities’ version that Basaev and his followers or other Chechen insurgents were 
Wahabi or religious fundamentalists. They fought for sovereignty from Russia. She did, 
however, find that Chechen insurgents at times were intentionally associated with al-Qaida for 
pragmatic reasons i.e. economical funding and military training from sympathizers in the Middle 
East.181 
When Maskhadov on 4 January 1999 decreed that the religious Shari‘a laws should rule 
Chechen society, it caused outrage in the Kremlin and public opinion across the Russian 
Federation.182 The tradition of Shari‘a, however, is not foreign to Chechnya, although it has to a 
large degree been adapted to the reigning customs, adat. Maskhadov’s decree was by some 
regarded as evidence that Maskhadov was not a moderate, and that he supported Basaev more 
than he officially claimed to do.183 However, Maskhadov’s reason for introducing Shari‘a can 
have had many pragmatic causes. The Chechen President was unable to establish control over a 
post war society in anarchic conditions. He received no support from the Kremlin or international 
organisations. He needed to consolidate his power by trying to please more extremist tendencies 
such as Basaev’s radical Islamic rhetoric. As such, it was perhaps a desperate strategy.184 
Maskhadov was torn between choosing civil war or concessions to extremist groups.185 
Several factors provide a backdrop to the religious fervour gripping Chechnya in the 
nineties. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Muslim peoples of the Northern Caucasus 
were once again allowed to practice their faith, which had been suppressed by Soviet authorities. 
In the wake of the massive Russian reforms, a breakdown of the economy combined with 
faltering local and federal authorities, an increase in criminal activity and corruption in Chechnya 
was obvious. Islam’s message of equality and social justice, because of this, became very 
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appealing to a people who had lost their faith in the secular authorities.186 The brutalities and 
losses of war came in addition. Turning to religion in trying times is a well-known phenomenon. 
As a final point, similar to former days of Chechen resistance movements, Islam can once again 
have become somewhat synonymous with resistance in the small republic. 
The Dudaev-regime that led Chechnya into the first war with Russia, is considered most 
considered to have had little to do with Islamism. They did perform some traditional ceremonies 
in public, but these seem more of a façade than a real commitment, but it did bring support in the 
traditionalist areas.187 Nonetheless, the Kremlin said they were fighting bandits and terrorists. 
Individual Chechen insurgents did carry out terrorist operations. James Hughes suggests that “a 
balanced assessment of the use of terrorism by Chechens demonstrates that it has been used 
sporadically rather than systematically, and in reaction to Russian intervention.” He further 
claims that both terrorism and Islamization in Chechnya is a product of the conflict, and had in 
turn had significant impact on how the conflict developed and was perceived.188 
 “The conflict in Chechnya is still a separatist conflict – not a religious war, not a war 
against international terrorist networks.” The quote is taken from Julie Wilhelmsen conclusion in 
her dissertation on the relation between Chechen insurgents and Islam from 2004.189 Wilhelmsen 
thought that if the Kremlin pursued the same brutal tactics in the years to come, they would be 
responsible for a development in a more fundamental religious direction in Chechnya.190 Her 
assertion was supported by descriptions of how the Federal counter-insurgency operations have 
accelerated “the recruitment of individuals into the ranks of militant groups professing Islamic 
principles.”191 It can seem as if the Kremlin gradually through the application of rough methods 
has created the terror problem it all the way has claimed to be combating. 
For instance, many Chechen youth, especially boys, are at risk of being put into so-called 
filtration camps, suspected of insurgent activity on the grounds of being of the right age. These 
detention centres are often synonymous with torture, disappearances and death. Therefore, many 
young Chechens choose to join Islamic bannered groups that still fight against federal forces. 
Support from other Islamist political groups in the Middle East, or Africa, can additionally have 
encouraged stricter religious practise. A lot of moral support might also be secured for Chechen 
insurgents by being part of a global jihad, not only economical benefits. Global movements 
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strengthened by the use of the World Wide Web should not be underestimated in matters like 
these.192  
HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CASE OF CHECHNYA 
The wars played out in Chechnya challenged a whole spectrum of human rights obligations that 
Russia had recognized and committed itself to. Among the most fundamental human rights is the 
right to life and freedom from torture and ill-treatment. These are central in international 
humanitarian law, in “political binding” documents within the OSCE framework, and in many 
global and regional conventions and declarations, including the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR).193 Nonetheless, these are the rights Russian authorities most often have been 
criticized for violating. “In both wars, as in all developments in Chechnya over the last ten years, 
the trend has been from ‘bad to worse’.”194  
The extensive human rights violations in Chechnya have been thoroughly documented by 
NGO’s such as Amnesty International, Memorial, Doctors without Borders, Human Rights 
Watch, the Norwegian Helsinki Committee and others. The documentation has only increased in 
volumes. Despite this, the conflict has been neglected and experienced double standards 
compared to other conflicts such as the human rights situation in Kosovo. After 11 years with 
more or less constant armed conflict and violence, the Norwegian Refugee Council stated in 
2005 that “Chechnya constitutes the most serious human rights crisis in Europe today.” Based on 
documentation from humanitarian organizations such as Human Rights Watch, Amnesty 
International and Memorial, it was stated that the civilian population has suffered “grave and 
massive human rights violations, including extrajudicial killings, disappearances and torture, 
including rape.”195 The 1998 Russian law gave legal “protection” (immunity) to state officials, 
military and security personnel engaged in counterterrorism.196 The Russo-Chechen conflict’s 
brutality has not been confined within the borders of Chechnya. 
External journalists, lawyers and human rights activists that have been engaged with the 
conflict, have to an extensive degree had their lives threatened, and in many cases been 
murdered. The Russian journalist Anna Politkovskaya was perhaps the most well known of these 
activists. In October 2006 she was gunned down on her way home, after preparing extensive 
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documentation on the widespread and systematic use of torture by Russian forces and their 
proxies in Chechnya. Another menace to Russian society is the increase of Russian soldiers that 
return from warfare in Chechnya with damaged nerves, criminal minds, as drug-addicts or with 
alcohol problems, not able to function in every-day life. In Chechnya the infrastructure was 
severely ruined, the school system nonexistent and a whole new generation knows little beside 
war.197 
THE DYNAMICS OF CONFLICT 
Even with the above conflict elements in mind it is hard to tell why such a human tragedy came 
to unfold. An important premise for understanding a conflict is to take into account the dynamics 
of conflict. In accordance with this conflict-dynamics perspective it is not necessarily correct to 
talk about the reasons for a conflict, because the conflict may just as well consist of several 
conflicts intertwined. A conflict also goes through different phases with alterations of key issues 
and changing protagonists.198 
The dynamics of the conflict is thus an explanatory point of view that helps understanding 
the Russo-Chechen Conflict. To focus simply on Russo-Chechen history, geopolitics, 
protagonists, or terrorism is just not adequate. All of the above-mentioned explanatory factors 
have to be seen as interactive factors that have triggered or facilitated armed action. The Chechen 
conflict started off as a secessionist nationalist conflict within the Russian Federation ignited by 
the wave of the nationalist movements in the nineties. It soon developed into an armed standstill 
with guerrilla warfare and acts of terrorism as spotlighted ingredients. By the second half of the 
1990s the conflict was somewhat transformed “into a struggle driven largely by ideas based on 
religious and racial exclusivism.”199 The study of the transition of the Chechen insurgents from 
nationalists to jihad warriors is a good example of the dynamics of the Russo-Chechen war. The 
conflict has been so-called Chechenized because the Russian authorities have to a gradually 
degree fought through Chechen proxies. The violence has increasingly been carried out by 
Chechens against Chechens.200 
The best way to answer the two initial questions, “of all the Russian republics – why 
Chechnya?” and “why has Russia gone through two wars to keep this republic?” is by starting 
with a different question: Why did the first war take place? Several explanations and alternative 
explanations can, as shown, be found. Nonetheless, as soon as the first war had started the 
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conflict changed. Many of the protagonists radicalized and so on. The situation was severely 
changed after two years of war and Chechnya lay in ruins. Russian families had lost thousands of 
sons as soldiers in Chechnya, the Chechen society was thoroughly brutalized and acts of 
terrorism were escalating outside Chechen borders. The state of Chechnya and the causes of the 
second Russian war are therefore probably to be found in the fact that the first war was launched, 
and that no one took responsibility to get Chechnya back on its feet after the first war. The causes 
of the conflict today are results of the first and especially the second war and the brutality that 
was exercised, rather than the “bad historic relations from the days of the Tsar” or the 
geopolitical Russian interests for that sake. Therefore, the answer to the second question may 
invalidate the first question. If Russia had not invaded Chechnya in 1994, Chechnya might not 
have been the republic maintaining the claim to sovereignty in such inexhaustible manner. 
Perhaps that was a consequence of the war. 
 Today the “peace” in Chechnya is ruptured with violence, insecurity and unemployment. 
Armed action between insurgents and Federal Forces are still taking place every week and 
spreading to neighbouring republics such as Dagestan and Ingushetia. Militant and Islamic 
movements across the borders of the North Caucasian Republics are spreading violence, 
destruction and terror, also in the capital Moscow. It seems Yeltsin was right in his predictions of 
war in Chechnya in 1994:  
Intervention by force is impermissible and must not be done. Were we to apply pressure by 
force to Chechnya, this would rouse the whole Caucasus, there would be such a commotion, 
there would be so much blood that nobody would ever forgive us.201 
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Russia’s military offensive against the Chechen insurgents in December 1994 did not pass 
unnoticed in Norway. Fighting in North Caucasus was reported in Norwegian newspapers as 
early as November 1994.202 Further, on 13 December several Norwegian newspapers stated 
that Russian military forces had clashed with Chechen insurgents on numerous occasions.203 
One must assume that the Norwegian Embassy in Moscow had kept the Norwegian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, MFA, well informed on the situation, so that the news did not come 
unexpectedly to the ministry.  
Tidings of a war stirring in the North Caucasus had been generally talked about in the 
Norwegian media since 1992, and it is hard to imagine that it had not been discussed in 
diplomatic corridors.204 At this time, however, the Kremlin had launched conventional war on 
its own citizens in a part of their own state. Norway’s Labour Party Government, along with 
other Western governments, had to respond in some way to an increasingly violent situation.  
This chapter concerns how the Norwegian government responded and related to the 
eruption of the first Chechen war in December 1994 and throughout 1995. This chapter seeks 
to observe what dominated the Norwegian official response and approach. It is also an effort 
to see what means, i.e. political, economical or diplomatic, Norway had to affect the situation. 
NORWEGIAN RESPONSE TO THE RUSSIAN INVASION 
On the morning of 11 December 1994, around 40 000 Russian troops were ordered over the 
Chechen border. For all involved, the situation was rather gloomy from the outset. The 
Russian army was not well prepared for the neatly organised resistance arranged by Chechen 
officers, of whom many had their military ranks from the Soviet Army. The Russian’s 
equipment for intercommunication was poor, and their food supplies ran out at an early stage. 
The moral of the many young untrained Russian soldiers was reported by present journalists 
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to be low.205 Nevertheless, after about two months of bombardment from airplane raids, fierce 
ground combat and heavy casualties on both sides, the Russians captured the Chechen capital 
Grozny. The Chechen capital was almost levelled by the Russian bombing, and the civilians 
suffered badly during this phase of the war. Shamil Basaev, the young Chechen field 
commander formed the last Chechen military stand in Grozny,  then withdrew his division 
and went into the villages and forests of the Chechen highland to lead guerrilla warfare.206 
The first public Norwegian response to the Russian invasion came in a newspaper 
article in mid-December 1994. The article claimed that the Norwegian Defence Minister 
Kosmo had only reluctantly deprecated Russia’s military invasion. The journalist continued 
by saying that: “Norway and other Western countries are apparently afraid to damage their 
relations with Russia, and prefer to consider the conflict as an internal Russian affair.” 
Defence Minister Kosmo was quoted in the same article saying that he couldn’t regard the 
Russian invasion merely as an internal Russian problem.207 Foreign Minister Godal’s 
comments came two weeks later, on 2 January 1995, when he expressed his disappointment 
over the Kremlin’s attitude on the matter. The Russian government would not listen to advice, 
to be “sensible” and end the military action, Godal exclaimed. Then he added to his comment 
that it was an internal Russian conflict.208  
Siri Bjerke, State Secretary in the MFA, established in a news broadcast 7 January, 
that the Norwegian Foreign Ministry regarded the use of violence employed by the Kremlin 
as deeply disturbing. She declared that the MFA did not view the use of military force in 
Chechnya as an internal Russian affair, and underlined that Norway had protested to the 
Russian government.209 
When Norwegian Defence Minister, Jørgen Kosmo, again commented on Russia’s 
warfare in January 1995, he underscored the political unrest in the former Soviet Union and 
specifically remarked on what he called “a bloody and unintelligible war in Chechnya.”210 His 
address had a post-Cold War perspective and focused on what he regarded as challenges 
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linked to the new foreign political situation. He characterized the Russian situation on the 
whole as uncertain and unstable: “The way the conflict in Chechnya is developing, it is 
obvious that it will have consequences for the domestic political situation in Russia. It is too 
early to indicate, what kind of effect this will have on political relations between Russia and 
Norway.”211 
These representatives of the Norwegian government did not seem to agree whether the 
conflict was an internal Russian matter or not. In a recent interview however, former Foreign 
Minister Bjørn Tore Godal reiterated once more that the government had perceived it as an 
internal conflict.212 From the Norwegian government’s point of view the eruption of conflict 
in Chechnya was at first seemingly perceived as one out of many domestic disturbances 
occurring in the wake of the Soviet Union’s dissolution in 1991.213 
In addition there was great scepticism about the invasion in the Russian society at the 
time.214 This was also true among the officers in the Russian army.215 Many officers foresaw a 
recurrence of the quagmire war the Soviet military had fought in Afghanistan from 1979 to 
1989.216 Moral concerns were aired as well. A Russian general considered it a criminal act to 
use military force against the nations own citizens, and resigned in protest. In the course of 
the war, more than 500 other officers followed his demonstrative action.217 This scepticism in 
the Russian society was perceived as an indication that Russia was on the “right” and 
democratic path, and that the war would be brought to an end in the near future. It was to last 
over two years.  
Receiving the news of the total destruction of Grozny, Foreign Minister Godal 
remarked on 9 January 1995 that he was horrified by the development in the Chechen 
conflict. “This is regular warfare”, Godal said, seeming somewhat surprised. It seems as if the 
Norwegian MFA, as well as other Western governments, did not quite grasp the scope of the 
situation in the Chechen republic at first.218 
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WESTERN REACTIONS AND RESPONSES 
Most Western government’s reacted strongly to the Russian warfare in Chechnya. Norway’s 
reaction towards the invasion did not differ from the general set of reactions among Western 
European governments. Along with the Russian decision makers that launched the military 
operation, it seems as if most Western powers believed that it would be a short military 
operation to wipe out the Dudaev regime and stabilize the area. They were all surprised at the 
resistance that met the Russian soldiers. The Chechen people united behind a regime that was 
rather unpopular with most part of the Chechen population. This had not been foreseen by 
Russian authorities who, it has been claimed, thought they would be received as liberators.219 
The invasion quickly turned into a quagmire for the Russian military. Thus, the consequences 
of a prolonged armed conflict started to appear on television screens throughout the world.  
The devastating images made it harder for the Western governments to publicly 
support Russia’s military effort to preserve territorial integrity by such brutal means. When 
asked what his immediate response to the news of the invasion was, Godal claimed years 
afterwards that his principal worry had been the civilians situation. He had felt: “a strong 
surmise that human rights were not first priority among the Russian military forces.”220 War 
brings out the best and the worst no matter who is involved and the Russian army had a 
reputation of faltering discipline in its ranks.221 The decade that had commenced with 
optimism regarding freedom and democracy in Russia was taking an ugly turn. 
The French Foreign Minister Alain Juppe warned Russia that a prolonged military 
campaign could damage Russia’s efforts to get more involved in Europe. He added that if 
Russia continued to undermine human rights in the Chechen area then the French reactions 
would come in much harsher terms.222 The German Chancellor expressed his opinion by 
saying that the Russian military campaign towards Grozny was “pure madness”. Vice-
President of the USA, Al Gore, claimed he had warned the Russians in December 1994 not to 
go through with the military campaign.223  
To most of the Western governments, the criticism remained rhetorical.224 This does 
not necessarily mean that it cannot be considered as a form of sanction. According to historian 
Quentin Skinner words and theories are not empty phrases. Rather, they are conscious and 
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mindful attempts to alter and reinterpret the world through the words that are chosen to 
describe it. The battle for words and definitions is an attempt to influence how the world is 
arranged through the attempt to dictate how we understand and talk about it. Skinner 
distinguishes the importance of how legitimacy is conditioned by the reining linguistic and 
political universe. This limits the potential legitimization and thus the potential act. It is even 
more important that if someone wants to achieve change, they have to be able to legitimize 
it.225 
In accordance with this thinking, Norwegian authorities did not just utter critical 
words towards Russia by condemning its invasion of Chechnya, but actually acted by 
condemning Russia’s action. It can thus be considered a Norwegian political act in the same 
way as launching a sanction of sorts against Russia. Also by uttering a condemnation together 
with several other governments Norway took part in establishing what was a state’s legitimate 
conduct or behaviour at that time. The condemnation can be seen as an effort to make 
Russia’s decision makers change their minds about the military intervention and make them 
see that it was not the right way to proceed to solve the conflict. 
As Yeltsin was making efforts to establish a Western inspired state and society, this 
effort of trying to make Russia “ashamed” of its conduct in Chechnya may have been 
effective in the first period. Norwegian diplomats and Foreign Minister Godal also “felt” that 
this approach had an effect on the Russian decision makers and that a common understanding 
existed.226  
The Danish government became the exception among the Western governments early 
on. Danish Foreign Minister Niels Helvig Petersen was one of the more critically outspoken 
Western politicians, who also put some practical measure behind his statement.227 The Danish 
government postponed ratifying the Partnership for Peace Treaty (PFP) as a direct 
consequence of the military invasion. The PFP had been launched at the NATO Brussels 
summit in January 1994. The intention with the PFP was to facilitate transparency in national 
defence planning, budgeting processes, the democratic control over defence forces, as well as 
enhancing respective peacekeeping abilities and capabilities through joint planning and 
exercises.228  
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Nonetheless, despite Gore’s initial statements, Yeltsin soon received support and 
understanding for the intervention from Warren Christopher and William Perry, respectively 
USA’s Secretary of State and Defence, and eventually also from President Clinton himself.229 
What brought on this ambivalence in the Western governments’ reactions? An anonymous 
diplomat stated one of the first days of January 1995 that the West was placing all their bets 
on Yeltsin. The diplomat’s cynical conclusion was that it was not worth spoiling Western 
relations with the Kremlin over the conflict in Chechnya.230 The diplomat’s analysis has since 
been backed up by researchers and academics. “On the issue of Chechnya, the self-interest of 
states and the international organizations in preserving good relations with Russia, and 
protecting the material dimension of the relations, has consistently trumped concerns over 
other more value-based issues such as democratization and human rights”.231 The West had 
formerly put all their money on another horse, namely Gorbachev, who was ousted from 
power in 1991.232 The track favourite had become Yeltsin.  
“In terms of scale and abandonment of international laws on rules of engagement, 
Chechnya was comparable to the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unlike Milosevic, however, 
Yeltsin was a reformer considered to be sympathetic, compliant even, to Western interests.”233  
The West had invested in the success of Yeltsin’s domestic reforms and was not going to 
abandon him over Chechnya.234 It is asserted by many that the USA and the Western 
European states did not pressurize Yeltsin during the first war mainly for fear of damaging the 
more important strategy of keeping Yeltsin in power.235 Lecturer of politics at the University 
of East Anglia, Mike Bowker’s presentation of Western responses in his article “Western 
views of Chechen conflict” pretty much sums it up: 
Thus throughout the crisis the Western governments have always publicly backed 
Moscow’s policy on Chechnya. The West has refused to recognize Chechnya’s claim, 
and has accepted Moscow’s right to defend its territorial integrity, if necessary by force 
(jus ad bellum). On the other hand, the West has occasionally spoken out against Russia’s 
conduct in the war and the violation of human rights by the Russian authorities (jus in 
bello), but it has always been reluctant to back such rhetoric with any kind of meaningful 
sanction.236  
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SECESSION – AN UNWANTED CHILD OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 
The emphasis on territorial integrity is an important explanatory factor of how Norway and 
the West in general dealt with the Russian warfare. The West sympathized with Russia’s loss 
of territory compared to the geography in the days of the USSR. Professor in Russian regional 
studies at the Norwegian Institute for Foreign Affairs (NUPI) Iver B. Neumann argued that 
this was the reason for Godal’s careful comments on the matter. In addition did neither 
Germany nor Norway favour a situation with a large country in a labile fragmenting situation, 
Neumann stated.237  
In accordance with Neumann’s analysis, State Secretary Jan Egeland defended the 
Norwegian policy from accusations of being too mild towards the military invasion. He firmly 
established that Norway had never recognized Chechnya as an independent state, nor had any 
other country for that matter.238 Egeland stated that there was a difference in regards of the 
Baltic nations that had received support from Norway in their struggle for independence and 
Chechnya. Russia had ruled Chechnya for a much longer period of time and Chechnya had 
not been a sovereign state before the USSR, as the Baltic nations had been.239 Egeland also 
claimed that if Chechnya or any other regions within Russia wanted to claim their 
independence, this had to be done by peaceful means.240 The fact that Russia had invaded 
Chechnya three years after its sovereignty claim, and that the Chechen secession had not been 
an act of war, was not considered in his comment. Neither did he discuss the fact that 
Chechnya had never actually recognized Russian rule. In the article he supported the political 
custom that had developed with the dissolution of the communist unions Yugoslavia and 
USSR.241 
Foreign Minister Godal was clear on this point in the interview, where he stated that 
the Norwegian government had been resolute not to support a separatist movement in Russia 
at the time. Norway did not want a more fragmented Russia. This was, he said, a foreign 
political concern that Norway shared with other governments.242 Throughout the winter of 
1995, statements by France, Germany, and the USA supported this line of thought.243 
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Thus, when US president Bill Clinton, in one of his more spectacular speeches, 
compared Yeltsin with Lincoln and the Chechen war with the Civil War in the United States 
of America in the 1860s, he made clear an important point about secession: it is unwanted in 
today’s world of international politics.244 In the article “The Sustainability and Future of 
Unrecognized Quasi-States”, Professor of Russian and Central European and Balkan Area 
Studies Pål Kolstø enunciate this: “In the post WWII period, the unwritten rules of 
international relations have contained extremely strong restrictions against the creation of new 
states.”245 Further, he added that secessionist states will in “most cases – eventually be 
reabsorbed into the parent state or agree to an autonomous status within the parent state in a 
federal arrangement. This last outcome is the preferred option of the international 
community.”246 
Iver B. Neumann (NUPI) summed up the Norwegian response in four key terms in 
accordance with Kolstø’s view: internal affairs; territorial sovereignty/integrity; international 
consensus; and diplomacy. He mentioned that there had been approaches by Western 
governments towards the Kremlin, i.e. diplomatic attempts in regards of the Chechen conflict. 
But these attempts were exception, because most of the political world outside Russia had 
responded carefully, and there had been put little pressure on the Kremlin in this particular 
matter. Neumann’s arguments were in line with the narrative above, but he went even further 
by narrowing it down to one word: realpolitik.247 
It seems obvious in the Norwegian government’s response that it wanted to keep in 
line with the rest of the western world. There was of course no way of knowing how the 
conflict would develop and the responses that came from the MFA have to be seen in light of 
this. The Russian military campaign was legitimized by the Kremlin through the argument of 
preserving territorial integrity. The conflict was by the Norwegian Government perceived as 
an internal separatist conflict, to avoid further encroachment of Russia’s territorial integrity.248 
As showed above, this was also to a certain extent seen as legitimate by most of Western 
governments.249 There was an international consensus that this kind of secession was 
unwanted and an understanding that Russia had to go to war to avoid further disintegration. 
Diplomatic activity to preserve good relations with the Yeltsin government was first priority. 
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Yet, there was a Western ambivalence in the reaction to the military invasion due to the 
“excesses” and “lack of proportionality” in the Russian response to the Chechen insurgency.250 
The outrage and unpopularity the military invasion caused both inside and outside Russia, and 
the availability of the conflict through mass media forced the Western government’s to 
respond. 
The response however, except for Denmark’s sanctions of postponing agreements, was 
mostly diplomatic and performed through “Skinnerian” speech-acts, such as condemnations 
of the disproportionate use of violence. No other practical political, economic or military 
sanctions were effectuated. However, what means did the Norway have to affect the situation 
in Chechnya? In accordance with the general international pattern of response and motion of 
disdain towards the Russian military action, Foreign Minister Godal sent a letter of protest to 
his Russian colleague Andrej Kosyrev.251  
GODAL’S LETTER TO KOSYREV 
Norway’s Ambassador in Moscow, Per Tresselt, delivered Godal’s letter to Andrej Kosyrev. 
In the letter Godal demanded that the fighting should come to a complete halt and 
negotiations had to be initiated. Godal’s letter maintained that “the situation in Chechnya is 
not only a tragedy to the area itself and Russia, but to the entire international community”. 
Godal demanded full stop in the war in order to start negotiations.252 
Furthermore, the letter suggested that the conflict could threaten the democratic reform 
process in Russia, and encumber on the many parties involved in the reforming process. It 
stressed the violations of basic human rights that the civilian population was being subjected 
to by Russian forces. Godal stated in the letter that the conflict could not be solved by military 
means. In addition, it was of the greatest importance that the International Red Cross and 
United Nation’s High Commissioner of Refugees was given the opportunity to assist with 
humanitarian aid. Increasingly many Chechen civilians became internally displaced (IDPs) 
and the civilian populations were suffering severely. Shortly after the Russian invasion, in 
December 1994, Norwegian Ambassador Tresselt offered Norwegian humanitarian aid at a 
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meeting with Russian authorities. The offer, however, was declined as the Russians told 
Tresselt that the situation did not call for it.253 
Godal’s letter requested, furthermore, that his Russian colleague Andrej Kosyrev 
should work with international organizations to find a solution, primarily through the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Looking back, Godal believed 
that the Russians had listened to the criticism that came with regards to the conflict. He 
argued that Norway was the one country, within the NATO framework, that Russia at the time 
had close and good relations with. Godal thought this created some Russian goodwill towards 
Norway. He added, however, that the Russian reactions to Norwegian criticism ranged from 
total rejection and accusations of false propaganda to sincere reflection over the situation.254 
Russian Foreign Minister Kosyrev had been appointed Prime Minister by Boris Yeltsin in 
October 1990.255 He had been elected to the State Duma through the Murmansk Oblast in 
North West Russia and was rather Western-oriented. Although Godal felt he and his Russian 
counterpart were on the same wavelength, Kosyrev’s views on matters were not necessarily 
shared by his colleagues in the Russian government.256 Godal stated time and again the need 
to involve the OSCE, but he avoided suggesting whom within the OSCE that should take the 
lead.257  
The OSCE had only a couple of years before developed from the Conference for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe into an organization broadly recognized from West to 
East. Russia was already integrated in the OSCE, and therefore it was considered even more 
appropriate to deal with the conflict there. Russia was very sympathetic to the OSCE, and 
wanted to see OSCE become an alternative to NATO.258 Russian military intervention in 
Chechnya broke several agreements within the OSCE and other agreements and treaties 
Russia had inherited through the USSR. This is also true whether the Russo-Chechen conflict 
was perceived as an internal affair or not, or whether Russia’s right to intervene with armed 
forces was recognized or not.259 In this regard, Russia undermined the legitimacy of the 
organization it constantly promoted to be the main organization for security in Europe. 
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NATIONAL SECURITY AT THE CROSSROADS 
In 1995 Norway was at the crossroads with regards to national security and defence policy, 
and this may have affected how Norway related to the Russian invasion. Russia was in a 
labile state and still a powerful neighbour with massive military resources. It was at this time 
also on the warpath in its own state. Norway was still a small state dependant on importing 
security. The international security structure was rapidly changing and for Norway it was 
important to keep up, especially with the changes in NATO and the EU. After preserving 
western security since 1949, NATO lost its raison d’être when the Warsaw Pact dissolved. 
With the fall of the iron curtain a lot of the member states wondered what would happen to 
the Alliance. Some believed it would be dissolved. However, NATO had been tailored into a 
modern suit. At the 1990 NATO summit in London, it became clear that the organization had 
“both the will and the ability to reform itself in order to meet new challenges.”260 NATO 
established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, NACC, to include the former East Bloc 
nations in a consultative relationship. In 1994 the Partnership for Peace was instituted. This 
programme took NACC a step further with the same countries being able to cooperate with 
the alliance about defence strategy, military planning and participation in peacekeeping 
activities.261 
Through President Yeltsin the Russian Federation had moved toward cooperation with 
NATO, and NATO had established a permanent joint council to include Russia on a 
permanent basis. From the beginning of the process Norway had stressed the need for an open 
dialogue with Russia on the broader problem of European security. In this regard Norway had 
initiated the Euro-Arctic Barents Sea programme to transcend borders that had been 
impossible during the Cold War.262 According to Foreign Minister Godal, Norway had a more 
open and close dialogue with Russia than any other Western government.263 Increasingly 
deeper disagreements between Washington and EU over security related issues came to the 
fore in this period. Norway was still a member of NATO and a neighbour to Russia, but also 
one of three European nations outside the EU, after the Norwegian population once again had 
turned down membership in the1994 referendum. The first had been in 1972.264 The power 
triangle consisting of EU, USA and Russia was somewhat imbalanced to Norway. If the USA 
decided to pull out attention and efforts from Europe, Norway would be dependant on the EU. 
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The attention towards the so-called High North where Russia and Norway meets also received 
less attention from NATO and EU in this period.265  
Efforts in the EU towards creating a common foreign policy through the European 
Political Cooperation, EPC, were steadily becoming more effective. Causing more concern 
with the Norwegian government, perhaps, was the efforts towards revitalizing the Western 
European Union, EU’s Defence and Security arm.266  The Norwegian government feared that 
Norway could become completely sidelined in Europe and completely dependent on the US. 
As a result, Norwegian national security became a prominent issue for the government.267 
Godal told the Norwegian parliament that remaining outside the EU, Norway had fewer 
possibilities of safeguarding its own interests. He claimed that Norway was marginalized in 
the establishment of an international framework, where Norway as a member could have 
promoted its own interests. The foreign minister pressed the importance of bilateral relations 
with the respective European nations to keep at least one foot inside Europe. In addition, he 
said, it became more important for Norway to make efforts in the international forums where 
Norway was a full member, for instance NATO and the UN.  
What happened with regard to the EU would to a large degree be decisive to how the 
relations of the Central- and Eastern European countries and how NATO developed.268 Godal 
was accused by several Parliament members of “whimpering” over loosing the national 
referendum on Norwegian membership in the EU. The Labour Party wanted membership in 
the European Union and considered it a serious problem to remain an outsider. The political 
parties opposed to Norwegian membership in contrast perceived it as an advantage.269 
Nonetheless, the labour government perception of this as a problem made them work 
intensely to secure Norwegian interests from outside the European Union.  
PROMOTING NATO’S ENLARGEMENT 
NATO had concurrently with EU’s enlargement, announced ambitions to extend the list of 
members. This would have political implications on the Russo-Norwegian relations. Russia 
was not particularly fond of the idea, and Norway supported it. From the Norwegian 
government’s point of view a NATO enlargement should be in accordance with other 
integration processes in Europe and strengthen European cooperation structures. The 
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government wanted to make sure that a NATO enlargement in an eastern direction, 
incorporating Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Hungary, would unite the need to 
preserve the alliance’s core functions with a broader European perspective.270  
According to Godal it was vital for Europe that the relations between the USA and 
Russia were in a manner of cooperation and not confrontation. Russia needed to be part of the 
all-European cooperation processes and not isolated, he said. Norway’s security was greatly 
affected by the development of Central and Eastern European countries’ relations with both 
NATO and the EU. Norway had important interests to preserve due to its geopolitical 
situation and being Russia’s neighbour.271 Norway’s efforts in preserving good relations with 
both Russia and NATO, was a solid Norwegian tradition, consistent with Norway’s policy 
towards the Soviet Union throughout long stretches of the Cold War.272 
With his eyes fixed on Russia, Godal meant that it was apparent that the foreign 
political- and security situation had changed the last years. Godal claimed that the war in 
Chechnya was an illustration of the conflict potential in a new era. The explosion of ethnic 
conflicts in the nineties created uncertainties and chaotic discomfort. The new challenges for 
regional security in regards of the extended security idiom of many small ethnic conflicts 
could not be handled by NATO alone in Godal’s opinion.273  
On 9 March 1995 Foreign Minister Godal held an address on security issues at an 
international conference at Bolkesjø.274 He claimed that it was very important for Norway to 
have regular and close contact with both NATO and the Kremlin in the process of an 
eastward bound NATO enlargement. The speech was focused on Russia’s position. Godal 
said that time had come to formalize the relationship between Russia and NATO. This could 
take place in the shape of a cooperation agreement that reflected Russia’s special position in 
Europe, as a regional great power. One natural aspect would be to have regular meetings at 
different political levels. “Strengthening the relations with Russia is perhaps the single most 
important factor to hamper new confrontations and deviations in Europe.”275 Godal’s 
statement with its emphasis on Russia underscored how momentous this was in the eyes of the 
Norwegian government. The liberal perspective is here obvious. Stressing the importance of 
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incorporating Russia into Western structures shows how Norway tried to use international 
political structures to stabilize Russia’s position, and thus, promote its own security. 
Godal made it clear that to enlarge NATO was not an unfriendly act towards Russia. 
He said this was very important to emphasize, “given that Norway and Russia are 
neighbours”. He wanted to ensure that Russia was not faced with unpleasant surprises and that 
the cooperation was bilateral. However, this did not mean that Russia had a veto, and further 
that the Russians would have to agree to certain fundamental principles. “The actions and 
events in Chechnya is a dramatic example to a conflict we cannot accept”.276 Godal’s language 
in this speech demonstrates Norway’s clear support for the NATO enlargement, while at the 
same time appeasing Russia’s aversion to this action.277  
In November 1995 State Secretary Siri Bjerke met with the Russian Vice Secretary of 
the Russian National Security Council, Vladimir Rubanov, to discuss the upcoming election 
of the State Duma (the Russian Parliament) and NATO’s enlargement in an eastern direction. 
Rubanov was originally in Oslo to attend an academic conference on the conflict situation in 
the Caucasus, but agreed to meet with the Norwegian MFA.278 According to Bjerke their 
conversation dealt with general issues, and no bilateral issues or problems were brought up. 
Rubanov claimed that both Russia and Norway wanted stability in Europe and that the peace 
negotiations in Chechnya strengthened the possibilities for a peace arrangement at that point 
in the war.279 
Bjerke emphasized that from a Norwegian point of view, it was important that NATO 
had a central part to play in the development of the new security structures in Europe. 
However, she also underscored that the relations with Russia needed to be strengthened, 
because Russia’s role in the new European security structures was vital.280 The early 1990s 
was perceived as a change of paradigm in Western relations with Russia, and Bjerke showed 
how important it was perceived to be to include Russia in this. However, Russia was invited 
on Western premises. If the choice was up to Russia, OSCE would have replaced NATO.281  
Bjerke maintained that Norway supported the enlargement of NATO, but asserted to 
Rubanov that it was going to take some time before the enlargement would take place. She 
said that Norway understood the Russian concern with regards to the enlargement. Rubanov, 
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on his part, focused on specific areas of cooperation with NATO, not least within the 
framework of Partnership for Peace. The opposition against NATO enlargement was huge in 
Russia, and several leading politicians had strongly spoken out against it and criticized the 
Western position in this matter. The only clear exception to the many different views on the 
outlining of foreign policy in Russia was exactly the unanimous protests against NATO 
enlargement.282 From the Russian side it had frequently been repeated that a NATO 
enlargement would bring the alliance’s eastern borders all the way up against Russian 
territory.283  
RUSSIA – A MOMENTUM OF WORRY IN NORWAY 
The Chechen conflict caused great concern in Norway. Defence Minister Jørgen Kosmo 
claimed that he feared that Yeltsin had lost control over the military. He was also worried 
about the reports of massive human rights violations in Chechnya.284 It seems as if Norwegian 
decision makers did not know what to make of the Russian authorities at the time. They 
expressed themselves in worried, even, astonished terms regarding the Russian authority’s 
actions and declarations. “Next month we’re heading to Washington D. C. to discuss these 
issues”, Kosmo told the Norwegian newspaper Aftenposten.285  
It was the development in Russia that concerned Kosmo the most. The Defence 
Council was called upon for the first time in many years. It had been established in 1934 and 
functioned as a forum of meetings between the Norwegian military and political leadership. 
There had been regular meeting activity between 1948 and 1955, but from the late fifties the 
meetings occurred sporadically. Eventually the Council had become a peripheral institution 
and a debate forum for discussions on budgetary questions. This was seen as a token of the 
supremacy of the political leadership in Norway and shows that the military leadership had 
less influence on the creation of Norwegian security policy.286  
Kosmo thought there were obvious reasons to be alarmed by what was happening in 
Russia at the time. The situation in Chechnya gave the impression that there had not been any 
good coordination between the civilian leadership and the military leadership. In regards to 
the civilian management of the Russian army, it had been somewhat of a worrying-factor to 
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the Norwegian Authorities the last couple of years.287 Senior Researcher Neumann said that it 
was not clear how the decision to invade Chechnya had come about. He hypothesized that it 
could be the military trying to cover up problems among its top brass. Signals had also 
pointed in the direction of a more political active military and that they were already 
controlling parts of Moldova and Tadzhikistan through political influence.288 The state Duma 
had been sidelined in its opposition to the invasion of Chechnya. It had voted forth a 
resolution stating that the handling of the crisis was unsatisfactorily. The resolution was 
reportedly barely commented on by Yeltsin’s staff. It seemed as if Yeltsin’s government as 
such had little to do with the decision, but that the responsibility was to be found in the 
Russian Security Council.289 
“What is happening in Chechnya clearly shows Kremlin’s lack of ability to handle 
domestic political issues in a common political and democratic way. This does not make us 
feel safer. It is too early to draw conclusions of what we are now observing in Russia”, 
Kosmo stated.290  He had noticed that some Russian political commentators had observed 
tendencies to a more authoritarian and centralized governing. He continued his statement by 
saying that if this were the case, it would have clear implications for Norwegian politics. The 
situation, in Kosmo’s view, did not encourage relaxing Norwegian security policy in the high 
north.291 Kosmo was seemingly not very optimistic on behalf of Russia’s democratic 
development. What implications Kosmo were thinking of can only be guessed at, but it seems 
as if he thought Norway would not have the stabile, European and democratic Russia that it 
had imagined in 1991 as a neighbour in the near future. 
Kosmo remarked that Russia’s behaviour in Chechnya was a violation of international 
agreements and conventions Russia had signed and inherited directly from the Soviet Union. 
First and foremost, regarding to basic human rights and the civilian population’s right to 
protection in crisis and conflict: “The systematic bombing of apartment flat areas is clearly in 
violation of humanitarian law.” The Defence Minister wanted the Council of Europe and the 
UN to apply pressure on the Kremlin.292 He did not, however, say in what way this should be 
done. Kosmo was considerably more outspoken than his colleague, foreign minister Godal, 
when he commented on the situation in Chechnya. 
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Senior Researcher Neumann remarked that Norway had been caught in a jam with 
regards to its great neighbour. As the rest of the West, Norway feared that Chechnya was only 
the first target and that the next thing to go could be the entire reform policy and glasnost. 
Although Godal had protested concerning Chechnya, Neumann did not think that Norway 
dared to take their criticism too far without broad backup. Norway was a vulnerable small 
neighbour state, he stressed.293 The tendency was that Norway criticized the violations of 
international laws and human rights violations, but was ambivalent as to how eventual 
sanctions should be initiated. 
State Secretary Siri Bjerke in the MFA confirmed Neumann’s assumptions. She said 
that the war in Chechnya was a serious strain on the dialogue between Western governments 
and the Kremlin. However, “eventual economical sanctions or non-dialogue with Russia is 
out of the question. That is not a solution, and can have unprecedented consequences for 
Norway.”294 Bjerke stated that Norway’s policy was political pressure on Russia, support to 
the OSCE’s presence in the conflict area, and humanitarian aid.295 The political pressure 
consisted as far as can be seen, of communicating to Russia that its actions in Chechnya were 
unacceptable. In a constructivist perspective this is in accordance with the idea that actors can 
have definition power and thus define what legitimate conduct is. Norway was here taking 
part together with other Western governments in defining what was legitimate conduct, and 
“trying to convince” Russian authorities of this. As the Western governments in many ways 
had monopoly on this structural ideological power, it can also be considered in a realist 
perspective of strategic use of soft power. Bjerke made the point that Norway’s decision 
makers perceived their options as few in regards of responding to the conflict situation.  
Although Norway had little hard power to place behind it condemnations, there were 
other options. Denmark, for instance, set an example with its postponement of agreements 
with Russia. Why did not Norway perform similar actions on their many fields of cooperation 
with Russia? Was Norway afraid of its grand neighbour? State Secretary Bjerke did not 
elaborate on what was encapsulated in the expression “unprecedented consequences” in 
response to eventual Norwegian sanctions. It probably did not refer to a potential Russian 
military invasion. Still, it may have referred to the fear that Russia would sabotage 
cooperation in areas essential to Norway, for instance the cooperation to destruct nuclear 
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waste in the High North. Norway had more at stake than Denmark, which did not share 
borders or bilateral administration of natural resources with Russia. 
NORWEGIAN HUMANITARIAN AID 
In response to the military invasion and the ongoing war, Norway could, in addition to 
attempting to convince Russian authorities to end the war, assist with humanitarian aid. In 
early January 1995 Siri Bjerke encouraged Norwegian NGO’s in a news-broadcast to 
contribute with humanitarian aid in Chechnya. She avowed that the MFA would regard all 
initiatives for humanitarian aid as positive and that the MFA would support these by 
economic means.296 Initially the Norwegian government gave two million Norwegian kroner 
(NOK) to the International Red Cross.297 
However, two million NOK and two months later, the NGOs that had applied for 
economical means had not received the support they had been promised. Stein Støa of the 
Norwegian Refugee Council had asked for 9 million NOK in humanitarian aid to help 
Chechen refugees. After a month they had not received an answer. Støa suggested that it was 
a problem of bureaucratic tardiness. He saw the authorities’ lack of response as “incredible”. 
Applications for humanitarian aid usually moved with speed through the system but 
apparently not this time, he said.298 Yet, the MFA’s press spokesman Ingvard Havnen rejected 
the accusation of bureaucratic tardiness. He claimed that it was hard to find cover for it in the 
MFA’s budget, and added that there was no intention of handing out more money at the 
present time.299 Then on 16 March 1995, the MFA gave seven million NOK in humanitarian 
aid divided between the Norwegian Red Cross, Norwegian Refugee Council, the Norwegian 
Church Aid and the UN High Commissioner of Refugees.300 
Gunnar Andersen, also in the Norwegian Refugee Council, summed up his view on 
the situation in an interview in mid-March. He claimed that the Norwegian MFA had used too 
long a time on the treatment of the applications for humanitarian aid to Chechnya. 5-6 weeks 
passed before they received a response to the applications and UN appeals for economic 
support. In addition, he thought that Norway gave too little economical support to ease what 
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he called a humanitarian catastrophe in the North Caucasus.301 Andersen argued that both the 
slow treatment and the low amount granted, was connected to the fact that Russia was not on 
the OECD-countries list of states that could receive aid. He stated that political will could 
have overcome these types of bureaucratic hinders.302 In October 1995 a press release stated 
that the MFA gave a new nine million NOK in support of the humanitarian situation in 
Chechnya. The press release stated that by this additional support, Norway had in total 
contributed with 18 million NOK the first year of the war. The contribution was assigned the 
continued precarious situation of the civilians in Chechnya.303   
Compared to other conflict and humanitarian catastrophes Norway has given little 
support to Chechnya. Compared to the humanitarian support given to the former Yugoslavia, 
the Chechen humanitarian crises received small amounts. Between 1991 and January 1995 
Norway supported Yugoslavia with 400 million NOK in humanitarian aid. This was the 
largest humanitarian effort in Norwegian history.304 By anticipating the events and jumping 
forwards in time, this is made even clearer: In 1999 when two humanitarian crises unfolded 
one after the other in Kosovo and Chechnya, Norway allocated NOK 575 million to 
Kosovo.305 What was allocated to the situation in Chechnya and the humanitarian crises is not 
to be found in any gathered total.  
Perusing the 1999 and 2001 annual reports for Norwegian engagement for human 
rights, Russia and areas within Russia are not enlisted in the statistics. Chechnya is mentioned 
in the reports, but is not to be found on the statistical overview.306 In oral question-time on 19 
January 2000 foreign minister Vollebæk was asked about what efforts had been made by 
Norway to ease the humanitarian situation in Chechnya. Vollebæk responded that Norway 
had been among the first to contribute with economical aid to the area. He continued by 
stating that: “up till now NOK 20.3 million kroner has been distributed to this end.”307 The 
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foreign minister ended his reply by stating that the government would consider giving more 
money if it received an appeal for aid, but added: “The problem with Chechnya is that it has 
been difficult to get in means and equipment, precisely because there has been an ongoing 
war there.”308  
NEW AND IMPROVED RUSSIA 
The Norwegian authorities seemed consoled by the resistance within the Russian society 
towards the war in Chechnya. They saw in these democratic forces at work, and seemingly the 
resistance would put an end to the war. The Russian leaders also gave the impression that the 
war would be short. In March 1995, an attempt was also made to bring the conflict to a cease-
fire, but it was fruitless.309  
The warfare continued with Russian progress and international pragmatic blessings, 
but also with more brutality. Word came out that Russian troops had committed massacres in 
the villages they went into. The most infamous episode was in the village of Samashki on 7 
April 1995, where over a hundred civilians were killed and had their houses and barns burnt 
to the ground by Russian soldiers.310 News about the character of the war, and the harsh 
Russian methods reached Western governments, and Western media. The protests within 
Russian society against the warfare in Chechnya had so far not led forth. The war was in its 
fourth month, and still raging. Godal claimed that it was to a high degree uncertain if the 
parties in the conflict wanted a political solution. He claimed that it was of greatest 
importance that Norway used its bilateral contacts to pressurize Russia on the matter and that 
Norway would stand as central support to peace-initiatives by international organizations like 
the OSCE.311 A discrepancy between words and deeds was appearing:  
“All efforts have to be made to make sure that the Chechen conflict isn’t allowed to 
become a threat to the democratic reform process in Russia.”312 What did Godal mean by “all 
efforts”? In the particular situation Godal thought it best not to isolate Russia because of the 
conflict, but rather maintain political dialogue and use that to present Norway’s point of view, 
namely that of promoting a truce and negotiations for a non-violent political solution. In the 
name of political stability, it was in everyone’s favour that Russia continued the political and 
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economic reforms with economical support from the Western governments.313 Godal’s 
statements were in accordance with what his State Secretary Bjerke expressed in January. 
“Norway has great interest in furthering the economical and political reform process in 
Russia, and want Russia as an active partner”, Bjerke said in an open meeting about Chechnya 
initiated by the Refugee Council. She continued by saying that Norway was going to 
pressurize Russia, but that it would not be possible to go beyond the scopes of international 
organizations.314 What did Bjerke mean by pressure? Bjerke presumably meant verbal 
criticism, and mostly within international organizations. Norway was not going to take any 
sanctioning action against Russia alone.  
What can be deduced from Godal’s declaration of efforts? By what Godal continued to 
allege and express, it seems as if the main threat to the Russian democracy was not violation 
of human rights in Chechnya. It seems that Godal perceived withdrawal of political support 
and economic aid to Yeltsin’s democratic reforms as more threatening. The development in 
the civil society in Russia gives the opposite impression. The consequent support of Yeltsin 
says something about the perception of the situation at the time. Western governments 
believed they would strain a democratic political development by criticizing undemocratic 
actions performed by their democratic light-carrier Yeltsin. Professor Daniel Heradstveit at 
NUPI told Aftenposten that: “Western cynicism will turn out to be misfortunate realpolitik 
because it will not stabilize Russia, which is the West’s intention”.315 Heradstveit may 
retrospectively have been correct in his analysis. Western governments thought they were 
supporting a democratic movement. They did not want to sanction Russia for the invasion of 
Chechnya and the human rights violation in fear of disturbing this positive process. In practice 
Western governments ended up supporting undemocratic developments. This is however the 
wisdom of the present looking down its nose on the past.  
Human rights expert, Asbjørn Eide however, agreed with the Norwegian government’s 
policy. He said that it was difficult to proceed with any different policy in the Chechen case. 
There was no doubt that Russia was violating human rights through infringements of the 
civilians and terrorizing the population. In this way Russia was violating its responsibility in 
OSCE, Eide underscored. Eide thought the most important thing Norway could do was 
support democratic efforts and movements in Russia, not least through informal channels and 
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an active but silent diplomacy.316 Again, Eide’s statements showed how broadly based the 
perception of value diplomacy as an effective means to fight undemocratic ideas and conduct 
was at the time. One such channel where promotion of constructive ideas could be served was 
the newly established Euro-Arctic Barents Sea Region.  
The overall target for the government’s Barents initiative was in Godal’s words of a 
broad security political character.317 To establish a stabilizing pattern of cooperation between 
Russia and the Nordic countries had been the main strategic goal of the Barents co-operation. 
The Euro-Arctic Barents Region, commencing its third year of existence early January 1995, 
was presented as a Norwegian contribution to integrate Russia into European cooperation.318 
The second main aim was to strengthen the economical and social development in the Barents 
Sea region itself, and between Russia and Norway. The Barents Region had become a crucial 
part of Norway’s relations with Russia, and through it a vital tool to improve relations.319  
In the scope of Russia making a brand new effort to be democratic and European, 
Yeltsin, consequently, needed a victorious end to a war that was becoming increasingly 
embarrassing and politically burdensome both within the Russian Federation, and in relation 
with the Western governments and other international institutions. This came to the fore as the 
celebration of the peace 50th peace anniversary for the Second World War moved closer in 
time. The celebration was taking place in Russia and was hosted by President Yeltsin.320 
PEACE ANNIVERSARY WITH THE CHECHEN CONFLICT AS BACKDROP 
On 9 May 1995, Norway’s Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland met one international 
politician after the other during the commemoration of the end of the Second World War. The 
prime minister was reportedly satisfied with the meeting with her Russian colleague Victor 
Tsjernomyrdin. Prime Minister Brundtland told the press that she had made it perfectly clear 
to him that Norway reacted strongly against what was happening in the Chechen war.321 As a 
silent and symbolic protest against the war in Chechnya, none of the Western leaders were 
present during the military parade on the Poklonnaja-hill.322 “The Russian leadership did not 
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question the minimal participation of the World Community in the settlement of the conflict; 
in turn, the latter did not expect to achieve much.”323 
Peace negotiations in the Russo-Chechen war was brought on by a large Chechen 
hostage operation barely a month after the peace anniversary. Chechen field commander 
Shamil Basaev’s birth town, and stronghold of the separatist movement, Vedeno, had fallen 
after a Russian air raid. 11 members of Basaev’s family were reportedly killed, including one 
of his wives and two of his children. Seemingly as a result Basaev took 30 of his men into 
Russian territory on 14 June 1995, notifying neither the Chechen President Dudaev, nor his 
senior commander Aslan Maskhadov.324 In the Russian city of Budennovsk he launched a 
mass hostage taking, a huge operation involving approximately 1200 hostages. The goal was 
to pressure the Kremlin to negotiate. The situation turned into a passé once more, and a cease-
fire was established. The peace-efforts made by both sides seemed to settle things into order, 
for a while.325 By the end of 1995 heavy fighting re-erupted.326 
While Norway and other Western governments verbally exclaimed their abhorrer over 
the Russian conduct, attempting the sphere of influence, battles between Russian troops and 
Chechen insurgents continued to be fought. The civilians of Chechnya were caught in the 
midst. 
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________________________________________________________________ 
A second large Chechen hostage operation in Russia transpired on 6 January 1996. Receiving 
massive attention in international media, the operation became a reminder to the Kremlin and 
the Western governments of an ongoing war. “Norway is strongly against the utilization of 
hostages in the Chechen conflict”, said Foreign Minister Bjørn Tore Godal when asked to 
comment on the hostage situation 15 January.327 However, he did not want to comment any 
further due to lack of information on the situation. His only source of information had so far 
been CNN. Godal ended the press conference by encouraging “the parties to refrain the use of 
violence”.328 
The sitting Labour government had expressed its antipathy, and protested, towards the 
Russian warfare in Chechnya throughout 1995, in line with many other Western governments. 
The government had not followed its condemning rhetoric with measures of economic or 
political sanctions, or otherwise. Besides encouraging Russia to refrain from violence – what 
was Norway’s policy towards the first Russo-Chechen War? In terms of room of manoeuvre – 
what diplomatic, political, and economic means did Norway have to affect the situation in 
Chechnya? What could Norway do, and what did they want to do? 
JANUARY 1996 
In a peaceful part of Europe heated discussions were taking place: A debate on whether to 
accept or reject Russian membership in the Council of Europe in Strasbourg was the cause of 
the fuss among the member states.329 The continued Russian warfare in Chechnya was seen by 
many in Norway, and other member-countries, as the main objection to Russian membership 
in the Council.330 The subject had already been discussed over several years, and Russia’s 
application had previously been rejected.331 In Norway there were clear disagreements on this 
question between the Labour government, who was positive, and oppositional political parties 
in the Parliament.332 
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That the Chechen insurgents were by no means neutralized and the war was not over 
had become clear when Chechen commander Salman Raduyev launched the “lone wolf” 
operation on 6 January 1996.333 He was seemingly copying Shamil Basaev’s large operation in 
Budennovsk. Near the Dagestani border town Kizlyar in Pervomayskoye district, Raduyev’s 
unit had assaulted a federal military helicopter airfield. The armed group destroyed two out of 
three helicopters and killed about thirty people in the attack. Raduyev then led his unit into the 
town itself and reportedly took between 2000 and 3400 inhabitants hostage in the town 
hospital buildings. After a few hours they released all but 120 of the hostages and headed 
towards the Chechen border in buses. The federal forces attacked the bus convoy by air 
artillery, and the Chechen fighters sought shelter in the nearby Dagestani village, 
Pervomayskoye. For eight days Chechen insurgents and Russian forces fought and by the 
time the Chechens escaped, the small town was completely in ruins. There were several losses 
on both armed sides, and many civilians were killed in the rumble.334  
In the following six months, there was no Russo-Chechen refrain from use of violence. 
Instead, the war raged at its most volatile throughout the first six month of 1996, until a peace 
agreement was reached in July 1996.335 At the same point in time, about 600 000 people 
reportedly voted with their feet against the conditions in Chechnya. Almost 200 000 ethnic 
Chechens were internally displaced (IDPs), and both ethnic Russians and Chechens were 
fleeing over the border to the neighbouring republics, seeking shelter from the storm.336 
PROMOTING RUSSIAN MEMBERSHIP – A DEMONSTRATION OF NORWEGIAN 
CONSENSUS ORIENTED FOREIGN POLICY 
The Norwegian Labour government followed the same course as the preceding year, when it 
supported Russian membership in the Council of Europe in January 1996. The Labour 
government had its mind set on voting in favour of Russian membership and was supported 
by the Liberal party of Norway. The Norwegian Progress and Conservative Party, however, 
were against accepting Russia as member, as long as the Chechen war prolonged. The 
Conservatives though, did not want the parliament to instruct the government on this matter, 
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and therefore voted against a proposition by the Progress Party, intended to deny the 
government to vote in favour of Russian membership.337  
The Russo-Chechen conflict did not only stir the surface of Russo-Norwegian 
relations. The conflict raised fundamental questions of human rights and a discussion of what 
distinguished internal conflict from other conflicts. As the 1990s saw an “explosion” of ethnic 
conflicts inside sovereign nation states, these questions concerned many Norwegian 
politicians in general, and were openly discussed in Parliament. Did Parliament influence how 
the Norwegian government treated the Russo-Chechen conflict in this first period? The 
question is posed to see if domestic pressure was put on the government and to analyze the 
situation in a domestic perspective. Due to the level of brutality, the conflict came to be 
mentioned and discussed several times in open parliamentary sessions. At this time it is not 
possible to investigate if the situation in Chechnya was on the agenda of the Extended 
Committee of Foreign Affairs.338  
The necessity for Norway as a small state to have a reining national consensus on 
foreign affairs has been generally agreed upon since Norway was granted independence in 
1905.339 Among the Norwegian political parties there has, in addition, traditionally been little 
foreign political interest. Two foreign political subjects have been the source of much debate 
and political disagreement: NATO and the EU. The consensus tradition was seen as especially 
important throughout the Cold War when Norwegian security policy was firmly placed within 
NATO and based on close cooperation with Washington. A political split has been apparent in 
what the diverging political parties considered important. The left-wing parties were usually 
more concerned with humanitarian aid and global peace efforts, whereas the Conservatives 
and the dominant Labour party were, roughly speaking, more concerned with state security, 
geopolitics and economy. The compromise between the political left and right had formerly 
been to put as much effort into the UN, as they did in NATO. That policy was maintained 
through the 1990s.340  
The general consensus was not disrupted by the Russo-Chechen conflict. Little effort 
was in reality made by Parliament to make the government do anything radical or front a 
different policy towards the conflict. The Russo-Chechen conflict was discussed in 
parliament, and some of the parties expressed themselves as being disappointed by the way 
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the government handled it. However, the debates mostly functioned as a forum where the 
conflict could be discussed and agreed upon. It could also be considered a “test ground” for 
the government to see how much the Russo-Chechen conflict engaged public opinion and 
how much money for humanitarian aid it should allocate. In early 1995 a strong cross-party 
stance in parliament had expressed that the Norwegian government had to follow a sharper 
tone in its condemnation of Russia’s abuses in Chechnya.341  
The Centre Party, prior to the parliament debate, had in 1995 been the only Norwegian 
political party that had criticized the government publicly on its response to the Chechen 
conflict. In Norwegian newspapers the Centre Party demanded a tougher approach towards 
Russia. The party had also written a letter to the Norwegian MFA in an effort to encourage a 
more direct criticism towards Russia on the matter. The Centre Party stated that Norway 
should bring the issue to the OSCE. Although Godal had been positive about bringing the 
case to the OSCE, he had not taken the initiative for Norway to do this. The Centre Party 
thought that Bjørn Tore Godal had been too careful in his statements regarding the Russian 
military invasion and were sceptical to his definition of the conflict as an internal Russian 
affair. The Central party’s concern may have been deep felt, but it was also an opportunity to 
promote itself as more concerned with human rights than the government, thus creating 
goodwill in domestic politics. This can in many ways be considered as an oppositional attack 
on the sitting government. The chance to alter what the opposition had viewed as a too soft 
policy by Labour towards Russia, came little over a year later, when three of the oppositional 
parties in the Parliament formed a new government.  
RUSSIA AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE 
In Europe it was widely believed that Russian membership in the Council of Europe would 
enhance security and stability in Europe, but also strengthen the democratic forces at work 
within Russia. This was the main argument on the “pro-side”. This way of perceiving the 
situation was also why not only the Government, but also the majority of the Norwegian 
Parliament ended up supporting Russian membership.342 Bjørn Tore Godal confirmed this 
explicitly when he said that the MFA “felt that through [Russian] membership in the 
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European Council Norway got an additional structure, which the Russians had to relate to and 
that could be a natural place to discuss basic questions.”343  
James Hughes, Professor of Comparative Politics, claims that with regard to Europe 
and Russia, two “prominent opportunities for the use of some form influence or 
conditionality” on the Chechen situation occurred in the mid-nineties. They were both in turn 
neglected.344 The first one came precisely when Russia applied to join the Council of Europe 
in 1995. The application was initially suspended due to the war in Chechnya.345 The Council 
had not stopped evaluating Russia’s application, although Russian membership had been 
postponed. During the meeting of the Council’s Political Committee in Copenhagen in 
December 1995, an updated and critical report on Russian membership had been put forth. 
Nonetheless, German, French, and other Western European leaders, one after another, 
publicly endorsed Russian membership.346 
The Parliamentary Assembly of the Council commenced the final debate as to whether 
Russia should become member of the Council. The debate resulted in a plenary vote the 
following Thursday. The result had been expected to be the 2/3 in favour that was needed to 
welcome Russian membership. However, doubts had been raised during the discussion after 
the last hostage incident in Chechnya. Acceptance of Russian membership had been fairly 
clear prior to the “lone wolf operation” and the Russo-Chechen showdown in Pervomayskoye. 
The Kremlin received a hasty visit from the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, 
Daniel Tarschys. The visit had the sole mission of discussing further procedures in light of the 
development in Chechnya with the Russian leaders.347  
The leading politicians in the Kremlin, consulted by Tarschys, however, were of the 
opinion that they shouldn’t afflict Russia with another prestigious defeat. The matter had 
already been suspended a year before, due to the armed conflict in Chechnya.348 It had also 
been commented, or threatened, that a negative outcome in the Russian membership matter 
would be perceived as indirect support to those who wanted to solve the Russo-Chechen 
conflict with inhuman methods and terror.349 
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Russia was elected into the Council of Europe as the 39th member on 25 January 1996 
by 165 parliament votes against 35. Another 15 had withheld their vote.350 Russia was 
included on the terms that the Russian actions in Chechnya were attuned with their 
international obligations, and treaties of the Council.351 Boris Yeltsin and Western European 
governments had just prior to the voting made a real effort of lobbying in the halls and 
corridors of the Council of Europe. Yeltsin himself was very proud of the achievement and 
took much credit for having achieved Russian membership. Yeltsin’s Russia was given one 
year to ratify and sign the ruling conventions on human rights, protection of minorities and 
forbid and put a stop to the use of torture.352 In contrast, the oil wealthy Azerbaijan with 
numerous Western oil investors, including Norwegian Statoil, was not accepted as a member 
until 2000. The main reason was all along the unresolved dispute between Azerbaijan and 
Armenia, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.353 
The Western European governments saw Russia’s membership as a victory and 
support for the pro-western forces in Russia. However, not everyone agreed with Yeltsin and 
his supporters in the Western European governments. The Russian human rights activist 
Sergei Kovaljov appealed to the Council of Europe not to open up for Russian membership 
unless the Council insist that Russia respect human rights and follow the political situation in 
Russia very carefully. Others critical to Russian membership pointed to the fact that the 
Council’s own Commission of Human Rights (ECHR) had stated that Russia could not be 
considered a legal state and did not fulfil the membership criteria.354 Hallgrim Berg, of the 
Norwegian Conservative party, and the Swiss Christian-democrat Dumeni Columberg, voted 
against Russian membership. They felt that the Council’s legitimacy was weakened, because 
they did not consider Russia as a constitutional democratic state.355 On the other side the 
Socialists, Christian-Democrats and Liberals in the Parliament acclaimed Russia’s 
improvement in areas of democracy, especially regarding liberty of speech and free media.356 
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DISAPPOINTING RUSSIA – A DEMOCRACY MISCARRIED? 
It seems as if the Norwegian government in 1996 still, more or less, perceived Russia as 
something that was daily becoming more European, as did many other Western leaders. This 
again seems to have affected how Norway related to the Russo-Chechen conflict. With the 
wisdom of hindsight it can seem as if the Norwegian government, as well as other Western 
governments, had some misperceptions about Yeltsin and the new Russian democracy.357 In 
most public statements Labour government officials spoke positively of Yeltsin and his newly 
democratic Russia. Foreign minister Godal said he felt he had very good contact with his 
colleague Kosyrev, and Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, as I will show below, wrote 
something of a tribute to Boris Yeltsin after his visit in Norway.358 
In the mid-1990s, however, the perception of Russia’s leadership did seem to change 
slightly in Norway. From being overly enthusiastic about Yeltsin and his reforms, more 
scepticism crept into the public discussions on Russia. Many commentators and politicians in 
Norway saw a new course of a more nationalist turn in Russia that the surrounding world had 
to deal with from that point on.359 Professor of Political Science has described what he has 
called the “misery discourse” of how Russia was portrayed in Norway increasingly from the 
mid-1990s. Norwegian reporters delivered news about poverty in Russia, alcohol problems, 
the nuclear waste problems in the high north, and the Russian prostitutes and organized crime 
crossing the border over to Norway in the north. In contrast, they presented Norway as the 
sound and helpful neighbour that provided advice and aid to the “poor giant”. 360  
State Secretary Åslaug Haga, of the Bondevik I government, confirmed this image of 
Russia painted in dark colours, almost astonishingly accordantly. When addressing an 
assembly at the Carnegie Endowment for Peace, in Washington on 19 October 1998 she gave 
focus to the “alarming state of nuclear safety in north-western Russia”, and problems “typical 
of present-Russia, such as corruption, organised crime, official inertia, and a breakdown of 
political, economic and social networks. She told the American audience that some of this 
“social confusion” was already spilling over into Norway. Among them “busloads of Russians 
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on tourist visas including Russian woman who prostituted themselves for lack of other 
income, smugglers of Russian vodka and cigarettes, and I am afraid sometimes even people, 
guns and drugs.”361 She said she did not want to be too pessimistic, but that Russia was stilling 
sinking deeper into crisis. However, the Russian society had shown itself resistant to crisis.362 
Changes also took place on the Russian political scene. Most of Yeltsin’s “family” 
had, naturally enough, had their careers within the Soviet Communist Party. It was the same 
Russians that woke up on the morning of 26 December 1991, although the Soviet flag had 
been raised for the last time the day before.363 Nonetheless, during Yeltsin’s first period, the 
process of completely reforming the main structures of society was commenced. Russia was 
rapidly transformed into an open economy with decentralized political structures, except for 
the highest federal level. Although these changes were real and evident enough, there were all 
the time conservative forces wanting to return to a communist regime, and a less Westernized 
course. This divergence in the broader debate on Russian foreign policy was at this time split 
in two main ideological blocks: the pro-western liberals, called the internationalists or 
atlantists; and the nationalists or the neo-patriots.364 
The turn away had accelerated since 1993, when what has been called a “honeymoon” 
period in Russian foreign policy thinking on the West.365 This became more apparent when 
Godal’s friendly counterpart, the atlantist Andrej Kosyrev, left the Yeltsin government, along 
with five other ministers, after the Russian parliamentary election 17 December 1995. It 
seemed as if Kosyrev left by own will, but he had the preceding year received several political 
blows, some dealt to him by President Yeltsin himself, and others by opponents of a more 
nationalist conviction. He was replaced by Jevgenij Primakov.366 The 66 year old Primakov 
had until this appointment been leader of the Russian Federal Foreign Intelligence Service 
(FSB).367 Primakov was not as interested in the Barents Sea or other projects underpinned in 
the West as his predecessor had been. 
Foreign Minister Vollebæk, who succeeded Godal in 1997, regarded the perception of 
Russia and Yeltsin at the time retrospectively in an interview. He recalled that the Norwegian 
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government had not naïve in its perception of Yeltsin, although Yeltsin had been viewed as a 
positive force that opened up the Russian society and someone who made it possible for the 
common man in the street to be more politically involved.368   
However he recognized that there had occurred a change between the first Yeltsin 
period around 1991 and the period where Vollebæk was in government. In 1991 bilateral 
relations with Russia had seen a wholly different dynamic. During the first years there was 
considered to be more possibilities for influence, cooperation and interaction in the northern 
areas. In the mid-1990s it changed with the appointment of Primakov and others. The process 
of democratization staggered in the mid-1990s and Yeltsin’s connection with former allied 
reformers were broken.369 The Norwegian government had worried about the development, 
but all along there had been hopes of further improvement despite the setbacks. The invasion 
of Chechnya had been seen as a warning-signal. It was perceived in Norway, according to 
Vollebæk, as a dilemma of how to support the positive tendencies in Russia without 
compromising on important ideals and values. The government saw the Russian democratic 
development as a course in the right direction, if not a course in a straight line. The discovery 
of Russian intelligence officers attempting to recruit Norwegian spies in Norway, and other 
spy-affairs came as a huge surprise to the Norwegian government, who thought that those 
days had ended with the end of the Cold War.370 
Criticism against authoritarian tendencies came increasingly also forth from within 
Russian society.371 The Russian Bellona co-worker Alexandr Nikitin was arrested in January 
1996 on grounds of uncertain charges. Human rights activist Kovaljov thought that Norway 
should get engaged with the matter on behalf of Nikitin. Kovaljov was in Norway to accept 
the Helsingfors Committee’s Sakharov Award for his work with peace efforts and human 
rights in Chechnya. Norwegian interests were also touched by this matter, because Norwegian 
environmental workers in Bellona had indirectly been accused of espionage.372  
Kovaljov encouraged Foreign Minister Godal to talk to Primakov about Nikitin’s legal 
security during his visit in Moscow. Kovaljov met with State Secretary Siri Bjerke and the 
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Parliament’s committee of foreign affairs during his stay.373 The 65 year old man had recently 
resigned from the chairman position of the President’s human rights committee. For the 
occasion he had sent a very critical letter to the President with an account of what he 
considered an unfortunate development.374 When Godal had his first meeting with his new 
colleague, foreign minister Jevgenij Primakov, in Moscow 2 March 1996, he mentioned 
Nikitin and his case. Reportedly, they then discussed NATO, but did not bring up Chechnya 
at all.375 At the end of this introductory meeting Primakov announced that President Yeltsin 
was “finally” visiting Norway.376 
PRESIDENT YELTSIN’S VISIT TO NORWAY 
On 25 March 1996 Yeltsin landed on Norwegian soil where he was received by the 
Norwegian Crown Princess Martha Louise. The main assertion as to why Yeltsin chose to 
visit Norway was that a “Norway-visit” would most likely be a positive contribution to his 
election campaign at the time. The Russian president had already suspended his Norway-visit 
twice, due to ill health.377 He had also had a series of unfortunate public performances, where 
he among incidents “overslept” to a meeting with the President of Ireland. In general he often 
seemed drunk and unstable whenever he appeared.378 Yeltsin was in his final phase of the 
Russian Presidential election campaign and he needed goodwill. The election date was set for 
June, only months away, and his reasons for visiting Norway was therefore thoroughly 
discussed in Russian and Norwegian media.379 Norway and Russia had some issues to work 
out. Nevertheless, it was reckoned to be a nice event to be received by the King and Queen of 
Norway and to discuss, for instance, how well the cooperation in the Barents Sea was going. 
In other words, it would give Yeltsin a convenient chance to show himself and his 
government off to the Russian voters from the best possible side.380 
A few days before Yeltsin’s arrival there were many speculations on what the Russian 
President wanted to discuss. Spokesman for the Prime Minister told the media that if Yeltsin 
should choose a tough approach, he would receive the answers that were needed, already 
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explained to Russia by NATO’s Secretary General Javier Solanas, and US Foreign Minister 
Warren Christopher.381 The Prime Minister expressed by this comment that Norway was 
firmly within the alliance with NATO and the US, and would provide the same answers as 
Solana and Christopher. The first “talks” between Yeltsin and Prime Minister Gro Harlem 
Brundtland were to take place under “four eyes only”, except for the interpreters and 
referents. There were also going to be talks between Foreign Minister Godal and Minister of 
Fisheries and Coastal Affairs and their counterparts. The Norwegian Prime Minister, the 
spokesman said, would be likely to mention the Chechen war, though the Prime Minister’s 
advisors thought that a “soft” approach towards Yeltsin was important. The Norwegian 
government was going to pay attention to Yeltsin’s “tone-of-voice in the conversations”, not 
least when it came to international matters.382 This strategy of precaution clearly shows that 
Norway did not want to step on Yeltsin’s toes during the visit.  
For Norway, Yeltsin’s visit was an important opportunity to further dialogue with its 
great neighbour. The Norwegian government seemingly wanted the visit to run as smoothly as 
possible. If Yeltsin did not want to discuss Chechnya, inquiries about human rights, 
seemingly, were not going to ruin the good atmosphere. Yeltsin’s “tone-of-voice” was 
composed and friendly during his entire stay and this facilitated conversation on most areas. 
Next to the question of the nuclear facilities on the Kola Peninsula, most of the time had gone 
by discussing the bilateral marine delimitation between the continental shelves and the 
economical zones in the Barents Sea. The Prime Minister, according to “centrally placed 
sources”, had brought forth a map, whereon she drew and described and explained to her 
Russian guest, how and why the remaining issue could and should be solved.383 Earlier on, the 
Russians had wanted to make the disputed area into a common area. It had become confirmed 
that Norway and Russia really needed a defined border. While negotiating the border line, 
they also wanted to discuss how they could cooperate on the petroleum resources that were 
expected to exist in the area.384 
Four agreements were reached and signed during Yeltsin’s stay in Norway. The first 
agreement was a 14 pages very general common statement on the status of the relationship, 
expressing common desires to develop it further. A second agreement on common taxes was 
achieved and a third agreement on trade and economical cooperation, and a fourth protocol on 
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the fulfilments on the Petsjenga-Nikel project were also signed. “That was one more 
agreement signed than expected”, said Prime Minister Brundtland.385 
NATO’s plans of enlargement were not formally discussed, although Yeltsin openly 
criticized the plans in speeches and press conferences during his stay. Only minutes before 
Yeltsin had left Moscow for Norway, he had warned Norway and NATO of the planned 
enlargement in an eastern direction.386 As to the Chechen conflict, the Norwegian Prime 
Minister Brundtland had ”openly” made clear the concern that reining both in Norway, and 
throughout the world, about the conflict and the humanitarian situation. Yeltsin responded by 
telling the Prime Minister about the “peace-speech” he was going to make the upcoming 
Sunday and that he wanted to try to end the warfare within June the same year. 
TO WHAT END? 
The Russian media emphasized Yeltsin’s need to make an effort to dissolve the Russian 
military campaign in Chechnya because of the upcoming election.387 Various polls were 
conducted in Russia with questions relating to the Russo-Chechen war throughout the first 
war. The results showed that the war was increasingly unpopular in Russia, and increasingly a 
burden to Yeltsin’s image as a democratic politician.388 “The peace-process plan launched in 
April 1996 can therefore be seen as largely driven by the presidential campaign.”389 The 
Russian President was homewards bound and his visit was very positively referred to in the 
Russian media the days after his return from Oslo.390 Yeltsin had gained what he sought in 
Norway. 
A week after Yeltsin’s visit, Norway’s Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland had an 
optimistic op-ed about Russo-Norwegian relations published. “It favours Norway in every 
possible way if Russia has success with their reforms. Therefore we have to support a positive 
development, politically and by a strong economical engagement.” In that way, Brundtland 
thought Norway would have the best chance to affect the development.391 Brundtland’s 
commentary in Aftenposten 3 April 1996 was a tribute to the good cooperation with Russia 
throughout the centuries and to the areas that were functioning well.392  
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Despite making it clear that Norway could not accept the war in Chechnya, she did not 
think it would get better in Chechnya if the surrounding world showed their opposition to the 
war by closing doors or reducing the aid that could contribute to Russia’s progress.393 She 
stated that it would not help the Chechen people to isolate Russia on areas where Norway and 
Western countries could help. Her vision was that if the West proceeded in such a rejecting 
way, Russia would follow its own path and that would not do anyone good. She continued by 
stating Labour’s strategies for the Barents Sea cooperation. Norway was building a 
framework for new openness, growth and new optimism, she wrote, not least through the 
Barents sea-cooperation, where Russia was Chairman.394 It is evident from the Prime 
Minister’s comment that she was convinced that Russia was on the right path, and if only the 
West “showed the right way”, it would continue in the right direction. 
Gro Harlem Brundtland was indeed selective when she chose her images of the 
democratic Yeltsin. For instance she described the image of Yeltsin in front of the White 
House in Moscow, on top of a tank with his megaphone during the coup attempt in September 
1991. However, she did not mention when Yeltsin had attacked the Russia parliament with 
armed forces in 1993.395 She added to her op-ed that the image of the warfare in Chechnya 
also was a strong image that “we cannot accept.” It can almost seem as if the Norwegian 
government regarded President Yeltsin as somewhat of a “good Tsar” who could not be held 
responsible for the acts of his brutal footmen. 
THE LEBED-MASKHADOV PEACE AGREEMENT 
On 31 August 1996 the first Russo-Chechen war was officially brought to an end with the 
signing of the Khasavyurt ceasefire agreement also called the Lebed-Maskhadov peace 
agreement.396  Yeltsin and the Kremlin had been serious about ending the armed conflict. 
Yeltsin was re-elected for a second period, and the peace process plan was on schedule. The 
negotiations had been facilitated by the head of the OSCE Assistance Group in Chechnya, 
Tim Guldiman. The group had been established at the 16th meeting of the OSCE Permanent 
Council on 11 April, 1995.397 The negotiation process had been led by the Russian general, 
Security Council Secretary, and newly appointed envoy to Chechnya Alexander Lebed, and 
the Chechen field commander Aslan Maskhadov. When President Dudaev was killed by a 
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Russian missile the process sped up.398 The political status of Chechnya was to be decided 
upon in negotiations within a period of five years. Russian federal troops began to withdraw, 
although the last troops were not out before the end of 1997. Russian policy towards 
Chechnya, after this, was characterized mainly by passivity. No serious negotiations on the 
status of Chechnya, as prescribed in the Khasavyurt agreement, took place, since both sides 
were stuck in their positions and not open for compromises. Russia chose not to support the 
relatively moderate Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov, against his more radical 
challengers.399 
BJØRN TORE GODAL’S STATEMENT ON HUMAN RIGHTS 
Bjørn Tore Godal’s statement to the Parliament on human rights on 10 October 1996 touched 
upon most troubled areas in the world. Russia was conspicuous in its absence. Firstly, Godal’s 
statement contained brawny proclamations of Norwegian efforts:  
Never before have so many people who are imprisoned, persecuted or missing received so 
much effective assistance from Norwegian diplomats or relief organizations. Never before 
have we so actively confronted power-seeking leaders with specific violations of human 
rights and concrete proposals for improvement.400 
He continued by stating that the active line Norway was pursuing was not without cost. 
Norway was occasionally the target of serious accusations by regimes that wanted to avoid 
becoming focal point of Norway’s critical attention. His following example was Kenyan 
authorities. Godal did not provide an example where Norwegian security or national interests 
was at stake. Godal referred to the UN when he stated that military force to stop a state from 
violating the rights of its citizens should only be applied if international peace and security 
was at stake. The international society had a right and a duty to react when states failed to 
display a minimum of respect to its citizens: “In such cases, the principle of national 
autonomy must take second place.”401 In the eyes of the Norwegian government, dialogue and 
incentives were the best way to promote human rights, and this was put to effort in all 
bilateral relations Norway had. 
The government’s opinion was that economic sanctions should only be used as “a last 
resort when other measures have been tried and found wanting.”402 He argued that the political 
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results might be difficult to predict and did not always correspond to the intentions. The 
government did not view unilateral Norwegian sanctions as an effective means of exerting 
pressure. The symbolic effect was argued to be stronger in Norway than abroad. It is usually 
easy for regimes to find substitutes for relations with Norway. It could also have 
disproportionately severe effects on Norwegian industry and could undermine confidence in 
Norway as a trading partner.403 Unilateral Norwegian sanctions will seldom, if ever, Godal 
said, be an effective means of exerting pressure. Norway is small and vulnerable, and the 
government objected to the idea that countries could boycott another without being authorized 
by the UN.404Godal was aware that the government was occasionally criticized for being 
inconsistent in the measures it employed or for using apparently conflicting measures. To this 
he remarked that the means should always be adapted to the ends, and the overriding 
objectives should be to always find ways of improving the situation as effectively as 
possible.405
The statement proceeded by leading the Parliament through a couple of cases. China 
and Indonesia were two regimes where the Norwegian government had chosen to maintain 
dialogue even though it was concerned with the human rights situation. Norway recognized 
the social and economic progress that had been made in China and also the great challenges 
the large society was facing.406 By comparison, there were plenty of reasons to criticize human 
rights violations in Russia in general, and Chechnya in particular. But the Norwegian 
government chose not to. In fact, Godal did not even mention it. An integral part of the 
government’s commitment to human rights was the concern about the treatment of minorities 
such as the Kurds and the Tibetans. The situation in Russia had similarities to quite a lot of 
the cases he mentioned. 
Norway could support or perform sanctions against regimes, even if they were not UN 
based. On request by the leader of the democratic forces in Burma, Aung San Suu Kui, the 
government supported isolation of the military regime in Burma. This was done through 
economic sanctions and international censure. Due to the issue of the Fatwa regarding the 
publication of Satanic Verses by Salman Rushdie, Iran was an additional country that in 
Godal’s opinion represented a totally unacceptable violation of the most fundamental norms 
of international law, which normal relations with could at the time not be maintained.407 
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On the question of why Russia had been excluded in the statement, Godal has stated 
that he could not remember. He added to his answer that at times the government could avoid 
mentioning the state in concern to see that it did not disturb eventual processes at hand. 
However, he took the precondition that it did not necessarily concern this particular episode. 
Even though Norway at the time seemingly “had a thing” for secret negotiations, there was 
nothing to indicate that Norway was involved in the North Caucasus at the time.408  
Peace processes were at hand in Chechnya at the time. An OSCE mission team had 
been sent with Norwegian representatives. State Secretary Jan Egeland had a year previously 
commented to journalists that, due to Norway’s “status” as peace facilitators in the mid 1990s, 
several requests for mediation were received also from the Caucasus. Egeland concluded his 
view on the matter by stating that the government had to decline inquiries if they did not meet 
the requirements for Norwegian engagement. That is, Norway had to be represented in the 
area preferably on “both sides” of the conflict, there had to be Norwegian expertise on the 
area available, and “both parties” had to have confidence in Norway.409 Norway seemingly did 
not have any representatives in the North Caucasus that could have established such 
mediation contacts as they had in Guatemala, for instance. Even if they did, it is by no 
indication given that they would have involved themselves without Russia’s acceptance. 
THE KILLING OF INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS EMPLOYEES IN NOVYE ATAGI 
Tragic news reached the Norwegian MFA on the morning of 17 December 1996. Unknown 
assassins had killed six expatriate employees of the International Committee of the Red Cross 
(ICRC) in the small Chechen town of Novye Atagi. Among the victims were the two 
Norwegian nurses – Gunhild Myklebust and Ingebjørg Foss.410 The ICRC hospital they 
worked at was financed and provided by the “people of Norway and the Norwegian 
government as a gift to the Chechen people”.411 It had at first been somewhat of a tug of war 
with the Russian authorities before Norway was allowed to place it in Chechnya.412 The 
violent incident in Novye Atagi caused withdrawal of most Red Cross Workers.413 
State Secretary Jan Egeland exclaimed that Norway’s government wanted a clear 
message to reach local and federal authorities in Russia and Chechnya: those responsible for 
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the atrocities had to be captured.414 He continued by stating that a similar impairment had 
never struck Norwegian or International aid work before. Spokesman of the MFA, Ingvard 
Havnen said that this was probably the worst attack on Norwegian aid workers that had ever 
taken place: “The MFA is shocked by what has happened, and the MFA will provide all 
possible assistance in regard of it.”415 Nevertheless, Norway did not want to send police to 
Chechnya to investigate the murders. They received invitation to participate in the 
investigation from Chechen spokesmen to the Nordic countries, Usman Fersauli. Ingvard 
Havnen, spokesman for the Norwegian MFA, said the department had concluded that it would 
not make much difference and that the MFA trusted that Russian and Chechen authorities did 
their job.416  
Spokesman Havnen was asked if the episode would have consequences for Norwegian 
efforts, i.e. the hospital and Norwegian health workers and OSCE observers, in Chechnya, 
whereby he responded that it was too early to comment on. Havnen claimed that more 
information was needed. He added that before the incident there had been a general 
impression, based on observations of the Norwegian MFA and the ICRC, that the security of 
the ICRC employees had been satisfactory.417 Aid-worker Terje Engevik, who had been part 
of the Norwegian Red Cross mission group that decided where the hospital should be placed, 
supported this as he said that Novye Atagi had been considered completely safe.418 
Nonetheless, the overall security situation in Chechnya had been just as labile to 
foreigners as it had been to Chechen citizens since the first outbreak of war. Already within a 
month of the establishment of the hospital, in September 1996, there had taken place a 
threatening incident at the grounds of the Hospital. Norwegian journalist Kjell Dragnes 
reported that the guerrilla leader, Basaev’s secundant, the Saudi al-Khattab, came to the 
hospital and demanded that the crosses, the emblem of the Red Cross, were taken down. The 
intruding armed group quarrelled with the elders of the village surrounding the hospital, and 
the elders had managed to calm down the intruders.419 The episode ended by a settled 
compromise where the red crosses, except for the emblem above the main entrance, were 
painted over with white paint.420 
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The Khasavyurt Peace-Agreement signed in July had not made the situation much 
better. In contrast to the official peace in Chechnya, episodes like the one that occurred in 
Novye Atagi showed that it was a fragile hiatus and that armed groups were still ranging the 
area. In September 1996 Elisabeth Ranheim, a Norwegian nurse at the hospital in Novye 
Atagi, reported that they received persons with gunshot wounds every single day, although 
there had been a declaration of peace in the area three months previously.421 Aid workers had 
several times before this media covered incident been threatened and kidnapped in the region. 
Kidnapping had been a rather frequent phenomenon for some years.422 
A while after the attack on the Red Cross hospital the security situation was regarded 
too dangerous, and the result was that other humanitarian aid organizations withdrew their 
people from Chechnya, among them Medicines sans frontiers (MSF) and Medicines du 
Monde.423 OSCE was the only remaining international organisation represented in 
Chechnya.424 
HUMANITARIAN AID 
Humanitarian aid had been a way for Norway and other countries to contribute and provide 
assistance to the civilians in Chechnya. It had supported the civilian population with a hospital 
and personnel. The security situation, however, derogated to such a degree, as seen above, 
that all efforts were withdrawn for a period. By the winter of 1997 the Norwegian government 
had given NOK 1.5 billion to humanitarian efforts. The main priority areas had been the 
former Yugoslavia, central Africa, the Palestinian territories, Afghanistan and Sudan. In 
March 1997 State Secretary Jan Egeland in the MFA, raised doubts about the motives and 
effects of humanitarian aid in conflict regions.425  
Egeland claimed that humanitarian aid had been brought into the centre of 
international politics in the nineties. This contributed positively to the possibility of 
organizing operations that in only a few days could rescue hundreds of thousands of people in 
need. However, he also saw the potential for humanitarian aid to become a pretext for 
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powerful decision makers in organizations such as OSCE, the UN Security Council, and 
NATO, to avoid further political involvement in a conflict. If a humanitarian crisis was 
improved through humanitarian aid, the situation would not “demand” action. This could in 
turn make the surrounding world leave the situation be, indirectly prolonging the conflict, 
because the situation would no longer be completely desperate.426  
Vollebæk did not agree with Egeland’s overall view on this. He remarked that what 
Egeland stated, would be the same as abusing money to dodge political engagement. 
Vollebæk considered it more as a sign of a guilty conscience towards the civilians in those 
kinds of conflicts. According to Vollebæk the least external organizations or governments 
could do was to help civilians in warzones, especially when it was not possible to settle the 
conflict.427 Whether basic humanitarian assistance in Chechnya made the surrounding world’s 
demands for a peaceful solution less forceful or not remains an open question. The two 
possibilities here represented by Vollebæk and Egeland were both viable to the situation in 
Chechnya.  
PEACE TREATIES, INDEPENDENCE AND OTHER FRAUDS 
The OSCE played an important role in the first Russo-Chechen war. Head of the OSCE 
Assistance Group Tim Guldiman was by many seen to have been instrumental in facilitating 
the negotiation process that led to the Khasavyurt Agreement. In January 1997 the OSCE was 
going to supervise what would be the first and last national Presidential and Parliamentary 
election in the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria. Maskhadov was elected first Chechen president 
of the Chechen republic of Ichkeria in an election process, which was deemed by the OSCE to 
be decent and fair. There were some objections to the proceedings due to young men in 
groups harassing voters at a few places. These hoodlums were often supporters of Basaev, 
who came in second place to Maskhadov. Maskhadov had broad support as a moderate 
candidate in a war-weary population.428  
The OSCE also assisted in bringing about the Treaty on Peace and Principles of 
Mutual Relations between the Russian Federation and the Chechen Republic, signed by 
president Yeltsin and Chechen president Aslan Maskhadov in Moscow May 1997. 
Chechnya’s final status was stated to be settled within 2001 through negotiations. These 
negotiations did not come about as soon as Maskhadov was expecting. The Chechen president 
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was fighting a strenuous battle to maintain authority and received little support, although 
Sergej Stepasjin commented that “Maskhadov is supported by Russia and other countries and 
should be able to consolidate his authority”.429 On December 1998, Maskhadov reportedly 
expressed his “readiness for any dialogue with the Russian government”. Yeltsin however 
was reported in Russian newspapers to have annulled his directive to negotiate a treaty, along 
the lines of the treaty with Tatarstan.430 After spring 1997, the prevailing view in the Kremlin 
was that no third party mediation was necessary.431 Russian authorities claimed that the OSCE 
task had been carried out in full, and by this implicitly stated that there was no need for 
continued involvement.432 Hawks in the Kremlin and the Russian military have also been 
blamed for doing everything they could to get revenge on the “Chechen bandits” that 
“defeated” them.433  
LABOUR OUT 
On 17 October 1997 a coalition government took seat in Norway. The Bondevik I government 
consisted of the Christian democrats, the Centre Party and the Liberal Party. The government 
was headed by the Christian democrat and protestant priest Kjell Magne Bondevik. It claimed 
it was more concerned with human rights than its predecessor. The government even had a 
minister of human rights.434 Filling the position of foreign minister was Knut Vollebæk, a 
department official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and advisor to former foreign minister 
Thorvald Stoltenberg through many years. Three days into his office as foreign minister, 
Vollebæk was leaving for an official visit to China, prearranged by the former political 
leadership.  
Before the fresh foreign minister left for China, the Bondevik I government loudly 
announced to the Norwegian press corps that it was much concerned with human rights in 
China and this would be attended to during conversations with the Chinese leaders.435 
Reminiscing the first days in office, Knut Vollebæk made perfectly clear that human rights’ 
activism was something the new government wanted to be seen as part of its trademark. The 
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government’s representatives therefore deliberately highlighted it at all possible times the first 
period to establish it as a characteristic feature.436  
Did the high human rights-profile that the new government emphasized have 
implications for the policy towards the Russo-Chechen conflict? Recollecting the Bondevik I 
period, Vollebæk found it hard to see that the Bondevik I government he was part of led a 
more activist-policy in regards of the conflict, than did the antecedent Labour government.437 
As shown in foreign minister Godal’s account of Norwegian policy on human rights, China 
had been on top of the priority list for some time.438 It can thus be seen as a mere effort, or 
strategy, made by the Bondevik-government to distinguish the new heads of the Norwegian 
state as more concerned with human rights than the former Labour government, and simply 
enough, an effort to achieve goodwill on the domestic political scene.   
Criticism was early on voiced against the Bondevik I government. Professor Daniel 
Heradstveit at the Norwegian Institute for Foreign Affairs showed little initial confidence in 
the fresh Norwegian Prime Minister. He expected that he would confirm the standard 
“silence” on difficult conflicts that did not engage the media and the general population. He 
posed the rhetorical question of why Prime Minister Bondevik had chosen to visit Burma and 
not Algeria. His point was to show that the new government was affected by popular concerns 
as to what was most important. He claimed that it was a matter of identification, the less the 
Western society could identify itself with the parts of the conflict, the less concerned were 
Western people and the less attention was received by the conflicts. Insurgents in Chechnya, 
Algeria and North Korea had no popular face to front their campaign as compared to Burma’s 
Aung San Suu Kui, the Palestinians’ Yasser Arafat and Tibet’s Dalai Lama.439 
Even though the members of the Bondevik I government had been critical to the 
Labour government while in opposition, positioned as government it would not make itself 
distinct with a tougher policy toward Russia than its predecessor. It can in the end be 
considered foremost to have served a domestic strategy to promote the government’s good 
will. 
Compared to other Norwegian political parties the Norwegian Labour Party has had a 
unique position in Norwegian foreign politics and policy making. In the fifties they could 
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almost draw out the main lines of Norwegian foreign policy on their own party congresses.440 
The Labour party has also had tight links with Norwegian political research institutions and 
has had the largest collection of foreign political experts within their party. However, the 
consensus tradition of Norwegian foreign policy is well established.441 
Thorvald Stoltenberg, Thorbjørn Jagland and Bjørn Tore Godal are three Norwegian 
politicians that are distinguished as foreign political veterans. All of them are from the Labour 
party. All of them were part of outlining Norwegian foreign policy in the nineties.442 Foreign 
minister Bjørn Tore Godal had served as chairman in the work with the “famous” Whitepaper, 
“development trends in the international society and their effects on Norwegian foreign 
policy”. He thus brought political continuity through his own person as foreign minister in the 
mid-1990s and as defence minister in 2000-2001.  
However, it was not only Godal and the Labour party that brought continuity. 
Professor of history Terje Tvedt has described what he calls “elite circulation” between 
Norwegian foreign politicians and heads of the Norwegian NGOs such as Norwegian Red 
Cross, Norwegian People’s Aid and/or Norwegian Church Aid.443 “Over time, a practice has 
been developed, where a small number of individuals circulate between leading positions in 
the political sphere and the sphere of the NGOs, in addition, the same persons distributes the 
systems resources between the actors of this system, often without openness and 
parliamentary control.444 An example is MFA State Secretary in this period, Jan Egeland, who 
later became head of the Norwegian Red Cross abroad, UN official, Secretary General of the 
International Red Cross and, today, Director of NUPI.   
The strategy for Norwegian foreign policy in the nineties, and also the Barents Sea 
cooperation, as shown in the introduction, had been presented by Thorvald Stoltenberg. As 
mentioned above one of the main advisors to Stoltenberg through many years, was MFA 
official Knut Vollebæk, at this time foreign minister of the Bondevik I government. 
Stoltenberg had for example also been President of the Norwegian Red Cross.445  
An additional momentum in regard of how different the conduct of Norwegian foreign 
policy could be is that, the small nation Norway has little hard power to place behind its 
demands in most regards. Any alleged actual aspiration to do well is restrained by 
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considerations of what state and situation Norway is facing. It follows that the ability to lead a 
substantially different or “better” foreign policy for the Bondevik I government was limited. 
CORRODING CHECHEN CONDITIONS 
The Khasavyurt Agreement and the following Moscow peace treaty can be seen as an uneasy 
truce.446 The two hopeful agreements signed by the Chechen president Maskhadov and 
Russian president Yeltsin held high promises that the two parts would never again raise arms 
against each other. The Russian army had more or less been unwillingly forced into the 
situation with poor equipment and it was defeated by a small insurgency army. Left on its 
own, Chechnya and the Maskhadov regime did not receive much support from the outside 
world, or in the words of James Hughes: “After the agreements of 1996 and 1997, Russia and 
the international system consigned Chechnya to a limbo status, effectively acknowledging 
Russia blockade.”447  
Neither of Russia, the UN, the EU nor OSCE gave the financial aid needed to improve 
the situation, build infrastructure, and pay wages and pensions. The aid organisations, as 
shown, had all retreated from the area because of the labile security situation.448 The Chechen 
republic was not disarmed. Maskhadov was unable to gather the fractions in the small 
republic in the period between the signing of peace treaty of July 1997 and the second 
Russian invasion in September 1999. His power was constantly challenged by former allies, 
such as Shamil Basaev. The small republic was in a political and infrastructural mess. 
Kidnappings were again thriving. Acts of terrorism were increasingly occurring outside 
Chechnya more often than before. The window of opportunity that had been created through 
external involvement, negotiations and the peace treaty was soon closed. The future did not 
bode well for Chechnya in a period of “peace” that eventually led to a second war.449 
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Due to its OSCE chairmanship in 1999, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs became 
strongly engaged with two ferocious conflicts of escalating nature, both on European soil: the 
Kosovo conflict and a second Russo-Chechen war. Norwegian foreign minister Knut 
Vollebæk assumed the turn take position as Chairperson-in-office of the OSCE on 1 January 
1999.450 On his first day in office he commented that: “[t]he challenge will be Kosovo, and 
both I personally, and the OSCE as organization, will be judged by what happens in 
Kosovo.”451 Little could Vollebæk know that an additional conflict would concern him and the 
OSCE just as much in the upcoming fall. Russia invaded Chechnya a second time in 
September 1999. The second Russo-Chechen war can in many ways be seen as the test of how 
Norway balanced the chairmanship function with the close alignment to the USA, as Russia’s 
neighbour, as a state outside the EU and a high profile as human rights advocate.452 How did 
the OSCE obligation affected Norway’s “policy” towards the Russo-Chechen conflict, and 
why? 
NORWAY AND THE OSCE CHAIRMANSHIP 
Already in 1998 when Norway, under foreign minister Vollebæk, entered the OSCE 
Chairmanship troika, the foreign minister had clear ambitions as to what he wanted to 
promote and achieve as Chairman-in-office. The OSCE troika consists of the Chairperson-in-
Office assisted by the previous and succeeding chairperson.453 This structure ensures 
continuity of the organization’s activity. In 1999 the troika consisted of Poland, Austria and 
Norway.454 Vollebæk explicated four areas that were to guide his period. First, he wanted to 
promote consensus among the 54 member states. “One criterion for the success of Norway’s 
chairmanship will be whether it has the ability to balance the need for quick action against the 
need to find broadly based solutions.”455 Second, he wanted to enhance the “moral authority of 
the OSCE as a community of values”.456 A third primary aim was to define OSCE’s role in 
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conflict prevention, crisis management and post-conflict rehabilitation. His fourth area of 
priority was to enhance the operational capabilities of the organization.457 He considered the 
leadership task to be a challenge for Norway, but not a task too large. He ended his speech by 
saying that it was in Norway’s interest to “take on responsibility and play a role in resolving 
burning issues in today’s Europe.”458  
Vollebæk’s State Secretary at the time, Janne Haaland Matlary, considered it the 
largest task Norway had ever had. The OSCE area consisted, after all, of 55 nations from 
“Vladivostok to Vancouver”. With main focus on human rights she continued by stating why 
it was important for Norway to engage, but also with what would be Norway’s contribution as 
leaders of the organization:459  
First, she stated that Norway was obliged to be concerned with human rights 
violations, no matter where these might occur. Second, Norway was through the OSCE 
member of the same security and cooperation organization as nascent democracies in Eastern 
Europe, Caucasus and Central Asia, and also bound by the same standards for human rights 
and democracy. She asserted that stability and peaceful development in the East had 
implications for European security and, thus, Norwegian security.460 The OSCE’s struggle for 
human rights had been the main driving force since the beginning of the CSCE in 1975, she 
proceeded.461  
Norway was going to concentrate its efforts as chairman on the long term process of 
solving internal conflicts; increase Norwegian participation in the OSCE missions; and work 
to see that human rights and democracy received higher priority. In Central Asia, especially 
Caucasus, she perceived it of greatest importance to build local networks of non-
governmental representatives that could work for what she called legitimate community 
interests. Norway would reinforce the OSCE office for democratic institutions and human 
rights (ODIHR). There was still a need for meetings for evaluating the respective countries 
compliance with the OSCE-commitments. This was where Norway would speak out and point 
out major violations.462 In spite of Vollebæk’s enormous energy and efforts put into the 
organization, the Norwegian OSCE period did not exactly, as will be shown below, see the 
fulfillment of Vollebæk and Matlary’s goals.  
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Norway did engage in solving internal conflicts. In March 1999 the Bondevik 1 
government supported NATO’s decision to bomb Serbian forces in Kosovo. The situation in 
Kosovo early January 1999 had not promised peace. The truce between the Yugoslavian 
President Slobodan Milosevic’s Serbs and the Kosovo-Albanian insurgents who had 
committed themselves to outright independence, were frequently broken. Massive human 
rights violations were perpetrated by both sides and it seemed as if Serbian leader Milosevic 
was carrying out ethnic cleansing in the region.463 The OSCE mission in Kosovo was not 
successful. Chairperson Vollebæk had to withdraw the OSCE observers even before all of 
them were in place.464 Violence and massacres escalated after the observers left.465 NATO 
threatened to bomb Serbian targets if a peace agreement could not be reached.  
Norway, usually averse to sanctions if it is not founded in UN legislation, supported 
the NATO bombing. The relationship between Russia, who sympathized with Serbia, and the 
NATO members became strained. Several other countries, Sweden for instance, and other 
members of the UN, were against the “humanitarian bombing”. They did not see the 
legitimacy of the arguments for a humanitarian intervention. Norwegian Prime Minister 
Bondevik responded to the Swedish sceptic position by saying that NATO had to go through 
with the bombing or else it would have been an empty threat that would weaken NATO’s 
legitimacy.466 In the UN Security Council two permanent members, China and Russia, dealt 
with the same challenges that were taking place in the former Yugoslavia. Both of the great 
powers had areas that wanted to achieve secession and sovereignty. In China several 
provinces wanted independence, whilst Russia was struggling with Chechen aspirations, 
amongst others. To China and Russia it was thus an unpopular decision to support 
independence for Kosovo, thus legitimizing a secessionist movement that was similar to the 
ones China and Russia had within their borders. The controversial NATO bombing of Serbian 
targets nonetheless commenced on 25 March.467 
In a press conference the Norwegian Prime Minister Bondevik, foreign minister 
Vollebæk and defense minister Eldbjørg Løwer defended NATO and Norway’s decision.468 
Bondevik refuted that Norway was at war because, he argued, Norway had not declared war 
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against another state. He preferred to call it participation in a limited military operation.469 
Bondevik did not, when requested, define the difference between limited military action and 
war. The Norwegian government insisted that it was a humanitarian intervention. The Prime 
Minister asked rhetorically what the alternative was, and answered that it would have been to 
let Milosevic continue the severe violence against the Kosovo-Albanians. The NATO 
operation was not defined by a time limit, but the prime minister hoped it would be over in the 
shortest possible time. The two main purposes were to reduce the Serbian military capabilities 
and “make Milosevic think things through and decide to sit down by the negotiation table.”470 
Even though, according to Bondevik, it was: “with heavy-heart that we send Norwegian 
forces into battle”, Norway chose to support NATO and by this showed strong allegiance 
towards USA.  
The NATO allegiance seemed stronger than Norway’s allegiance towards the UN.471 
In addition to Norway’s support of a controversial intervention, Vollebæk’s double-role was 
considered unfortunate by Russia and others. The question posed was how the OSCE could 
function as a conflict-preventive organization when the chairmanship, Norway, was members 
of NATO. Vollebæk himself did not deem it to be a problem to be in official capacity as 
both.472 Vollebæk had in 1998 stated that he considered it a crucial advantage that Norway at 
the same time as the OSCE engagement was a committed member of NATO and familiar with 
the operating procedures of the Alliance, because NATO was majorly involved in the peace 
efforts in former Yugoslavia.473 
BANDS OF BANDITS AND RUSSIAN HAWKS 
Concurrently in Chechnya, disorder thrived. Without external economic or political help, 
President Maskhadov was locked in an unpleasant and seemingly hopeless position. He could 
not deliver relief to his citizens, whose living conditions were little improved. In addition, he 
did not manage to control the warlords that had fought besides him during the first Russo-
Chechen war. It provided extremist groups led by Shamil Basaev and others with a chance to 
pursue their own economic and political agenda. Kidnapping, robbery and criminal 
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exploitation thrived and concerned not only the civilians in Chechnya, but also the population 
in the surrounding republics.474  
Every once in a while Russian officials were sent as special envoys to Chechnya. On 
several occasions, however, a local warlord managed to kidnap them. Needless to say, this 
had little reconciliatory effect on the Kremlin. When the Russian General Gennadij Sjpigun 
was kidnapped from the airport after talks with President Maskhadov in March 1999, Sergej 
Stepasjin, then Interior Minister, reportedly threw a fit and threatened Chechnya with a new 
war.475 It was the second Russian envoy this had happened to in a short period of time. 
Valentin Vlasov, Yeltsin’s special envoy to Chechnya, had been detained and kept as prisoner 
in Chechnya from May to December 1998, thoroughly marked by it when returned.476  
The same Vlasov turned up at the Norwegian embassy to Moscow in late January 
1999 to inform the OSCE mission group about the situation in Chechnya. Odd Gunnar 
Skagestad, the Norwegian leader of the mission had been in Moscow for about a week, 
patiently waiting for the situation in the republic to improve, so that he could head into 
Grozny. The OSCE mission group had been forced to leave its office in Grozny in 1998, 
when the security situation became intolerable. With his suitcases ready the only thing 
holding him and his six delegates back was lack of carte blanche from Russian authorities due 
to deteriorating security situation in the republic.477 According to Skagestad Russian 
authorities would not provide security for the OSCE staff in Grozny, it is unclear whether this 
was due to incapability or unwillingness to do so.478 
Prior to a meeting with Foreign Minister Vollebæk March 1999, Primakov, Prime 
Minister since August 1998, calmed the “war-talk” when he told journalists that he “was not 
going to be dragged off into a war adventure in Chechnya”.479 President Yeltsin, allegedly, 
from his hospital bed, had given Primakov warrant to “solve” the crisis in Chechnya.480 
Several commentators saw this as an attempt by Yeltsin to get rid of Primakov by giving him 
an impossible task. Primakov did not swallow the bait. General Leontij Kuznetsov, leader of 
the Moscow military district, affirmed this policy when he made clear that the Russian Army 
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did not want a new war in Chechnya.481 It has since been claimed by central Russian decision 
makers such as former Prime Minister Sergej Stepasjin, that the invasion of Chechnya had 
been carefully planned already in March 1999.482  
President Maskhadov reportedly made solid efforts, unfortunately in vain, to retrieve 
general Sjipigun, who later turned up dead. No talks on Chechnya’s final status were 
commenced, although Maskhadov tried to initiate this. It is in addition claimed that military 
views in Russia that Chechnya was “unfinished business” did not improve the situation.483 A 
new war might not only restore morale, but also replenish military power, which had been 
significantly depleted by the 1994-96 war and further run down by budget cuts in its 
aftermath.484 
The situation was described by both sides with the word tupik, dead-end.485 As the 
relations between federal authorities and Chechnya were maxing out, a new kid in town 
appeared, and along with a couple of major incidents described below, tipped the situation in 
favor of a second Russian invasion. 
VLADIMIR PUTIN’S RISE TO POWER: A GREY BOLT FROM THE BLUE 
Regardless of motives and justifications, the second Russo-Chechen war had “a remarkable 
impact on the career of Vladimir Putin”.486 The former KGB operative was plucked from 
obscurity to become President Yeltsin’s successor. It is suggested by many that Putin’s 
legitimacy was built entirely on the war.487 When Basaev and his Saudi ally al-Khattab 
invaded the Botlikh highland area of Dagestan in early August 1999, the Kremlin was offered 
a legitimate reason to intervene militarily against Chechnya.488  
Also, seemingly as a result of the Basaev-invasion, Sergej Stepasjin, who had taken 
over the Prime Minister post from Primakov in May 1999, and associated with the failure of 
the first war, was sacked and replaced by Putin, Yeltsin’s hand-picked successor. Yeltsin’s 
government had been a revolving door the last years.489 Putin, also called “the grey 
eminence”, had a low public profile in Russia, and both Putin and Yeltsin’s ratings on the 
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opinion polls, conducted in August 1999, were extremely low. The Yeltsin “family” had six 
months to build Putin’s authority before the Presidential elections.490 
Vollebæk visited the Kremlin on 7 September 1999. He was requested to support, or at 
least display understanding of, the Russian military interventions against what the Russian 
foreign minister, Igor Ivanov, called Islamist separatists in Dagestan, the mountainous 
neighbor republic to Chechnya. Ivanov specified that the conflict was an internal Russian 
affair.491 Vollebæk visited both as Norwegian foreign minister and, perhaps more important to 
Ivanov, chairperson-in-office of the OSCE. Ivanov, according to Vollebæk, was seeking 
OSCE’s unambiguous condemnation of the Islamist guerrilla. Ivanov’s request was not 
immediately met by the chairperson, but Vollebæk did express his concern over the situation. 
He was careful to add that the Russian advance to “set things straight” in the region, had to be 
done by reasonable measures and avoid unnecessary use of force.492 Vollebæk linked the 
situation to Chechnya, when he told the journalist that OSCE had not been asked to contribute 
to solve the armed situation in the region. The Islamist militants in Dagestan were closely knit 
with the insurgency in Chechnya, where the OSCE actually had a mandate, but could not 
perform its task due to the security situation.493 
Things came to a head, and on 5 September 1999 Russian military forces attacked 
Chechnya’s Dagestan border with rockets and artillery. Before the Chechen attacks and the 
Russian assault had settled, a series of bombs went off in apartment blocks in Moscow, 
Volgodonsk and the Dagestani town of Buynaks. It has never been made clear who was 
behind the terrorist actions, but the blame was placed on Chechen insurgents.494 The apartment 
bombings fitted into the “pattern” of Chechen terrorism at Budennovsk and Pervomayskoye, 
although both Basaev and Maskhadov ardently denied any involvement. Basaev had always 
taken personal responsibility for his operations.495 Suspicion of the Russian Federal 
Intelligence Bureau (FSB) involvement was raised when federal security forces were “caught 
with their pants down” planting explosives in the basement of an apartment block in the 
Russian city Ryazan. It was later excused by the government as a counter-terrorist exercise.496 
Almost 300 civilians were killed and molested in the apartment building attacks and 
fear spread throughout the federation. The tragic incidents roused support for a military 
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intervention across the Russian Federation and through the layers of mass media and the 
public. Putin could portray the situation as a “counter-terrorist” operation.497  
A SECOND RUSSIAN INVASION OF CHECHNYA 
On 1 October, Russian federal forces invaded Chechnya and with overwhelming use of 
military power. 80,000 Russian troops were used against an estimated 3000 rebels.498 Russia’s 
leading human rights activist and former human rights commissioner under Yeltsin, Sergei 
Kovaljov was quoted in response to the second Russian invasion saying: “We borrow 
NATO’s methodology while acting on the basis of Milosevic’s ideology.”499 According to 
Senior Researcher at the International Peace research Institute, Oslo (PRIO), Pavel Baev, the 
massive grouping assembled moved slowly into Chechnya behind a barrage of artillery fire. 
Every point of resistance on the road towards Grozny was smashed by concentrated 
firepower, and the capital itself was thoroughly and systematically destroyed rather than 
stormed.500 “Nobody expected a low-casualty “peacemaking” operation, there were few 
concerns about the “collateral damage” and there was not much pressure to achieve a quick 
victory.”501 The next two years the federal forces deployed step by step into the mountainous 
parts, taking control of towns and villages. Consolidating territorial control took a heavy toll. 
Nevertheless, from 2001 the troops were settled into fortified garrisons leaving them only for 
raids into the mountains or “cleansing”, Zakhista, of towns and villages.502 
REACTIONS TO THE RUSSIAN INVASION 
Foreign minister Vollebæk stated to inquiring journalists that he was seriously worried about 
the development in Chechnya. At the time of the invasion he was on a tour of the Central 
Asian states, encouraging more cooperation between them to prevent further deterioration in 
regional security. The OSCE had offered the Kremlin assistance to improve the situation in 
the Northern Caucasus, but it would not come to OSCE interference without invitation from 
Russia, he added. Norway’s ambassador to Moscow, Per Tresselt expressed concern on behalf 
of the OSCE Troika. The Troika, now consisting of Austria and Poland in addition to 
Norway, was primarily worried about the humanitarian situation. About 100,000 refugees 
                                                 
497
 Hughes, 2007: 110. 
498
 Pavel Baev, «Chechnya and the Russian Military», Richard Sakwa (ed.), Chechnya: From Past to Future, 
London 2005: 119; Said 1997: 141. 
499
 Said 2007: 142. 
500
 Baev 2005: 119. 
501
 Ibid: 118. 
502
 Ibid: 119. 
5 - IN LIGHT OF THE 1999 OSCE-EXPERIENCE - 5                                               
 91 
were on the move in the region, and it was a huge destabilizing factor. The OSCE had made 
efforts to be present in Chechnya, offered its services and at the same time recognized 
Russia’s territorial integrity and made a point of condemning terrorism.503  
The Norwegian chairman was interviewed about the Russian invasion and said that the 
only effort the OSCE could attempt at that time, was to keep in touch with the various groups 
involved in the conflict. Although Vollebæk was considerate of the aversion to maintain 
dialogue with certain protagonists in conflicts like this, he referred to the experience of how 
important it was to achieve dialogue with everyone early on, in any conflict. His hope was 
that the Kremlin would initiate dialogue with the groups in Chechnya, and negotiate forth a 
peaceful solution.504  
Vollebæk was asked if OSCE would have handled the situation different or been more 
“persuasive” if it had been a smaller state than Russia that was on the warpath. Vollebæk 
answered diplomatically that the OSCE was concerned with the situation in all the member 
countries and that the organization was built on consensus. It could not impose decisions on a 
member state. That was why the Troika had inquired the Kremlin on the matter and tried to 
evoke dialogue. He referred to the situation in Chechnya as a tragedy, and that OSCE in the 
end could only relate to Russian authorities and hope that the Organization could be helpful in 
the situation.505 The situation in Chechnya quickly challenged all four of Vollebæk’s 
explicated goals. The “ability to balance the need for quick action against the need to find 
broadly based solutions” seemed to come short, as Russia did not want any external 
involvement. Also, the “moral authority of the OSCE as a community of values”, that 
Vollebæk had wanted to enhance, seemed to be struggling to exist at all. Some would say it 
had received a seriously blow already in February 1999 when OSCE had to withdraw all its 
personnel and its leader, Vollebæk, supported the controversial bombing of Kosovo. 
In 1998, Vollebæk’s State Secretary Matlary had found the OSCE standards for 
human rights to be satisfying and regarded the main challenge primarily to be to make sure 
that the member nations lived up to expectations. She continued by stating that the new 
political epoch made it possible to see that the standards were implemented through solid 
cooperation. In practice, she said, this meant that the OSCE could not only criticize human 
rights violation at OSCE meetings, but actually be present, and enforce practical action, in the 
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area of concern.506 Obviously, as seen above, OSCE in the new epoch was not distinctively 
more effective than it had been before Matlary’s comment. The OSCE was not even allowed 
to be present in the areas where it was needed the most. 
Chris Hunter, senior researcher at the Centre for Peacemaking and Community 
Development (CPCD), in Moscow, claimed that the West was being too mild in its reactions 
to the Russian invasion of Chechnya at a conference at the PRIO in Oslo. He pointed out that 
Russia’s “internal conflict” violated commitments in the Council of Europe, and OSCE, and 
therefore should not be perceived as internal. Ingvard Havnen, Vollebæk’s spokesman, 
discarded Hunter’s criticism on behalf of Norway by claiming that there had not been lack of 
criticism from Norway’s government or the OSCE. He reminded Hunter that Russia had 
rejected all form for external assistance to solve the conflict and added to it that Russia was 
not the only perpetrator of violent escalation in the conflict.507 Hunter sparred that the 
surrounding world and the western governments should not accept that the Chechen civilians 
became the victims subjected to a second brutal war, no matter who the main perpetrators 
were. The conflict had to be solved politically, argued Hunter. The Russian military invasion 
would not end terrorism, it would only increase and radicalize the groups involved.508 Hunter 
claimed that it was possible to stall Kremlin’s military actions by economical sanctions, i.e. 
holding back funds from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), for instance.509  
Nonetheless, James Hughes argues, in his thorough study of the Russo-Chechen 
conflict, that “the leading European powers consistently deflected any attempt to seriously 
sanction Russia for its policy in Chechnya, even at the height of the military campaign in late 
1999”.510 Western media portrayed the second Russian invasion as a pretext for Putin to push 
himself as the successor of Yeltsin as Russian president, and this time the rhetoric from 
official Western circles sounded less supportive. While the official position hardly changed in 
practice, there was a greater willingness among Western leaders to criticize the war in public. 
The West still acknowledged Russia’s right to defend its territorial integrity, but was more 
open in its concern over proportionality.511  
However, “European leaders interested in improving their relations with Putin and 
Russia, and securing economic opportunities, frequently expressed their solidarity with Putin 
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in his struggle against “terrorism” even before 9/11.”512 British Prime Minister Tony Blair 
exclaimed that they had made clear their concerns over Chechnya and any question of human 
rights abuses there, “though it is important to realize that Chechnya is not Kosovo… the 
Russians have been subjected to really severe terrorist attacks.”513 Tony Blair had a point: 
Chechnya was not Kosovo. However, the difference was not only the terrorist issue, but also 
that massive Russia was not small Serbia. Not only was Russia a large power, but it had 
several possibilities to influence control on international decision-making.  
In regards of Kosovo Russia were part of the Contact Group along with the United 
States, United Kingdom, France, Italy and Germany. They were also part of the OSCE, which 
despite a membership of 50 nations, still acted on a consensus principle. Beyond this, Russia 
enjoyed veto powers in the UN Security Council.514 There existed a difference between 
Western Europe and the former Soviet-sphere nations in Eastern Europe. The latter were 
much more suspicious towards Russia and more sympathetic to the Chechen cause than the 
West due to the fact that Eastern European leaders in many cases had first hand knowledge of 
Russian control and oppression.515  
Compared to the first war there was also some difference as to how Russian leaders 
received the Western criticism. In the period of the first war Yeltsin made efforts to establish 
a Western inspired democratic state and society. The effort of trying to make Russia 
“ashamed” of its conduct in Chechnya by giving them “unwanted” attention may have been 
effective in the first period. Norwegian diplomats and Foreign Minister Godal also “felt” that 
this approach had an effect on the Russian decision makers and that a common understanding 
existed.516  
However, when Norway in March 1999 agreed to join forces with other NATO 
members in the bombing of Kosovo it opened for new problematic questions. When 
defending Norway’s participation to the Norwegian people, the Norwegian government took 
part in a western dictate of what was legitimate international conduct in a conflict situation. 
Bondevik used his carefully chosen words to legitimize Norway’s participation. As the 
Western nations legitimized an intervention by bombing another European power, Russia 
could use the same language and the same strategy in what the Kremlin considered an internal 
affair. In addition, the attempt to make Russia ashamed of its own conduct did not have the 
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same effect on Russia after the Kosovo bombing as it had seemingly had had before. When 
Putin took over the leadership, Western criticism of Russia in Chechnya, in Abkhazia and 
North Ossetia was increasingly met by a deaf ear.  
As Vollebæk stated, the OSCE would await acceptance from the Kremlin to become 
involved in the Russo-Chechen conflict. The ambitious Norwegian chairman’s hands were 
helplessly tied. When asked years later if Norway considered sanctions against Russia, 
Vollebæk answered that Norway usually prefers sanctions to go through the UN system.517 
Vollebæk and the Norwegian government supported military sanctions against Serbia as a last 
resort to protect Kosovo-Albanians lives and stop the massive human rights violations against 
civilians. According to Vollebæk the NATO bombing of Serbian targets had support in UN 
Security Council resolutions, such as resolution no. 1199 of 23 September 1998, which stated 
that the situation in the Former Yugoslavia posed a threat to international peace and security. 
The decision and its resonance were - and still are - seen by many internationally as highly 
controversial.518 As for the situation in Chechnya, sanctions against Russia had never been 
seriously considered, according to Vollebæk:  
Neither Norway nor other countries has so far considered the use of sanctions as an 
appropriate means to pressurize Russian authorities. The introduction of sanctions would in 
my opinion lead to further isolation of Russia and make the efforts to establish political 
dialogue between the [conflicting] parts more difficult. Nevertheless, the government 
follows the development closely.519   
Parliament member Ingvald Godal (Conservative) was posing the above stated questions to 
Vollebæk during the Parliament’s Oral Question Hour, and did not seem quite satisfied with 
Vollebæk’s answers. Ingvald Godal inquired again, with the sanctions against Serbia and 
Milosevic in mind, how come Russia was not facing any such consequences, “not even 
economical sanctions.”520 Vollebæk replied that “I have to say that what took place in Kosovo 
was terrible and a striking violation of everything we understand by human worth.” 
Vollebæk’s answer seems suggests that Vollebæk considered what was taking place in 
Kosovo exceptionally bad and worse than what was occurring in Chechnya, as he uses this as 
argumentation for the moral side of the intervention argument. However, Vollebæk added: 
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“We have not left Russia alone. We constantly pressurize Russia, and my hope is that this 
pressure and the dialogue will be rewarding.”521   
Ingvald Godal claimed that there existed several economical measures that could have 
been expedient. He thought that if the Russians were allowed to get away with their conduct 
in Chechnya time after time, the threshold would become lower to intervene in additional 
areas. He claimed that if the Russians had met serious sanctions and non-acceptance during 
the first war in 1994-96, he believed that the chances of re-engaged Russian warfare would 
have been less. Godal also remarked that Norway had a tendency to act morally towards 
problems far away, but had a “sad tradition” of groveling at the Russian’s feet. He hoped that 
if the Council of Europe decided to suspend Russia, Norway would support it.522 
If measures were to have an effect, Vollebæk believed that the international 
community had to agree on them, and added that Norway had tried to affect such measures in 
various contexts where this was natural. At the same time Vollebæk wanted to remind the 
assembly that, sanctions and boycotts were last resort of international measures. “We wish to 
achieve a breakthrough for our view through dialogue of mutual efforts.” It was Vollebæk’s 
hope that it would not be necessary to follow the same procedures towards Russia as towards 
Serbia.523 Why the discrepancy of military sanctions in Kosovo, and none-at-all in Chechnya?    
KOSOVO AND CHECHNYA – DIFFERENCES IN SEARCH OF AN EXPLANATION 
It is possible to compare the secessionist situations in Chechnya and Kosovo, although many 
would not agree that it would be legitimate to compare the two. The latter could, for instance, 
argue that there waste historical differences and also refer to the acts of terrorism in Russia. 
Nonetheless, they were both secessionist conflicts occurring simultaneously.524                                                                         
The Kosovo authorities called for secession from Serbia, as did the Chechen leaders from 
Russia. The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia consistently rejected any international interest in 
the affairs of Kosovo, which it considered an entirely domestic matter, much like the Russian 
stand towards the Chechen insurgency.525The two conflicts also shared the fate of extreme 
brutality perpetrated against the civilian population. However, Kosovo received significantly 
more attention than Chechnya also in Norway, in mass media and official reactions.526 With 
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these things in mind a small discussion, on what many views as an inconsistency of Western 
and in this regard Norwegian response is needed.  
Professor Hughes claims that “the international approach to the secession of Chechnya 
has an obvious comparison with that of Chechnya.”527 As the EU and the USA according to 
Hughes drove the UN toward recognizing Kosovo’s sovereignty, with or without Serbia’s 
agreement, it became a clear double-standard compared with Western approach to 
Chechnya’s secession. In the latter case there was absence of both international moral and 
material support, but also an ever-present recognition of the Chechen conflict as an internal 
Russian matter.528 In the words of Hughes “it suggests that realpolitik trumped idealpolitik as 
the U.S. and the EU refused to put international cooperation and lucrative trade at risk by 
challenging Russia over Chechnya.”529 
Another side to a Chechnya-Kosovo comparative is that during the 1990s the Western 
attitude towards humanitarian operations changed. The perception of the efficacy of 
“humanitarian interventions” rose with what was seen as an effective intervention by NATO, 
following the Srebrenica massacre in 1995, to force the belligerent groups in former 
Yugoslavia to sign the Dayton treaty.530 This had consequences for the perception of the 
conflict between Russia and Chechnya:    
European public opinion had sided with the “victims” – Croats, Muslims and Albanians in 
Kosovo for whom independence and self-determination seemed the solution. These views of 
“right” and “wrong” were by analogy projected on to Russia and Chechnya. It seemed easy 
to from a distance to make judgements regarding the conflict. An equally simple solution 
would be the participation of international forces in settling the problems of the Caucasus.531  
Public opinion and human rights organization played a large part in this. The latter, while 
informing the world about the mass violations of human rights in a region, simultaneously 
warned states and organizations against hasty action that could infringe norms and procedures 
established by international law.532 Human rights expert Asbjørn Eide’s comments in 1995 
represented this point of view.533 Norwegian NGOs did however increasingly condemn the 
“mild” response/reaction towards Russia.534 
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It is feasible to say that the NATO decision to bomb Serbian targets in Kosovo 
undermined international organizations such as the EU, the OSCE and not least the so-called 
corner stone of Norwegian foreign policy, the UN. NATO had no UN mandate to proceed 
with the attacks, however NATO’s general secretary Javier Solana argued that it was a “moral 
duty” to intervene in Kosovo.535 
A central Norwegian diplomat claimed that Milosevic was planning or already 
perpetrating genocide in the Kosovo-Albanians and that was not what the Russians “had in 
mind” for the Chechens. Further, the Western governments felt that they could not stand on 
the sideline and watch a new massacre occur, such as the one in Sbreniça where Serbian 
forces killed 8000 Bosnian men without interference. It seems as if the general view was that 
the overall situation in Kosovo was “humanitarianly” speaking worse than what was taking 
place in Chechnya. However, the diplomat added that if NATO had intervened in Chechnya 
the way they did in Kosovo, it could ultimately triggered a Third World War.536  
OSLO SUMMIT MEETING, 1-2 NOVEMBER 1999 
Although a pressing issue, Kosovo and Chechnya was not the only conflicts concerning the 
Western leaders in 1999. A Middle East Summit was taking in place in Oslo early November 
1999. Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin attended the Oslo Middle East Summit Meeting 
along with USA’s President Bill Clinton, Israel’s Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and Palestinian 
leader Yasser Arafat. Putin came instead of the, literally, grand old man Yeltsin, and it was an 
opportunity for Norway to establish contact with what was potentially Russia’s new leader. 
Political commentators claimed that the relations between the West and Russia were warming 
up again after the icy front caused by the NATO bombing.537  
Chechnya was on all diplomatic lips during the Middle East Summit. Prime Minister 
Bondevik discussed the situation under bilateral talks with Clinton, with Finnish President 
Martti Ahtisaari and Javier Solana, Head Coordinator of a united EU Defense and Security 
policy. Bondevik stated what was quite usual when referring to the Russo-Chechen conflict: 
“Chechnya is a difficult matter, and we have to respect Russia’s integrity as a nation. But we 
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cannot accept the Russian Army’s conduct in the small republic.”538 Solana stated that they 
could not avoid commenting “when Russia acts the way they do in the Caucasus.”539  
Putin and Bondevik held a one hour long bilateral talk. Prime Minister Putin 
reportedly said that “Russia would not negotiate with terrorists”, but he would try to make it 
easier for international organizations to help the civilians.540 Putin did his best, according to 
Bondevik, to “explain” what was “really” taking place in Chechnya. Bondevik claimed he did 
not “buy” the Russian version altogether, but added that “Norway recognizes Russian 
territorial integrity”.541 Bondevik continued by saying that the government was very worried 
about the consequences for the civilian population in the midst of the military operation in 
Chechnya. There is an utmost serious refugee problem in the region, he said, and ended his 
comments by saying that if the Russian warfare continues on the same path, it could become a 
burden on Russian relations with Norway and other countries.542  
Bondevik had told Putin that the conflict needed to be solved politically, and the 
Russian prime minister reportedly agreed. Nevertheless, he repeated that Russia would not 
compromise with terrorists. The Russian army was busy removing “uninvited guests”, as the 
Russian Prime Minister called it, and liberating the Chechen population from terrorists. His 
final comment to Bondevik was that he was glad to have reached an understanding about 
terrorism’s threat against humanity through their conversation.543 
During the Russo-Norwegian press conference, good relations between the two 
nations were confirmed by both, and Putin said he wanted to make sure that Russo-Norwegian 
trade was further developed in the near future. The two prime ministers were both worried 
about the nuclear waste in the high north. The press conference also highlighted the fact that 
Russia was violating the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty. Putin himself wrote a 
declaration that due to the war in Chechnya, Russia had violated this agreement by having too 
many tanks, artillery guns, and other arms in an operative state. These would be withdrawn 
and destroyed as soon as Russia had neutralized opposition and controlled Chechnya. The 
declaration stated that Russia wanted to ensure as much openness and transparency as 
possibly.544 
                                                 
538
 « Ahtisaari vil ikke love Norge forhandlingshjelp » [Ahtisaari will not promise Norway help in negotiations], 
NTB, 2.11.1999. 
539
 « Ahtisaari vil ikke love Norge forhandlingshjelp » [Ahtisaari will not promise Norway help in negotiations], 
NTB, 2.11.1999. 
540
 «Putin utelukker kompromiss med ”terrorister”»[Putin no compromise with ”terrorist”], NTB, 1.11.1999. 
541
 «Putin utelukker kompromiss med ”terrorister”», NTB, 1.11.1999. 
542
 Ibid. 
543
 Ibid. 
544
 Ibid. 
5 - IN LIGHT OF THE 1999 OSCE-EXPERIENCE - 5                                               
 99 
One of four promised humanitarian corridors for Chechen civilians were held open a 
few hours concurrently with the Russo-Norwegian talks in Oslo. As Russian soldiers sealed it 
off again thousands of people waiting to leave the republic were told to come back another 
day. Only two carloads of refugees had been able to get through. The week before, Russia had 
closed the border for the first time. The act caused condemnation from a large variety of 
actors, from the president of the neighbouring Ingushetia Ruslan Aushev, to the UN and 
various other international organizations.545 
On 2 November 1999 Russian authorities gave their clearance to send an OSCE 
mission led by Norway to survey the situation. The Chechen President, Maskhadov, in this 
period, reportedly sent letters to several OSCE state leaders, desperately seeking external 
mediation assistance.546  
ISTANBUL OSCE SUMMIT MEETING, STILL NOVEMBER 1999 
Chechnya became the main topic at the Istanbul Summit Meeting 18-19 November, and it led 
to a new icy front between the Western governments and Russia. Almost three weeks had 
passed since Vollebæk and the OSCE was promised entrance by Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov 
to survey the situation in Chechnya, but no permission was obtained from the Kremlin.547 
During a press conference in Oslo 15 November, Vollebæk demanded that the Russians 
needed to come forth with a time schedule for withdrawal of Russian forces in Chechnya. He 
repeated the request to let the OSCE mission into northern parts of Chechnya and establish an 
OSCE office in Ingushetia.548  
The past year had turned out to be a frustrating year for Vollebæk, although he claims 
he would have gone through it again if he was given the chance.549 He was a small state actor 
caught in a sticky structural web of power politics. Now a second conflict would bring the 
year to an even darker end for the energetic Norwegian chairman full of good intentions and 
will to make a difference. The role as Chairperson-in-office had from day one put the function 
as Norwegian Foreign Minister in the background, although he managed to keep up bilateral 
conversations if it suited the occasion. During the year he had 150 days and nights of traveling 
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and visited 40 countries. Many from his team of 28 Norwegian diplomats would at the end of 
the year be physically and mentally sick from exhaustion.550 Vollebæk had used enormous 
amounts of energy and resources on the Kosovo conflict. It had not brought forth great results 
on the part of OSCE. Not until the great powers involved themselves, especially through 
NATO. OSCE, in spite of lots of will and good intentions, was seemingly too unconsolidated 
and had little power to back up their decisions with. 
During the Istanbul meeting Vollebæk was busy negotiating between Russian Foreign 
Minister Igor Ivanov and the most powerful OSCE members, trying to find agreement on the 
development of the re-engaged Russo-Chechen warfare. Three demands were at this point 
directed to the Kremlin by the OSCE chairmanship. First, Russian authorities had to let the 
OSCE mission team into Chechnya for observation. Second, OSCE should be allowed to have 
a political role in the conflict. Third, an OSCE office had to be allowed in Ingushetia. The 
British, French, American and Italian heads of state as well as Norway would refuse to sign 
the renegotiated CFE-treaty until Russia yielded to all three of the demands that had been put 
forth. During the Istanbul Summit, Russia was under more pressure over the situation in 
Chechnya than it had been before. Norway took part in pressurizing Russia more fervently 
than perhaps at any time during the first war, however, it was safely within the sphere of other 
Western governments’ approach.  
The fronts were staunch. The Russians had already, in early November, stated that 
they did not mind discussing Chechnya, but they warned against making Chechnya the main 
subject of the Istanbul OSCE meeting.551 Yeltsin said that the demands were out of the 
question and that Russian forces were not retreating until every terrorist in the region was 
wiped out.552 The Russian President left the Istanbul Summit in a demonstrative anger. The 
unfolding of the summit itself looked disastrous. Vollebæk became worried that the 
renegotiated CFE treaty stood in danger of not being signed by everyone since Russia had 
broken the agreement in Chechnya and moreover would not yield with regards to OSCE 
commitment in Chechnya.553 The original CFE-Treaty on reduction of conventional forces in 
Europe had been negotiated in November 1990 between NATO and the Warsaw pact. Due to 
the NATO enlargement with Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, the treaty had been 
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renegotiated in the course of 1999 and was ready to be signed at the Istanbul Summit.554 After 
what was referred to as tough negotiations in Norwegian newspapers, the Russian’s gave way 
to the three demands and the CFE-treaty was signed.  
Norwegian Prime Minister Bondevik was so satisfied that he celebrated with a cigar 
stating that: “he was on Norway’s behalf proud of the carrying out of the Summit Meeting”.555 
Vollebæk was also satisfied, but was already looking ahead towards the implementation of the 
signed Istanbul Summit Declaration. The “Chechen part” of the declaration ended up 
thoroughly vague. It “strongly reaffirmed the acknowledgement of Russia’s territorial 
integrity” and condemned “terrorism in all its forms”. It underscored the need to respect 
OSCE norms and measures to improve the humanitarian situation. The signatories agreed that 
a political solution was essential and that “assistance of the OSCE would contribute to achieve 
that goal.” It welcomed the willingness of the OSCE to assist in the renewal of political 
dialogue. It also “welcomed the agreement of the Russian federation to a visit by the 
Chairman-in-office to the region.”556 The latter part concerned Vollebæk, who didn’t see a 
point of going through with the inspection if he was not allowed into Chechnya itself. 
Russia’s foreign minister Igor Ivanov stated that Vollebæk would be let into Russian 
controlled territory, because they did not want him to end up as a hostage. Ivanov commented 
that he did not know if Vollebæk’s excursion would take place before New Year and that “we 
are not in a rush. We will find a time through diplomatic corridors.”557 
RUSSIAN REACTIONS  
The diplomatic corridors leading to Chechnya related areas were long, twisted and difficult. In 
late November 1999, the Russian newspaper Nezavisimaja Gazeta reported on what it 
regarded as Vollebæk’s “Chechnya schemes” behind Russia’s back, and remarked that 
Vollebæk’s visit to Chechnya as a consequence might not take place.558  The article contained 
facsimiles of two letters, one from Vollebæk to President Maskhadov and the other from Odd 
Gunnar Skagestad to the President of Ingushetia, asking for help to deliver the letter to 
Maskhadov. Sigvald Hauge, spokesman for the Norwegian MFA confirmed that there had 
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been a recent correspondence between OSCE chairman Vollebæk and Maskhadov. However, 
he rejected all accusations of going behind Russia’s back.   
The first letter from Maskhadov to Vollebæk concerned the humanitarian situation in 
Chechnya. Vollebæk replied in a letter to Maskhadov. ”The Russians have been fully 
informed on what happened; they have received copies of the letters”, Spokesman Hauge told 
the press that similar reactions had occurred in Moscow before, and that the comment in the 
Nezavisimaja Gazeta could be seen in light of these. The episode took place only days before 
Vollebæk was supposed to meet with Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov in Moscow. 559   
Years later, Odd Gunnar Skagestad claims that the criticism of Vollebæk in Russian 
newspapers can be seen as symptomatic of the general view of Russian decision makers at the 
time, even as a signal from the authorities.560 As head of the OSCE Assistance Group to 
Chechnya, Odd Gunnar Skagestad experienced episodes that showed the impatience Russia 
had for external involvement. As mentioned, it was not possible to stay in the OSCE office in 
Grozny, since Russian authorities would not guarantee security.  
As Skagestad remained in Moscow, he could still keep daily correspondence with 
local OSCE representatives and others inside Chechnya that wanted to contact the outside 
world through the OSCE. Skagestad said that a constant call for help and attention was issued 
from Chechnya. The least he could do, in Skagestad’s opinion, was to forward the information 
he received on human rights violations and the general situation to the OSCE headquarters.561  
Russian authorities did not have high tolerance Skagestad’s correspondence, which 
they considered outside his mandate. Late autumn 1999 three warnings were issued from 
Russian authorities. First, Skagestad was called on the carpet by Russian authorities, who told 
him that they did not approve of his correspondence. At the same time the Russian embassy to 
Oslo visited the Norwegian MFA and Russian delegates showed up at the head quarters of the 
OSCE in Vienna expressing their opinion on the matter. After being “carpeted” by Russian 
authorities, Skagestad made a phone call to the Norwegian MFA to explain the situation, 
where he was told “not to worry about it”.562 The Russian’s had made their point and the 
meeting between Ivanov and Vollebæk could take place. Vollebæk’s dialogue efforts 
eventually gave some results, he was promised a visit into Chechnya. 
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EYEWITNESS TO CHECHNYA’S DESTRUCTION 
“It is difficult to be optimistic from what we’ve seen here today”.563 As chairman of the 
OSCE, Vollebæk was “finally” present in Chechnya, after endless attempts to make the 
Russians let an OSCE observation mission into the warzone. At a hilltop above Grozny he 
was the first and only Norwegian Foreign Minister who witnessed the conflict. Vollebæk and 
the rest of the observation group had witnessed grenades being launched and fighting right 
below them. “What did I find? I found that reality was not quite corresponding with the 
version presented by the Russians.”564 The safe passages that Russia claimed existed for the 
civilians to flee to neighbouring republics were not safe. Vollebæk saw a bus carrying 
refugees bombarded by artillery and several people in it was severely hurt.  
Earlier on, in December, the civilians of Grozny had been given an ultimatum to leave 
the city within six hours prior to massive aerial and artillery bombing.565 Vollebæk had at the 
time stated that the ultimatum was totally unacceptable and demanded a 24 hours truce in 
respect of civilians who sought to escape.566 The civilians were given some more time, but 
were could they go? The Norwegian chairman-in-office cannot have been very pleased with 
the situation. The observation group was only allowed into areas that were controlled by 
Russian military, for its own protection according to the Russian. The Russian authorities did 
not allow the establishment of an OSCE office in Ingushetia. The OSCE field mission sat 1.5 
thousand kilometres away, in Moscow.567 In addition, they had just barely been allowed into 
Chechnya to observe the situation. All of the points of the declaration regarding Chechnya in 
the Istanbul Summit were printed letters on paper, the words would, it seemed, not be brought 
to life. 
CHANGING OF THE GUARDS 
On New Years Eve 1999, an elderly Boris Yeltsin in poor health handed over the presidency 
to Prime Minister Vladimir Putin until elections. Norway was about to see a different Russian 
leadership with a new attitude. Already as prime minister, Putin had explicitly expressed his 
desire to restore Russia as an international major power.568 His manifesto equated the “renewal 
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of Russia” with restoring Russia’s pride in itself as “strong state power”.569 Putin had built a 
tough image and gained great popularity in Russia because of his handling of the Chechen 
conflict.570 To show his firm support to the Russian soldiers in Chechnya, Putin took on a 
somewhat alternative Santa Clause role during the New Year’s holiday: He flew a fighter jet 
to Grozny to personally award hunting knifes to the Russian soldiers.571 
Putin’s background was so-called Siloviki, or Chekist, which refers to the security 
establishment. Putin was former FSB officer and head of the FSB in 1998-99.572 He was 
formally elected President on 27 March 2001 and made several changes to Russian society in 
the course of his first year as President:573 He unravelled the asymmetric federalism that had 
developed under Yeltsin. He forced Tatarstan and other republics to become fully integrated 
within the Russian federal constitutional and economic space, undoing the privileged status 
they had won from Yeltsin in 1994.574  
Putin also imposed state control of the mass media. Pressure for self-censorship was 
applied to oligarch owners of media and journalists, critical media organizations were closed 
down, and the circulation of critical print was obstructed. This had widespread consequences 
for the coverage of the second war in Chechnya. The Kremlin not only employed police 
action and judicial measures to strictly control the media’s access to Chechnya, in particular 
foreign media. This was to prevent the kind of negative images that had undermined public 
support for the first war, but, as showed above, engineered a revolution in media ownership 
and control in Russia.575 With the praise Russian free press and democratic behaviour received 
by members of the Council of Europe in 1996 in mind, it is possible to see how this changed 
during the years after Chechnya was de facto independent from Russia.576   
The new hard-headed leadership did not pass unremarked by Norwegian political 
commentators.577 The turn of attitude in the Russian leadership, and the society as a whole had 
however been noticed for some time already. Russia’s leading advocate for human rights, 
Kovaljov had seen the first Russo-Chechen war as the first great battle for democracy in the 
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post Soviet Russia. James Hughes claims “that the radicalized military-security interests had 
been vocal in Russian politics since 1996, and even had widespread political support in the 
Duma, as was demonstrated by its opposition to the Khasavyurt treaty and the peace 
agreements with Chechnya.”578  
Foreign Minister Vollebæk had shaken hands with the new regime and personally 
experienced that it was not a lightweight. Norway had never been as engaged in Chechnya as 
during Vollebæk’s position as OSCE chairman-in-office. A solid portion of effort had been 
put into the conflict’s never-within-reach-resolution, both in terms of resources and 
engagement. Vollebæk had balanced his roles well as OSCE Chairman. He had addressed the 
humanitarian situation in Chechnya and his concern, however, all the while closely aligned 
with USA and the EU, receiving much praise for his engagement from those circles. He did 
not receive much praise from Russian authorities by the end of the year, but he had 
maintained close dialogue with the Russians, and had not pushed their limits too a great extent 
– with the exception of the most intense negotiations of the Istanbul Summit. To the people of 
Chechnya and their situation Norway had – in the end – not made much of a difference. 
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In Norway the political situation remained the same into the new millennium. As 1999 expired, 
Vollebæk’s position as Chairperson-in-office in OSCE was taken over by Austria’s temporary 
foreign minister, Wolfgang Schüssel, quickly succeeded by foreign minister Benita Ferrero-
Waldner. Nonetheless, Norway’s engagement in the OSCE troika continued for another year.579 
Among Vollebæk’s wishes for the New Year was that “even though it may look dark, I hope 
we will see a political solution in Chechnya, in order to achieve stability.”580 This chapter will 
attempt an evaluation of Norwegian foreign policy towards the second Russo-Chechen war 
after the OSCE engagement, with a light comparative perspective on Norwegian foreign policy 
towards the first Russo-Chechen war. 
WITH BEST WISHES FOR THE NEW YEAR 
In Vollebæk’s address on foreign policy to the Norwegian Parliament in January 2000 he 
expressed great concern about the civilians in Chechnya. He explicitly told the assembly that it 
was a very difficult situation and that the government were struggling to find the right approach 
to discourage Russia’s behaviour in the North Caucasus.581 The foreign minister claimed that 
Norway had contributed to pressurizing Russia to end the war in Chechnya and asserted that it 
was not acceptable that Russia had launched such massive military power. He continued by 
stating that Norway obviously recognized Russia’s territorial integrity and the right to defend 
itself against terrorism and added that Norway was not indifferent as to what means Russia 
utilized.582 Nonetheless, he underscored that it was important to keep up dialogue with Russia 
and contribute to integrate Russia further into Europe.583 There was no divergence between 
active participation in international cooperation and preservation of national interests, 
Vollebæk claimed. On the contrary, he perceived that the Norwegian chairmanship in 1999 had 
strengthened the impression of Norway as a reliable and trustworthy partner in international 
relations.  
Vollebæk himself had become exceedingly popular as diplomat and enjoyed good 
contact with several of the leaders of the Western governments. Vollebæk may also have been 
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right in his assertion that his engagement had strengthened Norway’s image of good efforts in 
the name of peace and human prosperity. However, what did he achieve in terms of influencing 
an end, bringing forth negotiations or establishing observation in the second Chechen conflict?  
Reviewing OSCE’s role in the Russo-Chechen conflict, differences between the two 
Russo-Chechen wars stands out. Numerous actors, both inside and outside Russia tried to help 
solve the conflict during the first Chechen war. While the OSCE acted as mediators in the first 
war, a truce was established and a peace treaty was negotiated forth. In the second conflict, the 
OSCE and other intergovernmental bodies were more restrained, and journalists were unable to 
report from the scene of events as they did during the first war.584 This means that even though 
the OSCE, under the leadership of Vollebæk, presumably did its very best, it did not manage to 
get a permanent foot within Chechnya, because the new Russian regime would not allow 
external involvement, as the Yeltsin government had at times allowed. Vollebæk remarked on 
this when asked to look back. He said that Putin had been remarkably resolute and consequent 
in refusing any external involvement or interference.585 
Conflict resolution aside, Vollebæk’s OSCE engagement had given Norway a unique 
opportunity to be in the midst of political decision making. However, Norway was still outside 
the EU and thus not part of important decision making. One of the first things the Norwegian 
government focused on in 2000 was how to avoid ending up in a political vacuum outside 
spheres of influence in the EU. The EU was about to establish a common defence and security 
policy, and Norway did not want to be left out.586 Norway also firmly supported the so-called 
EU-14 sanctions against Austria’s government.  
The new Austrian coalition government, established in the end of 1999, caused a 
political storm of criticism all over Europe. One of the two political parties in government, the 
Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) was perceived by many outside Austria to be not just a 
populist party but on the extreme right-wing. Head of the FPÖ, Jörg Haider, had uttered several 
statements positively referring to the German dictator Adolf Hitler and the Nazi’s employment 
policy.587 The EU-14 sanctions lasted for several months and gave Austria a cold shoulder on 
several diplomatic, economic, and social levels, causing the country thoroughly isolation.588 
They were terminated after a commission of “three wise men” had examined Austria’s 
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commitment to “European values”, and found these to be more than adequate, and even above 
other member’s situation589  
In addition to the unusual measures, the EU was outspokenly dissatisfied with Austria’s 
engagement as OSCE chairperson-in-office. The relations were so cold that Austria’s Benita 
Ferrero-Waldner would reportedly not consult with her predecessor, Vollebæk. European 
diplomats quoted in Norwegian newspapers said that it was an outrage that there had not been 
seen peace initiatives towards Chechnya from the OSCE.590 During another Middle East 
Summit, this time in Moscow, on 1 February, the situation in Chechnya had been raised several 
times, although only informally. Foreign Minister Vollebæk had brought up the subject over 
dinner with Russian foreign minister Igor Ivanov.591 Vollebæk explained to journalists that:  
[w]e have all along made it clear that what is going on in Chechnya is totally unacceptable. 
But we will not under any circumstance allow Russia to isolate itself. Russia is Norway’s 
largest neighbour. It is fully possible to maintain a dialogue with those who govern Russia. 
The goal must be to affect Russia in the direction we want them to move towards.592 
Vollebæk gives an apt description of a perception in accordance with a constructivist 
perspective, which assesses that regional and international norms affects states conduct. The 
power to define what conduct is legitimate can be considered a structural ideological power. It 
seems that Norwegian authorities, here represented by Vollebæk, thought that it was possible to 
affect Russian authority’s minds as to what was considered right and wrong in the Western 
democracies.  Julie Wilhelmsen’s conclusion in the review of the Council of Europe’s approach 
to the Russo-Chechen conflict shows that Norway shared this perception with others. She states 
that “the Council of Europe still believes that cooperation and engagement, combined with 
verbal criticism, with time will have a socializing effect and will change Russia’s perception 
and practicing of human rights”.593 However, it must be pointed out that this strategy, which 
had been pursued throughout the 1990s, had not improved the democratic or the human rights 
situation in Russia. 
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HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE SECOND WAR: PUTIN’S TURN OF THE SCREW 
The second Russo-Chechen war has been compared to the first as “undoubtedly more brutal.”594 
Lord Frank Judd, Rapporteur of the Political Committee of the Council of Europe, observation 
of the state of Chechnya during the second war provided the outside with a glimpse of the 
situation:  
It was April 2000. Together with several colleagues I stood in the middle of Grozny. … Our 
group fell totally silent. In all directions the devastation of the city was terrible and total. … 
And this was at the beginning of a new millennium in a member state of the Council of 
Europe with all its commitments to peace, human rights and accountable democratic 
government. It would have been easy to despair.595  
The human rights situation was just as bad as Grozny’s condition. The Chechenization of the 
war, the deliberate use of Chechens to lead counterinsurgency, had an increasingly severe 
effect on the civil society. In addition to the same indiscriminate use of violence as performed 
by Russian troops, the proxies often caused cycles of revenge attacks and killings that would be 
launched against them and their relatives. The pattern of “dirty war” with war crimes 
perpetrated by poorly disciplined and brutalized troops on both sides was also a characteristic 
of both the first and the second war. From early on in the second war, the Russian military used 
overwhelmingly reckless force against armed resistance in civilian areas.596 “In absence of 
support from the civilian population, Russian forces employed torture systematically in attempt 
to extract intelligence.”597 Thousands of suspects were held in “filtration” or internment 
camps.598 There are in addition well-documented cases of massacres of civilians in towns and 
villages committed by Russian forces in late 1999. The commander of the involved forces, 
General Shamanov, was, seemingly subsequently, awarded the medal “Hero of Russia” by 
President Putin.599  
War is said to be the toughest test of any state’s ability to observe human rights 
obligations.600 The conduct of Russian authorities in Chechnya completely opposed the criteria 
of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), which not only demands that a state’s 
authorities refrain from the use of torture, but moreover demand that they actively take 
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preconditions to avoid torture and punish violations.601 What behaviour Vladimir Putin’s 
personal comments about Chechen fighters encouraged among Russian soldiers is hard to say, 
but the comments such as “waste them in the shit house” and “strangle the vermin at the root” 
did not encourage mild treatment.602 
CONTINUED OSCE ENGAGEMENT FROM A NORWEGIAN PERSPECTIVE 
The new OSCE chairperson-in-office, Austrian Benita Ferrero, was at this point constantly 
under political attack for allegedly not doing enough to ease the situation in Chechnya.603 This 
can however be regarded in light of how Austria was treated in general in this period of the 
EU-14 sanctions. The Norwegian newspapers had probably given Vollebæk disproportionate 
attention compared to what they in turn gave his unpopular successor, Austrian Ferrero. With 
this in mind, it nonetheless seems as some of the international engagement was cooled down 
and became less active in Chechnya from 2000 and onward. This is also confirmed by other 
material on the OSCE engagement. On 21 January 2000 the OSCE troika held a meeting 
where, among other issues, Chechnya was discussed. Vollebæk claimed that they had received 
signals from Russia that OSCE still had a part to play in Chechnya. As for Norway, the high 
profile the OSCE engagement had received in Norway during Vollebæk’s leadership was not 
as high anymore. The media reported significantly less on OSCE related material, but 
moreover the engagement of the Norwegian government changed with a new government.  
 The Labour government Stoltenberg I that succeeded the Bondevik I government on 17 
March 2000 took on a more pragmatic foreign policy profile than its predecessor: 
The main goal of our foreign policy is to secure Norwegian interests foremost in our own 
region. When we nonetheless are so deeply engaged in other parts of the world, both through 
development aid, contributions to peace, reconciliation and human rights it is due to our duty 
to make an effort for others, and a conviction that through such efforts we also secure our own 
long term interests.604  
This change of profile was also true in the character of the new foreign minister himself: 
Thorbjørn Jagland, Labour Party veteran and leader took over the post as foreign minister, 
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although after some seemingly superficial public debate on whether he was suited for the 
position.605  
In late March 2000 the Norwegian Helsinki Committee called out that Norway should 
make complaint to the International Court for Human Rights against Russia because of the 
violations in Chechnya.606 This was not going to happen. Chechnya was, as far as it is possible 
to observe, not on top of foreign minister Jagland’s list of priorities. 
To the OSCE Chechnya came second to Kosovo. A Norwegian diplomat who had held 
a central position in the work with the Chechen conflict told the media how important it was 
not to drop the matter.607 The humanitarian situation was severe he said, and he perceived the 
consequences would become grave for the entire North Caucasian region if a political solution 
could not be found.608 Espen Barth Eide, State Secretary to Foreign Minister Jagland, defended 
in June 2000 Chairman Ferrero’s work and claimed she was “fairly active” and that she kept 
putting pressure on Russia over Chechnya.609 State Secretary Bart Eide had been sent as stand-
in for foreign minister Jagland to the OSCE troika meeting with Austria and Romania. Bart 
Eide stated that the OSCE wanted to return to Chechnya as soon as possible, but “we can’t let 
Russia dictate the terms”. 610 He added that “we don’t want to be hostages in there.”611  
The OSCE Assistance Group to Chechnya was not hostages. They were, however, 
paralyzed and unable to perform their mission. The establishment of OSCE presence with an 
office in Znamenskoe in northern Chechnya dragged out. The two basic prerequisites for the 
establishment, defining the status of the OSCE mission group and Russian safeguard of 
security had not been fulfilled. This was apparently due to Russian authority’s reluctance or 
inability to provide the necessary security arrangements.612 Finally, in June 2000, an agreement 
between Russian authorities and the OSCE reopened the Znamenskoe office, after two years 
without being present. The Assistance Group, as the only independent field presence of 
international organizations in Chechnya, ceased to exist at the end of 2002.613  
On 31 October 2000 foreign minister Jagland made a statement to Parliament on the 
Norwegian OSCE engagement: “The conflicts enhance the basic fact that it is foremost the 
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parts’ willingness to find a peaceful solution that is decisive. It serves no end to force political 
solutions, which the parts are not interested in.”614 He did not linger on the fact that Maskhadov 
time and again had tried to contact Russian authorities for negotiations, and was repeatedly 
brushed of as terrorist. Nor did he take into account that Russia had completely crippled 
OSCE’s functionality in Chechnya. Nor did he mention that most of the declarations regarding 
Chechnya and Russia were being overruled by Russian authorities. There were already 
disagreements between Western European diplomats and Russian authorities on what the 
declaration actually stated.615 At the OSCE summit meeting in Vienna 27-28 November 2000 
the Russian delegation torpedoed, according to OSCE Chairperson Ferrero, the summit 
declaration of the 55 foreign ministers because of Chechnya, Georgia and Moldova.616 A 
planned declaration on the protection of children’s’ rights in war zones was also rejected, with 
Russian as the only objector.617  
Foreign Minister Jagland expressed his disappointment over the fact that the summit did 
not result in a declaration. He did not put the blame on anyone specific, but stated that some of 
the problems could probably have been sorted out before the summit meeting: “Perhaps the 
problems have grown bigger since the Istanbul summit and harder to pursue.”618 Russian 
foreign minister Igor Ivanov rejected the criticism directed at Russia in Vienna. He claimed 
that OSCE could not narrow its raison d’être down to human rights and crisis management, 
because that would damage European cooperation and security in a long term perspective.619 
RUSSIA AND THE COUNCIL OF EUROPE INTO THE RING FOR A SECOND ROUND 
The humanitarian situation in Chechnya, however, also concerned other international 
organizations. In April 2000, the Human Rights commission passed a resolution in favour of an 
EU motion criticizing Russia “for disproportionate and indiscriminate use of military force, 
particularly against civilians”.620 “At the same time, the Council of Europe’s parliamentary 
Assembly (PACE) suspended Russia’s voting rights for its part in the Chechen conflict, 
although its membership was restored in January 2001 after Russia declared the war officially 
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over.”621 Nevertheless, months after the war was declared over by Putin, the battles were still 
raging in Chechnya. The question of whether to suspend Russia from the Council on a 
permanent basis was brought up, but none of the foreign ministers of the member states 
supported this suggestion in May 2000, because it was perceived that it would only have 
negative consequences.622 One Norwegian newspaper article was found covering the possible 
expulsion of Russia from the Council of Europe. No statements by Jagland on this issue were 
obtainable.  
Facing – and probably discomforted – by Russia’s increasingly tougher language and 
lack of amenability to reason, the Council of Europe maintained its criticism of human rights 
violations, bus did not apply stronger measures.623 Wilhelmsen claims this soft approach has 
undermined the credibility of the Council of Europe as its demands of compliance with 
membership criterions were not observed, and the soft approach thus also undermined the 
legitimacy of the Council’s norms.624  
Despite the increasing verbal criticism towards Russia in 2000, Russia’s continued 
violations did not have any consequences. Both EU and USA were careful not to follow up the 
criticism with political measures or sanctions. Solids efforts were made to stabilize the relations 
with Russia. EU had along with other supportive countries, such as Norway since January, 
showed that they were not unfamiliar with the use of sanctions. Austria had been thoroughly 
sanctioned on several levels of boycott and isolation for months.625 
It was commented that double standards were obvious when comparing the EU-14 
sanctions against Austria and the “free-to-go” responses towards Russia. Vollebæk claimed the 
opposite in a response to this accusation. He felt that EU’s response towards Austria showed 
that the EU took its own members conduct just as serious as external states’.626 Examining 
Austria’s foreign policy in a small state perspective, Paul Luif, claims that “Austria’s partners 
would have thought twice before introducing these unusual measures against a bigger 
country.”627  
Foreign minister Jagland had also supported the sanctions against Austria, and he had 
supported the military sanctions against Kosovo: the Serbian violations of human rights. He 
seemingly was spared what could have had become an uncomfortable situation when the 
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Ministerial Assembly of the Council of Europe voted on Russia’s continued membership 
within the Council of Europe. However, Jagland could vote as all the minister’s did in favour 
of Russian membership.628  
It has often been maintained that the Russo-Chechen conflict, as many other conflicts, 
was overshadowed by the events of 9/11, and that the terror attack was “solid gold” for Putin’s 
struggle to legitimize his efforts.629 The terror attacks of 11 September 2001 caused tremendous 
fear throughout the Western World and are often regarded as an incident that led international 
politics into a new paradigm. Foreign minister Jagland seemed convinced of this three weeks 
after the attacks: “It should be no doubt that what we have witnessed in New York and 
Washington will bear with it a breaking point in American and international politics.”630 This 
might be correct, but the interesting question in this regard is whether Norwegian leaders’ 
rhetoric and approach towards the Russo-Chechen conflict became subdued before or after 
9/11? I will argue that a postulated watershed appeared before. The changes in Russia with 
Putin’s hard headed style as head of state, and his launching of a second brutal “campaign 
against terror”, can be seen as more paramount to this thesis than can 9/11. 
JAGLAND AND CHECHNYA 
Perusing statements, speeches and newspaper articles on Jagland as foreign minister, he rarely 
mentioned Chechnya. This is also true in reviewing the Stoltenberg I government as a whole. 
Compared to the general level of attention Chechnya received by the Stoltenberg I 
government’s predecessors, Jagland’s silence on Chechnya spoke for itself, as will be shown 
below. The silence of the new government toward the situation in Chechnya became an even 
bigger contrast in light of the fact that Vollebæk had almost (diplomatically) begged, every 
week over several months before New Year, to enter the Chechen warzone.  
As Jagland was about to become new foreign minister in March it was said that “with 
Jagland as foreign minister the modest Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs would probably 
spend less time on solving problems Norway does not have.”631 In the new government’s initial 
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declaration it was stated that a more positive approach to the EU and further development of 
the cooperation with Russia must be considered that most important foreign political tasks.632  
In a meeting with Javier Solana, coordinator of the EU foreign policy, in April 2000 
Jagland explicitly stated that: “It is important to maintain a solid pressure on Russia over 
Chechnya”.633 In autumn, during the Parliament’s Oral Question Hour, Jagland was questioned 
about Norway’s policy towards Chechnya. Parliament member Ingvald Godal, Conservative, 
asked: “in regards of Russia’s lack of response to the 25 April 2000 UN resolution on the 
conflict, the human rights organization Human Rights Watch has asked UN member countries 
to condemn Russia’s non-compliance. How will the government follow up the matter?”634  
Jagland replied that the government shared the concern that had been expressed: “We 
have addressed the situation in Chechnya in several international forums, among them, in 
OSCE, Council of Europe and UN. Norway took part in making the motion in question, which 
sought to have special UN rapportours in Chechnya. Norway will await their reports before 
reviewing the situation,” Jagland said. The foreign minister continued by stating that the OSCE 
chairmanship had given Norway opportunity to play an active role in the international efforts to 
promote a political solution, improve the human rights situation and to ease the human 
suffering in the area. “In power of our continued place in the OSCE chairmanship, we have 
been able to take active part in these efforts also this year”, Jagland added.635 He stated that the 
engagement to deter the human rights abuses in Chechnya was not limited to multinational 
forums. “The situation in Chechnya has been discussed with the Russian on several occasions, 
most recently during Prime Minister Kasianov’s visit in Norway in the end of September. We 
will continue to address the human rights situation in Chechnya as long as it is reason to do 
so.”636   
On 3 April foreign minister Jagland had his chance to address this situation when he, as 
the first Norwegian, held the main statement at the 56th annual session of the UN Commission 
on Human Rights, in Geneva. According to the Press Release of the MFA, Jagland had 
confronted the practice of death penalty. He had also suggested that mechanisms should be 
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established to help protect human rights advocates and workers all over the world.637 However, 
Jagland was thoroughly criticised the following days for being “too polite” in his address. 
Reportedly the Norwegian foreign minister had not mentioned any specific countries and their 
human rights violations. “Jagland treads wearily, the statement is very general”, remarked 
Bjørn Engesland from the Norwegian Helsinki Committee. Petter Eide, from Amnesty Norway 
stated that if Norway wants more authority as peace maker this was a failed strategy. “He 
should have mentioned the Middle East, he should have mentioned Russia’s violations in 
Chechnya and he should have addressed the difficult human rights situation in China”, 
Engesland added.638  
“This is very unfortunate”, said Eide, he described what he perceived as a general 
negative development where none of the Commissions members wanted to criticize each other. 
Eide considered the entire purpose of the Commission, which was to protect and promote 
human rights in all of the world’s countries, was undermined. 639   
In foreign minister Jagland’s statement on foreign affairs on 20 March 2001 he covered 
several areas regarding Russia, but Chechnya remained absent. He began by stating that: “[t]he 
Russo-Norwegian relations are good, nonetheless have we noticed the last year that Russia is 
still a challenging partner. In the bilateral relationship and in the High North we are facing a 
more self-conscious Russia.” It was not unnatural that Norway and Russia had different views 
and interests in certain questions, he said. However, what caused him some concern was that 
Russia, according to Jagland, partially were retrieving old patterns of reaction and conduct, 
especially on matters of common interest in the High North.640 He continued by arguing that 
Russian politics at the time had to be characterized as undecided and that, the Norwegian 
willingness to cooperate and the accommodating attitude interchanged with criticism, Jagland 
stated.641 
He further mentioned several issues of concern: The Barents Sea cooperation and 
people-to-people-cooperation in the High North, the cooperation on fishing resources, and 
securing the region’s nuclear waste among others. He also spoke of the potential future 
cooperation on the enormous energy resources in the region. However, energy related issues 
were according to Jagland dependant on a solution and an agreement on the bilateral maritime 
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delimitation.642 Jagland did not mention the situation in Chechnya, neither did he mention the 
increasing criticism regarding human rights violations and Putin’s muffling of Press freedom. 
Almost a year prior, in April 2000 Jagland had exclaimed that: “[t]his is a breakthrough 
in the international work for human rights.” The foreign minister was commenting on the UN 
resolution for the protection of human rights activists all over the world. According to Jagland 
the resolution was promoted by Norway, and the human rights commission asked UN Secretary 
General to appoint a special representative who could focus on States’ violations against those 
who work to promote human rights. “It is with great satisfaction that I can now establish that 
we have received huge support on this”, Jagland said, and added that no country had voted 
against the resolution. At the heart of this resolution were the violations, which persons who 
work with human rights had been subjected to at the hands of authorities in several countries.643 
However, by January 2001 this activist engagement had not become observable:  ”It is 
curious that Norway, who is usually concerned with freedom of speech and human rights, does 
not utter one word about the muffling of Press freedom in Russia”, commented Beate Slydal, 
Norwegian Forum for Freedom of Expression (NFFE) advisor.644 The NFFE is part of an 
international network that closely supervises the development in Russia. Slydal claimed that 
several signs indicated that Russia was increasingly using methods of the past: A mixture of 
legal tricks and mafia methods. The law was being used as means of power, and entirely 
criminal methods were to a larger degree than before used to “shut people’s mouth”, Slydal 
purported.645  
She stated that Russia was accustomed to power struggles and leaders that have not had 
scruples about “getting people out of the way”.646 The threshold, she continued, for making use 
of such methods was low. She claimed that the economical reforms in Russia have caused the 
Russian people such problems that it has undermined people’s confidence in an open society. 
She thought the frustrations dammed up in the Russian society to be something a leader could 
use to own advantage. A strong figure could be alluring, and people would be willing to take 
less notice of the dark side, she added.647 
Why did not the Western governments protest, as they had done regarding dissidents in 
the Soviet Union? Slydal’s answer was that Western politicians had been of the conviction that 
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a liberal economy with time would equal a liberal society. She was curious about why 
Norway’s government had not spoken up: “it is our large neighbour in the east, and we are 
usually otherwise concerned with issues that affect us: nuclear security and social decay. But 
not Press freedom, even though this is an area that we ordinarily are concerned with around the 
globe.”648  
In Jagland’s statement on foreign affairs two months later, he stated that Russia was in 
the midst of an extensive reforming process: “It is in our obvious interest that Russia succeeds 
in consolidating democracy and developing a sustainable economy.” To what extent the 
development will continue in this direction was up to Russia, however, he added that as 
neighbour country and together with Norway’s partners in Europe and North America Norway 
could provide important contributions.649 This way of verbally establishing the status quo in 
Russo-Norwegian relations had remained the same throughout three governments. It seems as 
the Jagland government were of same perception as its predecessors: Russia had to be 
influenced and affected into the right direction. This did seemingly no longer included public 
condemnation of Russian violations of human rights in Chechnya. 
SPACES OF EXCEPTION 
Norway was not alone in what was seemingly a general easy-going tendency towards Russia. 
Professor James Hughes finds it ironic that along with the increase of reports on the grave 
humanitarian situation, the “international criticism has become somewhat formulaic.” Hughes 
sees this in light of how Western governments themselves have become focal point of human 
rights activists. Due to human rights organizations criticism of Western governments’ 
“counterinsurgency practices in Afghanistan and Iraq, and over the erosion of democracy their 
influence over policy makers, and the media has declined.”650 Matthew Evangelista, professor 
of government and director of the Peace studies Program at Cornell University, claims that “in 
recent years people of the West, particularly the United States, have appeared to believe that 
the lives of civilians in enemy countries –or even countries that are target of ‘humanitarian 
intervention’ are worth less than the lives of their own countries soldiers.”651 Are Chechens 
worth less than other Russians - or Europeans - in the eyes of Russian and Western decision 
makers? Evangelista argues that there is evidence that Russian authorities sought to promote 
this belief in theirs dealings with Chechnya. Even though their military actions allegedly was 
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conducted to keep Chechens within the federation, it was fought in a way as if the civilians in 
Chechnya was expendable compared to those of Russian soldiers.652 Referring to war rumours, 
Prime Minister Putin said that the Russian leadership would never allow a replay of the 1994-
96 Chechen war, because it would lead to unnecessary casualties among the troops, he did not 
mention Chechen and Russian civilians653 
It is claimed that Russian authorities sought to place the massive human rights violation 
outside both federal and international law in both wars.654 A number of influential Western 
observers of the situation of Chechnya have, according to Evangelista, come to accept that a 
country is allowed, or even obliged, to protect its soldiers first, even at the expense of killing 
innocent civilians.655 Professor of Geography Derek Gregory has used Italian philosopher 
Giorgio Agamben’s ideas to explain how Western authorities have managed to place people in 
Afghanistan outside international legislation and moral perception.  
Gregory uses Agamben’s thoughts of how a political community is turned not on 
inclusion or belonging but on exclusion. Gregory’s argument is, in his own words: “highly 
abstract philosophico-historical.” Agamben’s thinking is based on terms from Roman law, 
foremost Homo Sacer, who was someone who fell outside both divine and judicial law. Homo 
Sacer could be killed because he was of no value to his contemporaries, marked as outcast. 
Gregory states that what matters is not only those who are marginalized, but even more, those 
who are placed beyond the margins, the exceptions. Agamben connected this exceptional 
position with political theorist Carl Schmitt’s key claim: “He is sovereign he who decides the 
exception.” These Homines Sacri are thus included as the objects of sovereign power but 
excluded from being its subjects. Agamben calls them “mute bearers of life” deprived of 
language and the political life that language makes possible and placed in spaces of exception. 
Giving names to the Chechen insurgents such as terrorists, bandits and criminals was to 
remove the Chechen separatists’ legitimate cause, and instead legitimize the “sound” efforts to 
remove such disturbing elements. Especially President Putin used extremely brutal language, 
so called Fenya- slang of the criminal world- when he talked about fighting Chechen 
insurgents, as showed above.656 Putin stated that “Chechnya was ‘a platform for the expansion 
of terrorism into Russia’, a ‘bandit enclave’ for foreign-funded ‘Islamic terrorists’, a ‘medieval 
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world’.657 This goes to the core of power of ideas. As Russian authorities managed to make 
Chechnya, in the words of Agamben, a “space of exception” and Chechens “mute bearers of 
life” alongside what Western governments has done in Afghanistan and Iraq, intentionally and 
not, it was easier as Professor Evangelista states above, for the Norwegian government and 
others to accept what was going on. 
NORWAY - A TAG-ALONG IN THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL?658 
There were also other, more tangible factors that could be considered to affect Norway’s policy 
towards the situation in Chechnya: If we backtrack to February 2000, Norway had been given a 
key position between Russia and NATO. Norway was leading a troika, consisting of Norway’s 
Ambassador Jakken Bjørn Lian, NATO’s Secretary General Lord Robertson and the leader of 
Russia’s Security Council Sergei Ivanov and would work to get the Russia-NATO Permanent 
Joint Council back on its feet. Spokesmen of both Russia and NATO expressed that they 
wanted the relations re-established despite of diverging opinions on several matters.659 After the 
terror attacks of 11 September 2001 it was commented that the struggle against international 
terrorism had brought Russia and NATO closer than ever since the dissolution of the USSR. 
After a meeting in NATO’s headquarters outside Brussels on 26 September 2001, NATO’s 
Secretary General Robertson referred to Russia’s foreign minister Ivanov as a “friend”, and 
emphasized the importance of the Russo-NATO relations. When asked if they had discussed 
the war in Chechnya, Robertson denied that it had been discussed in detail. However, he 
remarked that Russia were entitled to defend it territory from attacks “from that part of the 
world”, although he added that the response had to be proportional to the attack, and follow the 
rules of International law.660 “There will still be disagreements between NATO and Russia on 
those kind of matters”, said Robertson, “but there are more that unites us than separates us”, he 
ended. 661  
Norway’s candidacy to the UN Security Council had been one of the four highest 
priorities to the Stoltenberg I government, and could also be considered on of these factors. 
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After two years of competing against Ireland and Italy, Norway eventually won forth with its 
candidacy and was elected into the UN Security Council on 10 October 2000, formally taking 
its seat on 1 January 2001.662 When Jagland, a few days after the news of the membership 
admission, held a statement on Norway’s membership in the Security Council he précised that 
this would be a task the government would attribute highest priority.663 However, he added that 
Norway had to be level-headed and realistic about the possibilities to influence the Council’s 
decisions.  
As the Norwegian membership in the UN Security Council went into its sixth month, 
the Norwegian Helsinki Committee wrote an article about the “hidden veto” in the Security 
Council, concerning Chechnya. USA, China and Russia made it impossible to discuss conflicts 
they recognized as within their own spheres of interest. The other members did not want to try 
to bring up the conflicts, because they knew forehand that one of the permanent members 
would use its veto right. The great power’s “hidden veto” hindered several conflicts that 
concerned the Security Council’s mandate from even being discussed. The most obvious of 
these “touchy” conflicts was according to Anne Marit Austbø, Chechnya.664 
The author focused on Norway’s part in the Security Council. The Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs had, according to the authors, presented the focus on human rights in UN mandates for 
peacekeeping mission as the best way for Norway to promote human rights in the UN Security 
Council. Norwegian authorities had, apart from that, no clear strategy as to how Norway could 
promote human rights within the work of the Security Council. Nor had Norwegian authorities 
commented on how the Security Council should relate to human rights.665 
In his statement on foreign affairs March 2001, Jagland stressed that the five permanent 
members – USA, Russia, China, Great Britain and France – in effect affected the Council’s 
efforts more than the rest of the members. This was, he said, not only due to their veto right, 
but also the experience those five had accumulated throughout many years of work in the 
Council. Although, there were according to Jagland, no doubt that also non-permanent 
members had the possibility to influence decisions with their views, by the help of solid skills 
based on insight and experience and good diplomacy.666 
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According to the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, the Security Council had earlier 
passed several resolutions, where conflicts with severe human rights violations had been 
defined as threats against international peace and security. These had also included internal 
conflicts. These resolutions had been passed in the early 1990s. The UN Security Council is the 
only UN organ that can pass binding decrees and enforce military or peacekeeping operations. 
When the Security Council had engaged with conflicts in Haiti, Somalia and the former 
Yugoslavia and other places it was, according to Austbø, interpreted as a sign of the 
international will to react against human rights violations.667 
The optimism from the early 1990s had become increasingly toned down. Foremost 
because the Security Council had not been consequent in addressing conflicts with grave 
human rights violations. The UN Human Rights Commission had passed several resolutions 
condemning the human rights violations in Chechnya. The Norwegian Helsinki Committee 
encouraged the Norwegian government to pursue this and address the situation in Chechnya in 
the Security Council.668    
Austbø argued that the human rights- and humanitarian catastrophe in Chechnya was 
not an internal Russian affair, but a threat to the security and stability in the whole Caucasus. 
Austbø claimed that it was not unheard of that even though anticipated that one of the 
permanent members would use its veto, conflicts had been brought up nevertheless. This had at 
times been done by political and strategic reasons, but also to pressure a member to change its 
policy. Austbø gave two reasons to argue why this was a measure Norway should exercise as a 
member of the Security Council. First, it could be effective as one of several measures to 
promote human rights in certain conflicts. Second, it undermined the legitimacy of the Security 
Council and thereby the UN when discussions on human rights violations was consequently 
avoided because of great powers’ hidden veto.669 
To place the conflict in Chechnya on the agenda would have been a step in the opposite 
direction, she claimed. Such an initiative would have had political costs, and it might have 
infringed on the bridge building part Norway often played in international forums. Nonetheless, 
Norway’s important contribution could have been to promote a more consistent UN Security 
Council treatment of conflicts with human rights violations of such dimensions and character 
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that it threatens international peace and security. Such an initiative would have strengthened 
Norway’s legitimacy and credibility as a human rights advocate.670  
 Because of the membership in the Security Council, the UN-dimension had become 
extra important in Norwegian relations with Russia, Jagland had commented in his statement 
on 20 March 2001. The permanent membership in the Security Council had become a main 
pillar in Russian foreign policy. Norway’s membership in the Security Council had become an 
important meeting place between Norway and Russia, foreign minister Jagland stated, and the 
government had already experienced that it saw eye to eye with Russia on several questions. 
“Our membership in the Security Council will consequently also contribute to strengthen our 
relations with Russia.”671 
The Foreign Minister had established three areas of Norwegian priority in the Security 
Council: First, he wanted to focus on the underlying causes of conflict and war - such as 
poverty, underdevelopment, disparity, and suppression. Second, the government sought to 
contribute to strengthen UN’s ability to plan and carry out peace operations. Third, Norway 
wanted to place a distinct focus on Africa’s challenges.672 The continent of Africa had indeed 
many pressing issues to be dealt with. It was in addition less sensitive than internal conflicts 
within the state borders of permanent members. 
“THE SELF-IMPOSED SILENCE MUST CEASE”673 
Already by the end of 2000, a call for more Norwegian criticism against Russia appeared in the 
media. In a letter to foreign minister Jagland, Amnesty International, the Norwegian Helsinki 
Committee and Islamic Council Norway called for more engagement towards the situation in 
Chechnya.674 They suggested that Norway should use its newly achieved membership in the 
UN Security Council to focus on the Russo-Chechen war. During the presentation of Norway’s 
candidacy, Norway had promised to promote humanitarian law, transparency and responsibility 
among the UN members. For this to be something more than just words, Norway should 
publicly direct demands towards Russia, the letter purported.675  
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In May 2000 Amnesty International’s annual report on human rights, the “world’s worst 
grade book” triggered the media’s attention to Chechnya once more. Amnesty claimed that 
2000 had been a year of recession in regards of human rights in Russia, and Chechnya saw the 
worst of it. Russia was recognized among the “bullies” along with Sierra Leone, Israel, 
Columbia, Serbia, Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Zimbabwe and China.676 Even though authorities are 
familiar with the use of human rights rhetoric, the violations continue, claimed Petter Eide, 
Secretary General of Amnesty International Norway.677 Petter Eide’s example illustrates how 
important public diplomacy had become throughout the world. Governments and regimes all 
over the world talked the language of human rights, but their conduct towards groups within 
their own nations were often non-compliant with their words. The public and international 
emphasis may also have created expectations of engagement, which would not be lived up to 
by the main promoters, i.e. Western governments and NGO’s. James Hughes remarks that “the 
expectations of moderate Chechen leaders for international pressure on Russia were naïve.”678 
State Secretary Espen Barth Eide, present at the release of the Amnesty report, stated 
that: “We address the Chechen conflict as often as possible, even though we know Russia 
dislikes it. … We respect Russia’s sovereignty in Chechnya, but we are opposed to the 
disproportionate use of power.” He claimed that he did not accept the phrase “we are only 
fighting terrorists” when discussing the matter with the Russians.679 State Secretary Barth Eide 
claimed that the conflict in Chechnya was brutal because both parts behaved brutally. Russian 
authorities in Moscow had a special responsibility to protect the civilian population, and this 
was where the authorities had failed, according to the State Secretary. Norwegian authorities 
had repeatedly underscored this to the Russian authorities. “Even though the conditions are bad 
in Chechnya, this cannot be used to describe the situation in Russia in general”, he added.680 
Barth Eide showed that Norwegian authorities were well aware of different versions of 
the conflict. Nonetheless, he stressed that the situation was brutal because both parties were 
acting out brutalities. The prolonged conflict had severely brutalized protagonists on both sides. 
However there were many actors on the Chechen separatist side, such as Aslan Maskhadov, 
who repeatedly spoke out against acts of terrorism and attacks against civilians. These actors 
repeatedly sought dialogue with the Russian authorities, who again rejected them as 
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terrorists.681 These Chechens ended up fighting for their lives, because negotiations were out of 
the question. Maskhadov and others thus ended up joining forces with extremists such as 
Shamil Basaev. 
Barth Eide claimed that Norway ran extensive human rights promotion indirectly 
through the Barents Sea cooperation. On the question why the Barents Sea cooperation had not 
focused explicitly on human rights, he stated that it was not something the State Secretary 
could answer to. Norway did achieve a great deal, even though the situation in regards of 
Chechnya was difficult, he added.682 This is once more an example of Norwegian authority’s 
confidence that Russia could be turned over and influenced into a democracy through 
cooperation and interaction with others.  
”We do not question Russia’s sovereignty over the area, nor do we question Russia’s 
right to maintain law and order in its own state.” State Secretary Barth Eide admitted that there 
had clearly been committed violations far beyond any international standard for protection of 
civilians. However, according to Barth Eide, Russia had become “allergic” to the never-ending 
criticism and reacted with irritation and frustration. That made it exceedingly more difficult to 
proceed with human rights approaches toward Russia that would actually lead forth. Eide 
added that it was important to give the Russians a chance and that it was not correct to treat 
Russia as a “worst case” that does not want to take care of its citizens.683  
The Norwegian government still hoped to see Russia develop into a Western 
democracy. Barth Eide made a point of showing the frustration displayed by Russian 
authorities on continued inquiries about Chechnya. During the first Russo-Chechen war, it was 
easier to discuss Chechnya with the Russians. It was seemingly also easier to obtain 
understanding for external concern. During the first war, Russia was still making efforts to be 
part of the “good company”. When Putin came to power, it became remarkably more difficult 
for anyone concerned over the Russian conduct in Chechnya. This was true for both NGO’s 
and human rights activist, but also for other governments. Barth Eide, as he was presented in 
the newspapers, demonstrated an understanding of the Russian frustration.  
It was not only Foreign Ministers that were worried of the development in Chechnya. 
Senior counsellor Jan Egil Mosand from the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, who had 
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accompanied an observations mission into Chechnya and the refugee-camps in the neighbour 
republic Ingushetia, commented that: “It is still war in Chechnya, and the Russian army focuses 
mostly on the civilians.” According to Mosand the Russian authorities did everything in their 
power to force the Chechens back into Chechnya. They had cut off electricity, gas, and food 
deliverances to the refugee camps in Ingushetia. Tuberculosis and jaundice were spreading and 
the local hospital refused to receive Chechen patients.684  
“For how long are we going to keep our eyes closed to the Russians gruesome 
violations in Chechnya?”  Jan-Egil Mosand posed the question in a newspaper comment. He 
encouraged the Norwegian government to address the matter in the Council of Europe and the 
UN Security Council. Norway and its allies want to see a friend in the sociable President Putin, 
Mosand claimed. According to Mosand, Chechnya was perceived by Norwegian authorities as 
a Russian internal affair and did not threaten the good Russo-Norwegian relations. Mosand said 
that he understood that Norway needed to keep good relations with the large neighbour in the 
North -East. The need to cooperate with the Russians on administrating the resources in the 
Barents Sea region, and the cleaning up of nuclear waste was also by Mosand considered 
important. However, he stressed that Norway must be able to speak up and state that the crimes 
against humanity that are taking in place in Chechnya are not internal affairs. “What is 
happening in Chechnya is some of the worst I have ever seen”. Mosand had been to war zones 
in Africa, Afghanistan and Bosnia, and considered himself to have seen his share of brutality. 
The solid wall of silence met in the Western world is despairing, he said: “It is a betrayal to sit 
passively on the sideline, watching these terrible acts perpetrated on old people and 
children”.685  
STICKING TO SILENCE: AFTERWORD 
On 2 September 2002 journalist and human rights activist Anna Politkovskaya visited Oslo, 
where she held an address at the Nobel Institute. She spoke of the situation in Chechnya, and 
what she interpreted as a dangerous development in Russia with regards to neglecting human 
rights, and the tendency towards autocracy by the new Russian President Putin and his regime. 
Still alive and well, she thoroughly criticized the Western governments and their leaders on 
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their silence towards the situation in Chechnya.686 State Secretary to Foreign Minister at the 
time, Kim Traavik said retrospectively, that when a person such as Politkovskaya visited 
Norway, Norwegian authorities paid close attention to her views on the situation in Chechnya. 
However, in this regard he stressed the different roles the Norwegian authorities had compared 
to NGOs. Norwegian authorities had to weigh out how to expose Norwegian attitudes towards 
the Russo-Chechen conflict. It was not granted whether it was best to criticize Russia publicly 
or bring the matter up discreetly.687  
On 24 October 2002 a hostage crisis, at the hands of Chechens, arose in the Dubrovka 
theatre in Moscow. The Chechen perpetrators called for attention to their cause, and reportedly 
tried to reach government members outside Russia to negotiate. Several inquiries were 
addressed to Norway, but any Norwegian involvement was denounced that night.688 The terror 
incident, where Russian forces killed most of the hostages by pumping poisonous gas into the 
theatre was thoroughly condemned by the Western European governments. Once again, less 
sympathy was earned for the Chechens. “I condemn the operation that Chechen separatist have 
launched against many hundred innocent civilians in Moscow, by keeping them hostage. No 
cause can justify such acts”, Foreign Minister Petersen stated.689 Petersen pleaded that the 
perpetrators should release the hostages and ended by stating that: “Norway’s attitude is that a 
political solution to the conflict in Chechnya must be sought through dialogue between the two 
parts.”690   
A month later, in the anticipation of a forthcoming visit from the Russian President, 
Vladimir Putin, Norwegian Prime Minister Kjell Magne Bondevik had an op-ed published. The 
op-ed was a tribute to Norway’s peaceful relations with Russia throughout history. He 
emphasized that Norway, together with Russia, took a firm stand against terrorism. He did not 
mention Chechnya and the only sentence not overly positive was “[i]t is the leader of our 
largest neighbour state, a great power with economic prosperity, with huge human resources, 
but with large tasks waiting, who is paying us a visit on 12 November”.691 The resemblance to 
Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland’s leading comment on Yeltsin was striking. As 
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opposed to Brundtland, however, Bondevik did not mention Chechnya at all. The public 
condemnation of Chechen terrorism was considerable, but Russian violations in Chechnya was 
according to the Norwegian government brought up in closed forums.692 At a time with more 
documentation than ever on the humanitarian catastrophe in Chechnya, the response towards 
Russian authorities was rather mild. Anna Politkovskaya’s appeals for stronger reactions was 
heard but not acted on.  
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________________________________________________________ 
A high profile in regards of human rights and humanitarian law is a characteristic part of 
Norwegian Foreign Policy, preferably however, when there aren’t any interests of greater 
importance at stake, interests that for instance are linked to allied nations or powerful 
neighbours.693 
Olav Riste, Professor of International History, states that when a small country like Norway 
maintains a high profile foreign policy, it should be important to ensure a “proper balance 
between shadow and substance.”694 Do Norway’s actual achievements underpin its grand 
ambitions as human rights promoter and advocate? Political scientist Tore Nyhamar’s quote 
above is one answer to this question, establishing an unambiguous point of departure, 
foreshadowing the thesis’ main conclusion. 
WHAT CONFLICT? 
What perception did Norway have of the Russo-Chechen conflict? The analysis of the source 
material available showed that Norwegian interpretation of the conflict changed over time, as 
natural is, as the conflict changed over time. It also shows that the decision makers were 
aware of the fact that the Russo-Chechen conflict was differently presented by different actors 
involved in the conflict. Prime Minister Bondevik went as far as saying that he did not 
completely “trust” the Russian version. Foreign Minister Vollebæk got to see with his own 
eyes that Russian authorities’ version did not match the actual situation he faced in Chechnya. 
Nonetheless, as Vollebæk stated in an interview, the Norwegian government could not 
explicitly question Russia’s official version, because they would easily be accused of 
spreading lies or false propaganda. It would also be deemed rude if Norway’s government 
entered conversations with Russians asserting a priori that what the Russians were saying was 
untrue. This discussion is not an effort to show that the Russian version was “all false” or that 
other actors’ versions were nearer to the “truth”. It is merely an attempt to show some of the 
difficulty of apprehending the conflict situation Norwegian decision makers were dealing 
with. 
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The first Russo-Chechen war was the first “television war” in the territory of the 
former Soviet Union.695 The journalists’ version of what was going on in Chechnya was 
reported straight into living rooms all over the world, even back to the protagonists 
themselves.696 What is interesting, nonetheless, is that the Russo-Chechen wars were also 
“information wars”. The Chechen insurgents’ version often won sympathy with Western 
journalists and popular opinion. The Norwegian government seemingly perceived it as a 
separatist conflict, and often referred to Chechens as separatists. This is supported by the 
stressing of Russia’s right to defend territorial integrity. The Chechen call for secession was, 
in accordance with this view, illegitimate. However, Norway, along with other governments, 
repeatedly criticized Russia for its excessive use of violence. Awareness of the human rights 
violations perpetrated by Russian forces was in place. Nonetheless, this criticism was 
increasingly followed by condemnations of Chechen acts of terrorism. Although the attention 
towards the situation had decreased before 9/11 2001, Norwegian authorities verbally 
associated Chechens with terrorism exceedingly often after the attacks on the Twin Towers.    
According to Vollebæk looking back, it was hard to relate to Chechen leaders as 
legitimate political actors. Due of the use of terrorism by some Chechen protagonists such as 
Shamil Basaev, Russia considered all Chechen actors unreliable in the second war. This was 
not shared by Norwegian decision makers, who regarded President Aslan Maskhadov reliable 
enough for talks. However, the fact that the Kremlin’s version was the “official” version was 
an additional factor that made it hard not to accept it for the Western governments or openly 
question it, increasingly so after 9/11. There is an absence of an international consensus as to 
the difference between “freedom fighters” and “terrorists”.697 In this respect it is tempting to 
compare the legendary and notorious Shamil Basaev with the Palestinian leader Yasser 
Arafat. Up until late 1980s, Yasser Arafat was considered to be one of the world’s most 
dangerous terrorists. However, after taking part in negotiations with the Israeli government, 
he won the Nobel peace prize – and “the hearts” of the international establishment. Most of 
the original Chechen leaders, Dudaev, Maskhadov, Basaev and Sadulayev have been killed as 
terrorists. However, it is possible that in the future a Chechen leader, in cooperation with 
Russian authorities may accomplish a “change of heart”. As of yet, however, the Russian 
framing of the wars as legitimate and necessary campaigns against banditry and international 
terrorism have won acceptance. A reminder of Giorgio Agamben’s theory of spaces of 
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exception is here in place. So is the hopelessness many Norwegian decision makers seem to 
have felt in addressing the situation in Chechnya with Russian authorities. The Russian 
definition power isolated Chechnya and its regime and made it harder for international 
organizations and NGOs to get involved in Chechnya. 
THE RUSSO-CHECHEN CONFLICT IN NORWEGIAN DOMESTIC POLITICS 
To what degree was Norwegian policy towards the Russo-Chechen conflict affected by 
domestic considerations in form of Norwegian public opinion or national values? The 
Chechen conflict has by and large received little attention in Norway. Disturbing news and 
images of human rights violations and act of terrorism committed during the two wars has 
broken the silence days at the time. Norwegian politicians have concerned themselves with 
the conflict to a small degree, with a few exceptions.  
The consensus tradition was not challenged by the Russo-Chechen conflict. 
Discussions took place in the Parliament and in the media, with occasional oppositional 
criticism of the government’s policy. Oppositional political parties’ criticism of the 
Norwegian governments’ “mild response” towards the conflict tends to follow three 
tendencies. First, it seems as if the criticism often was an ordinary “oppositional strategy” to 
gain goodwill in domestic politics. Oppositional parties criticized the government in general 
for not doing what “they should or could”, thus placing themselves in a flattering light as 
human rights advocates. Second, it often took form of criticism of the Norwegian 
government’s relations with Russia in general. Parties such as the Progress Party and the 
Conservative Party thought Norway led a too careful line towards Russia. Chechnya was in 
this regard used by these parties as an example of how Russia behaved, and that Norway 
should be worried about its large neighbour and take more military and strategic precaution in 
the High North.  
Third, the sitting government was often accused of not being concerned enough of 
human rights in general. Chechnya was often brought forth as an example of this. With the 
Progress Party as only exception, most parties in opposition were given a chance to alter the 
Norwegian foreign policy of its predecessor. However, it should be observed that none of the 
governments conducted a policy towards the Russo-Chechen conflict widely different from 
the others. It should also be observed that it was many of the same individuals that 
“circulated” foreign political decision making despite changing governments. Except for the 
years holding the leadership of the OSCE troika, the Bondevik I government maintained the 
Norwegian foreign policy consensus towards Chechnya, despite of having a minister 
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specifically working for human rights. The Bondevik I government used a different rhetoric, 
more ideological and less pragmatic than the Labour party government. Nevertheless, this did 
not alter the policy towards the Russo-Chechen conflict. Domestic factors had, consequently, 
little effect on how Norway related to the conflict. 
REGIONAL CONCERNS 
Regional considerations, such as the interest for natural resources, environmental threats and 
Russian neighborship in the High North, can be considered to have had a paramount affect on 
how Norway related to the Russo-Chechen conflict. The Barents Sea and the surrounding 
region were during the 1990s of massive importance to Norway. It is where “tiny” Norway 
and great power Russia physically touch each other. It is where fish and petroleum, two of the 
most important natural resources for both states, can be found. It is also an area containing 
huge environmental threats due to Soviet atomic waste left from the days of the arms race 
between USSR and USA. The area cannot be considered other than essential to Norway.  
How important the Barents Sea region is considered was recently illustrated by 
Professor Iver B. Neumann. He denominated former foreign minister Thorvald Stoltenberg as 
the “Norwegian champion of foreign affairs”.698 He legitimized his choice out of the 12 
foreign ministers Norway has had since 1972, by claiming that Stoltenberg had increased 
Norway’s room of manoeuvre in the international structure. This had been done through the 
foreign ministers’ calculations of what could and was needed to be done domestically and 
internationally to improve Norway’s position. Especially Stoltenberg’s efforts to establish the 
Euro Arctic Barents Sea Region cooperation was considered important.699 The High North has 
since only received increased attention from Norwegian decision makers. 
The MFA’s main task has always been to preserve security for Norway and its 
citizens. As to the situation of being neighbours with Russia, a regional great power, Norway 
did not seem to fear a military response if it criticized Russia’s human rights violations “too 
harshly”. Norwegian decision makers seem to have had stoic confidence in NATO’s will and 
abilities to protect them. However, it can seem as if Norwegian decision makers were afraid 
that if they were too resolute in dealings with Russia and attempted sanctioning Russia over 
Chechnya, negative consequences would result. Not through a military invasion, or physical 
attack, but Russian decision makers might become difficult to “deal with”. Russia could 
“sabotage” important cooperation in the northern areas. Thus, the realist perspective is quite 
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obvious in Norway’s overall relations with Russia. However, in regards to how Norway 
related to the Russo-Chechen conflict there are other perspectives that nuances the picture 
more than just establishing that Norway is a small state afraid of the large state Russia.    
Norway worked hard through the 1990s to include Russia in all possible organizations 
and formal structures. A liberalist perspective on the efforts put into the Barents Sea 
cooperation underscores this. If Norway could integrate Russia in as many possible regional 
and international structures, Norway’s geographic situation would become a more secure 
place. Nonetheless, the confidence in the idea of moral persuasion seems to have affected how  
Norwegian decision makers related to the conflict, bringing us to the constructivist 
perspective. All of the decision makers I have talked to have underscored the point of asking 
the question “what would be the most effective way to affect Russia’s handling of Chechnya”. 
They all seem to consider that they did what was possible. All of them at one point verbally 
criticized the Russian conduct in public or closed forums. In the perspective of speech act 
theory this can also be considered political acts, and the criticism a form of sanctioning. 
However, this would not have been possible if this criticism was not perceived as legitimate 
by all parts. This can also be observed as Russian authorities were more receptive to criticism 
in the mid-nineties, than they were from 1999 and on.  
The idea that Russia could be affected in the right direction seems to have been 
widespread among policy makers. On the contrary, as the second war unfolded, it was by 
many NGO’s and human rights activist regarded as a failed strategy. It had not been 
successful in convincing Russia to act less brutally. Part of this criticism was based on a 
general notion that Norway could have been more explicit in its criticism, taken more 
responsibility in international reactions against Russian conduct and not been “so willing” to 
promote Russian membership in organizations where Russia did not fulfil the requirements 
regarding human rights and democracy, such as the Council of Europe. 
INTERNATIONAL STRUCTURES 
How much did international structures and considerations towards the USA, NATO, EU, UN 
and OSCE affect Norway’s policy towards the Russo-Chechen conflict? To discern what 
international structures affected Norway’s relation to Russia in general, and to the Russo-
Chechen conflict specifically in this period, several momentums must be kept in mind. The 
regional and international factors overlap and intertwine. The structural context of the Russo-
Chechen wars can be characterized into two dissimilar periods in time. 
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These differences are evident in the responses to the conflict both domestically in 
Russia, but also internationally. Uncertainty reigned Europe in the early 1990s, especially in 
regards of what would become of post-Soviet Russia. The nascent democracy in Russia had 
been promising, and great optimism ruled European governments. Russia was seemingly 
eager to live up to westernized democratic standards of society and economy. Russia was in 
that perspective more willing, although perhaps not enthusiastically, to listen and adjust to 
external “advice”. Central Russian actors admitted that mistakes had been made launching the 
first Russo-Chechen war. Western governments, including Norway, while critical, were 
willing to turn a blind eye to selective violations in Russia as long as the overall situation was 
improving. The first Russo-Chechen war was notably different compared to the second due to 
how it ended. The first war was actually brought to an end through peace negotiations 
facilitated by external international structures, i.e. the OSCE. The, ultimately wasted, window 
of opportunity had presented itself in the three small years of relative peace in Chechnya. 
Instead of demanding to get involved, international organizations such as the Council of 
Europe, the UN and OSCE allowed Russia to isolate the independent Chechen Republic of 
Ichkeria. 
During the second Russo-Chechen war the structural international political situation 
was more settled with regard to Russia. However, there was also a more pessimistic 
atmosphere. The Western European governments, including Norway, had since the mid 1990s 
lost some of the optimism toward the democratic development of Russia. Further, the Western 
European states, excluding Norway, were becoming increasingly dependent on Russian 
delivery of energy. With the “War on Terror” unfolding after 9/11 and the need for 
intelligence on Afghanistan grew, the Russo-Atlantic spirit of cooperation was strengthened.  
Alongside this development, the criticism faded. Russia had, since 1999, gained a 
headstrong leader, who was seemingly more determined than Yeltsin: Vladimir Putin did not 
waver on his decision to proceed with the extermination of terrorists in what he called the 
anti-terror campaign in Chechnya. He was considered extremely resolute against any external 
involvement. This atmosphere made it unlikely that Norway alone would speak up and rebuke 
Russian conduct publicly.  
It is in light of the international relations that the most distinct and exceptional 
Norwegian approach towards the Russo-Chechen conflict was displayed. Foreign Minister 
Vollebæk’s engagement as Chairman-in-Office of the OSCE displayed how Norway’s policy 
towards Chechnya was affected by the structures of international politics. It is hard to discard 
Vollebæk and the Norwegian MFA’s engagement and efforts to improve the situation in 
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Chechnya in this period. However, Vollebæk was helpless when the most powerful actors in 
international politics decided to handle the situation differently. Russia let the international 
community over the threshold only when it was convenient for the Kremlin. While he was 
head of the peace solution oriented organization OSCE, Vollebæk also supported the 
“humanitarian intervention” in Kosovo to discourage Milosevic’s ethnic cleansing of Kosovo-
Albanians.  
ALL IS RELATIVE? 
“The Russo-Chechen conflict has received little attention.” This phrase has in some form been 
stated so many times that it almost invalidates the statement itself. Without claiming that “all 
is relative” one must ask – little attention compared to what? The question has appeared while 
I have examined much material on Chechnya. Some of the material has been specifically on 
Chechnya, such as NGO reports on human rights in general, or on the situation in Chechnya 
in particular. Norwegian newspaper articles that mention Chechnya in any way have also been 
examined. Years of foreign policy debates and other published documents have been perused 
to see what the documents can tell about Norwegian policy towards the Russo-Chechen 
conflict. Needless to say, the Russo-Chechen conflict has been discussed among Norway’s 
political elite; it has been written about in newspapers; thus it has received attention. It has 
definitely not been forgotten, which has also been another standard phrase. Journalistic 
coverage of foreign affairs tends to reflect the focus of the government, NGO’s or other 
“authorities” on the matter. Without blindly following the latter assertion, a media analysis 
can be used as an indicator. 
Comparing the overall “coverage” of the Russo-Chechen conflict with another similar 
conflict did provide at least one perspective that removes some of the relativity. The search-
engine Retriever provided an analysis of the media covering Chechnya, and Kosovo. The 
analysis result, which can be found in the appendix, confirmed “little attention” towards the 
Russo-Chechen conflict. As the Kosovo conflict escalated with the Kosovo-Albanian claim 
for sovereignty its coverage was threefold that of the Russo-Chechen conflict. During autumn 
1999, the year of NATO’s bombardment of Serbia and Russia’s invasion of Chechnya, 9,969 
articles are documented on Kosovo, as opposed to 1,724 articles on Chechnya. These are the 
most extreme numbers. Nonetheless, in 2000 as the war raged in Chechnya and Kosovo went 
into a period of lesser military activity the number of articles on Kosovo was 3,962, as 
compared with the 1,935 articles on Chechnya. This small and particular analysis is not 
intended to state much empirically about the coverage of Chechnya and Kosovo in the period. 
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However, it is meant to provide some perspective on the scale of attention the Russo-Chechen 
conflict has received. 
ONE DISCREPANCY TOO MANY 
Norwegian images of Norway as a peace nation and human rights advocate are many and 
strong. This image collides with reality when Norway interacts with Russia. Shadow and 
substance of Norwegian human rights advocacy is thoroughly imbalanced. The outspokenness 
when it comes to criticizing human rights violations seems to become muted somewhere 
across the Barents Sea and at the Jacobselv border. It seems to be the fear of disturbing the 
good historical relations and cooperation in the northern areas where Norway has essential 
resources that prevents Norway from criticising Russia. This again strengthens the impression 
that Norwegian decision makers have perceptions of Russia that does not correspond with the 
official version of Russo-Norwegian relations that they present publicly. Norwegian decision 
makers seem to be of the opinion that they cannot demand of Russia to live up to the 
standards Russia has committed itself to, through international treaties and agreements. If 
Norwegian authorities do not believe that Russia can function by the same standards required 
by others, it is less likely that Norway will demand it. Norway and the rest of Western Europe 
avoided seriously sanctioning Russia over its human rights violations in Chechnya in fear of 
disturbing an ongoing democratic process. Western Europe was seemingly afraid of isolating 
Russia and bringing about a “cold peace”.  
Speculating in how the situation for hundreds of thousands of Chechens and Russians 
could have been different if Western European states had been more consistent in protecting 
human rights is perhaps pointless. Nonetheless, by allowing Russia to show utmost brutality 
against a specific group of people, in line with Derek Gregory, through creating a “space of 
exception”, the double standards have become obvious to all including Russia. Thus, it has 
seriously weakened the moral authority of human rights, its promoters and activists, and the 
organizations based on protecting basic rights for all people.  
In an op-ed from November 1997 Senior Researcher at NUPI, Henrik Thune, wrote 
that the Norwegian government has engaged itself with matters and questions where there has 
reigned a broad consensus among the nations Norway wanted ”to play ball with”.700 However, 
he wrote, the government had remained more quiet and unclear on controversial issues such 
as the Kurds in Turkey, Algeria, East-Timor, Nigeria and Chechnya. He posed the question of 
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whether Norway was willing to pay the cost of delivering the moral excellence Norwegian 
governments often invoke.701 In the case of Chechnya the answer was apparently negative.
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